Washington University in St. Louis

Washington University Open Scholarship
All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs)
Spring 4-3-2013

Explaining Subnational Variation in Voter Coordination and Party
Entry in Electoral Competition
Joshua David Potter
Washington University in St. Louis

Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Potter, Joshua David, "Explaining Subnational Variation in Voter Coordination and Party Entry in Electoral
Competition" (2013). All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs). 1105.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1105

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Washington University Open Scholarship. It has
been accepted for inclusion in All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs) by an authorized administrator of Washington
University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS
Department of Political Science

Dissertation Examination Committee:
Brian Crisp, Chair
Dawn Brancati
Michelle Duguid
Scott Morgenstern
Guillermo Rosas
Margit Tavits

Explaining Subnational Variation in Voter Coordination and Party Entry in Electoral Competition
by
Joshua David Potter

A dissertation presented to the
Graduate Schools of Arts and Sciences
of Washington University in
partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

May 2013
St. Louis, Missouri

Contents
Acknowledgements

iii

Abstract of the Dissertation

iv

Introduction

1

Paper 1: Selectively Entering Parties

7

Paper 2: Latent Diversity and Party Systems

51

Paper 3: Linkage as Ballot Composition

99

References

138

ii

Acknowledgements

A great many people and institutions have provided equally as many forms of support to me
during the process of drafting this dissertation:
Brian, Margit, and Guillermo
Cristian, Patrick, and Santiago
Dave, Sheri, and Sarah
and lovely Rachel;
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Abstract of the Dissertation
Explaining Subnational Variation in
Voter Coordination and Party Entry in Electoral Competition
by
Joshua David Potter
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 2013
Professor Brian Crisp, Chairperson

This dissertation focuses on electoral politics in a comparative perspective, specifically subnational variation in strategic party entry and strategic voter coordination. The dissertation
studies how within-country variation both in the demographic composition of electoral districts and also in the supply-side composition of ballots can impact: where parties choose to
contest elections, which and how many parties are successful, and why some voters in a country might not have the option of casting a ballot for all parties on election day. The first and
third papers concentrate specifically on the supply side of electoral competition and demonstrate under what circumstances parties can be expected to compete across a broad range
of electoral districts. I find that parties strategically enter those electoral districts where
they believe that the outcome of the previous election indicates the “electoral market” is out
of equilibrium. I also find that certain types of political institutions can induce parties in
some countries to enter more broadly across electoral districts. The second paper explores
the interaction between supply and demand to assess the impact of electoral constituency
diversity on electoral outcomes. In short, I find that there exists a statistically robust relationship between driving up diversity in an electoral district and subsequently increasing the
number of party offerings voters have access to on election day. This relationship, however,
is substantially qualified by the permissiveness of electoral institutions.
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Introduction
There’s no point for us in working districts we know we’ll lose. We know that
blanketing districts with a bunch of paper candidates isn’t going to get us anywhere. We achieve dramatically better results when we target a specific district.
– Party Strategist, Welsh Green Party
We tend to stand where we’ve stood in the past, regardless of how we performed
there. Having the activists already in place in a constituency is a huge help.
– Executive Committee Member, Socialist Labour Party
Increasing the size of the district means more proportionality, sure. But it also
means more voters live in the district. It means there’s a more complicated political landscape at work. For a party as small as ours, reaching out to voters in
a larger district is a lot more complicated.
– Party Leader, Scottish Christian Party
From the earliest days of the party, it was important for us that every Scottish person had the opportunity to cast a ballot for Scotland’s nationalist party.
For that reason, the SNP has always stood in as many constituencies as possible.
– Member of Parliament, Scottish National Party
The metaphor is loose, but common: elections are like markets. On one hand, there exists a
supply of political parties – or products – that offer their platforms to voters on election day.
This supply side of the electoral market can be comprised of parties that are large or small,
famous or unknown, liberal or conservative, regional in their focus or more nationalized in
orientation. On the other hand, there exists a demand for political parties and this demand
emanates from the preferences of mass electorates. The voters that populate this landscape
are typically arranged across the country in a constellation of electoral districts. Within
each district, the balance of voters is either more liberal or conservative; some districts are
more ethnically or socioeconomically diverse than others; and voters may be more or less
predisposed to hazard their vote on less well-known ballot offerings, such as independent
candidates, new parties, or parties catering to a very specific niche interest. Sometimes
these markets have been in place for many, many elections. In other, nascent democracies,
electoral markets are unsettled, in flux, and susceptible to upheaval.
1

For a long while now, scholarship of political markets has sought to understand the latent dynamics that drive the supply of political parties and the demands of voters, as well
as, ultimately, their congruence with one another. Due to an early lack of cross-national
data – and during the time of its intellectual infancy – the field of comparative electoral
politics initially sought to develop and test hypotheses at the level of the country in the
aggregate. Assuming away district-level market dynamics, early scholars in this field were
able to determine that there are, for example, systematic differences between the supply and
demand sides of electoral markets in those countries that rely on proportional representation
and those countries that rely on single-member districts. They established the mechanical
relationships between electoral outcomes and institutional variables such as minimum-vote
thresholds, average magnitude, and seat allocation formulae. They explored the implications for representation in national-level legislatures when we move from a “majoritarian”
system to a “consensual” system and they speculated about the more moderate effects of
adopting so-called “mixed-member” systems that draw on aspects of both the majoritarian
and consensual models of elective representation.
Many of these intuitions are deep and well-settled. But a more recent vein of scholarship
has rigorously pushed these intuitions to the micro – or the district – level, where substantial
variation in electoral outcomes can exist across districts falling within the same country.
Indeed, scholars have begun to ask, when we treat elections not as one giant market, but
rather as many (sometimes several hundred) district-level markets that are linked together,
what does that change about our fundamental understanding of representational democracy?
To this end, scholars of comparative politics have recently begun to explore within-country
(or subnational) variation in voters’ abilities to successfully coordinate their voting decisions
around a subset of truly viable party offerings; of geographic variation in the homogeneity
of parties’ support across different districts; of the stability of voters’ preferences over time;
and of the emergence and success of region-based parties that cater to the interests of only a
limited sample of the country’s overall population. The conclusion from this vibrant strain
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of scholarship is clear: focusing on subnational, district-level voting decisions can infuse our
understanding of the demand side of electoral markets with much richer nuance.
In comparison to this focus on voters, their preferences, and their support for political
parties, our theoretical and empirical understandings of the other side of the electoral market
– the party-based, supply side – lag well behind. Across countries, we do not have a great
handle, for example, on why some parties choose to field candidates or party lists in, say,
50% of a country’s available electoral districts while some other parties choose to contest
every district. We are unfamiliar with the strategic considerations that drive a smaller party
to choose to field a candidate in one district at the expense of fielding a candidate in one of
any number of other districts. How do parties assess the marginal costs of these unrealized
opportunities? On what criteria do they discriminate between districts? Finally, we know
very little about how party leaders weight tradeoffs in the proportionality of electoral districts
with the demographic composition of these districts. How many “types” of voters must exist
in a district before a party is willing to undertake the work to craft a bundle of policies that
might successfully target that type of voter? Does the permissiveness of the institutional
environment qualify this calculation? To what extent?
The main thrust of this dissertation, then, lies with the parties, with their strategic
calculations about when, where, and why they give certain subsets of a country’s voters the
opportunity to evaluate and, hopefully, cast a vote in favor of their platform. The preferences
and coordination efforts of voters are implicitly present in the analysis – after all, parties must
pay attention to electoral outcomes if they are to succeed – but these will take a backseat
to my considerations regarding the supply side of the market. In an anecdotal capacity,
this dissertation is about why the Welsh Green Party targets its resources specifically in a
district it thinks it can win while the Scottish Nationalist Party fields candidates in every
district due to its party leaders’ fervent belief in the cause of Scottish independence. This
dissertation examines, for instance, the difficulties encountered by leaders of the Scottish
Christian Party in evaluating how district-level voter diversity should come to bear on their
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strategic calculations. This dissertation is about why the Socialist Labour Party in England
returns again and again to the districts it has previously contested, regardless of its previous
levels of success with voters in these districts. In short, this dissertation drills down to the
comparative tradeoffs parties face when weighing factors such as: the likelihood of their
success in a district, the previous infrastructure they have built up in a district, the diversity
of the district’s population and how easy or difficult this makes pitching a unique party
platform, and the marginal cost of contesting elections broadly rather than intensively.
The first paper – “Selectively Entering Parties” – begins the analysis by asking a basic
question: given that a party chooses to enter some, but not all, electoral districts, how does it
choose in which districts to enter? My explanation focuses on parties’ ability to target those
districts where there was a breakdown in the electoral market in the last election. Relative
to districts where the supply and demand sides of the market were in balance, those districts
with evident coordination failure call out to selectively entering parties as opportunities to
make inroads with unsettled electorates. Together with the level of proportionality in the
district and whether the party previously invested resources there, I am able to demonstrate
that win potential – or a party’s odds of winning a seat, given the distribution of votes
in the last election – can substantially determine a party’s district-by-district patterns of
entry. This paper is the first to model individual parties’ relative evaluations of the tradeoffs
involved in entering one district at the expense of entering others.
To step a bit out of sequence, the third paper – “Linkage as Ballot Composition” – takes a
slightly wider view of parties’ entry decisions and, rather than exploring the motives behind
a party entering any one district, this paper ventures explanations for why parties enter a
certain number of districts. That is to say, this paper offers both marco-level institutional
and party-level logistical explanations for why parties in some countries, on average, tend
to contest more districts than parties in others and, similarly, why parties within the same
country exhibit variation in the extent to which they field candidates across districts. I find
that the centralization of political power – through the adoption of various constitutional

4

arrangements – leads to higher average levels of party “linkage” across districts. However,
I am also able to show that, at the party level, previous levels of success and notoriety can
mitigate these macro-level institutional effects. Put differently, the incentives emerging from
most political institutions are more salient predictors of the extent of linkage among smaller
parties than among larger ones. By way of concluding this paper, I make the case that once
parties are sufficiently large, they simply contest virtually every district in the country, regardless of the expected district-by-district outcomes. This is a luxury that is not afforded to
smaller parties (who must use their resources wisely and adhere to the institutional contexts
in which they operate). Furthermore, this homogenous entry strategy adopted by larger
parties can make voters’ job of selecting viable ballot offerings more difficult.
Finally, the second paper – “Latent Diversity and Party Systems” – altogether moves
away from parties as the unit of analysis, yet draws extensively on a theory framed in terms
of party-level decision-making. Specifically, this paper explores the ways in which voter
diversity within a district as well as across districts combine together with electoral rules to
determine how many parties – at the district level – receive substantial support from voters.
The classical argument in this respect is that increasing voter diversity will open up more
opportunities for parties to present unique and differentiable policy platforms to voters (so
long as the electoral rules are sufficiently permissive). A long track record of mixed findings
in this literature led me to argue that “diversity” as a concept should be disaggregated into
two components and, furthermore, that these components would work at cross purposes.
The first, diversity within a district, will drive up the number of parties competing and
receiving votes. The second, diversity across districts, will drive down the number of parties
due to the fact that it creates impediments for parties when they attempt to recycle policies
tailored to a specific district in other – socially distinct – districts. This paper is the first to
test the relationship between diversity and party system size at the district level. It is also
the first to postulate and find evidence in support a more nuanced understanding of the link
between voter diversity and party’s efforts at fielding candidates across districts.
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Paired with the extant literature that focuses on the demand side of the electoral market,
these three papers help contribute to our evolving understanding of the cross-district (but
within-country) dynamics that govern both sides of the electoral market. This dissertation
sheds new light on the strategic decisions underlying which and how many electoral districts
parties choose to contest. It shows specifically how constituency-level characteristics such as
previous coordination failures, district magnitude, previous resource investments, and voter
diversity inform these decisions. Most importantly, it couches these explanations in relative
terms, so that we can now understand what sorts of opportunities parties pursue and what
sorts of potentials they are comfortable forsaking.
By way of closing, I should point out the implications of my findings for the demand
side of the electoral market are worth noting. Voters should be wary for several reasons.
When they fail to coordinate sufficiently around viable ballot offerings, for example, in
the next election they can expect to be subjected to increasingly lengthy rosters of ballot
offerings populated by newer and smaller parties desperate to pick up seats wherever they
can. Having fielded candidates in the district previously, these parties are much more likely
to return, regardless of how they fared in the tabulation of votes. When parties meet with
more substantial electoral success, they break from the strategic tactics they employed when
they were smaller. Instead, they pay less attention to the incentive structures put in place
by constitutional designers and they place less emphasis on rooting out the specific electoral
districts where, based on previous results, they can rationally expect to win. The result is
uniform contestation across all districts – regardless of prospects – and this shifts the burden
of assessing viability almost entirely onto the shoulders of the voters. When they fail, newer
and smaller parties again take notice and again target those districts in future elections,
adding to the clutter and making coordination more difficult. And the cycle continues.
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– Paper 1 –
Selectively Entering Parties:
Subnational Variation in Voters’ Choices

Abstract: Given that a party chooses to selectively contest some – but not all – districts
in an election, how can we explain where it chooses to enter? This is a question that has
profound consequences for the menu of ballot offerings to which voters in different areas
of a country have access when they go to the polls on election day. However, previous
scholarship on elections has not examined the tradeoffs that such selectively entering parties
face in choosing to enter one district at the expense of another. In this article, I build the
first cross-national model of intranational variation in voters’ menus of party offerings. I
argue that selectively entering parties should aim for the electoral districts in which voters
previously exhibited poor levels of coordination. I test this argument with data on more than
a half-million party-entry decisions in thousands of districts across hundreds of elections in
a diverse subset of 40 democracies.

Introduction
Given that a party chooses to selectively contest some – but not all – districts in an election,
how can we explain where it chooses to enter? Because parties that universally contest all
districts in a country are actually comparatively rare, this is something of an important
question that affects most parties around the world. Indeed, a rather broad swathe of the
types of parties studied in the field of electoral politics fall under the heading of what we
might refer to as selectively entering parties. These might be newer and smaller parties,
these might be parties with few resource endowments or regionalized parties that cater
to the political interests of only certain districts; these might be parties that are simply
transitionally small en route to broader electoral success or perhaps these might be niche
parties that espouse platforms that appeal to the needs of specific demographics such as
rural communities.
But these are only a few of many possible examples. The unifying conceptual characteristic of selectively entering parties – regardless of their “type” – is the fact that these parties
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face real tradeoffs in electoral competition. For any one of a number of reasons, these parties
assess their electoral prospects differently across different constituencies and ultimately conclude that some constituencies are simply not worth the time, resources, and effort of fielding
a candidate or a list of candidates. Instead of contesting all districts, they forgo potential
opportunities in some districts in order to more specifically chase opportunities in others.
By contrast, parties that are able to contest every district in a country are not, by definition,
faced with these tradeoffs. Perhaps a universally entering party will allocate greater or fewer
resources to particular districts or take steps to ensure that high-quality candidates run in
certain localities; but these parties do not feel the bite of completely forgoing opportunities
to stand for an election in some areas of the country.
Previous studies of electoral politics have not yet addressed this question, which might
most effectively be framed as an additional strategic calculation that selectively entering
parties must undertake (and that universally entering parties need not). Studies of the
emergence of new parties (Kitschelt, 1988; Meguid, 2005; Mudde, 2007) or of parties with
platforms grounded in regional social cleavages (Chhibber and Torcal, 1997; Chhibber and
Kollman, 2004; Brancati, 2008), for example, only address this question indirectly and are
unable to provide systematic explanations that operate across all types of selectively entering
parties. While previous studies of resource barriers to new party emergence (Harmel and
Robertson, 1985; Hug, 2001; Tavits, 2006) tell us something about the impediments that
parties face in deciding whether or not to contest an election at the national level, they have
nothing to say on a district-by-district basis at the intranational level.
This is a gap that requires filling because the theoretical implications of selective entry
range across research questions focusing on party system consolidation, party nationalization,
voter choice, and preference aggregation. Understanding the choices of selectively entering
parties can tell us something about important variation in the consolidation of party systems
at the district level (Tavits, 2007). Stability in the number and type of party offerings
have long been indicators of a party system’s consolidation (Bielasiak, 2002; Sartori, 1976;
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Tavits, 2007). Selectively entering parties – by virtue of never entering all districts – might
potentially either reinforce or upend consolidated political competition to differing capacities
within the same country. These elite-level, district-by-district entry decisions may leave
intact preexisting patterns of party support in some areas of the country at the same time
that they undermine patterns of support in other areas of the country. In short, until we are
able to understand selective entry, we run the risk of committing an ecological fallacy when
discussing party system consolidation at the national level.
Such district-level variation in support for parties results in varying levels of party system
nationalization, or the extent to which parties draw homogenous levels of support across districts (Jones and Mainwaring, 2003). Party systems with low levels of nationalization have
long been viewed as normatively distressing because these are systems where political competition centers on divisive regional issues, representation is predicated on particularistic rather
than programmatic ties, and budgeting decisions result in resources being disproportionately
focused on targetable (rather than public) goods (Caramani, 2000; Jones and Mainwaring,
2003). To the extent that these patterns of support across districts hinge on variation in
the menu of party offerings rather than different groups of voters responding variably to the
same party offerings, then studying selective entry stands to make an important contribution
to the growing literature on nationalized politics. For example, we might learn that in some
cases, a low level of nationalization is an artifact of many selectively entering parties neglecting a large number of electoral districts (in which case nationalization is not indicative of
the concepts it is thought to measure), while in other cases, a low level of nationalization is
resulting from voters’ disparate assessments of the same (universally entering) parties (which
is what we typically argue when studying geographical dispersion of party support).
Selective entry’s most proximate implication for voters, however, is that voters in different
districts within the same country can potentially be faced with radically different menus of
party offerings on election day. This is a conundrum that has long received attention in the
methodological and formal theoretical literatures on voter choice and district-level election
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outcomes. At the level of the individual voter, studies drawing on survey data have tried
to correct for violations of the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives:
certainly the fact that a voter is not presented with a particular party on the ballot when
she might have actually preferred to vote for it will impact the quality of efforts to predict her
vote choice (Alvarez and Nagler, 1998, 2000; Glasgow, 2001). These measurement problems
also aggregate up to the district level, where vote totals for individual parties in a district are
biased for want of information on parties that did not enter there, but did enter elsewhere
(Jackson, 2002; Katz and King, 1999; Tomz, Tucker and Wittenberg, 2002).
Aside from methodological nuisances, this variation in the menu of party offerings also
has profound normative implications borne out of the formal theoretical literature (AustenSmith and Banks, 1999). Violations of the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption
results in deeper problems with the process of social choice. Aggregating up from districts (or
smaller contests) to the national level (or larger contests) will not ensure that basic principles
like path independence (Arrow, 1963; Plott, 1973) or choice consistency (Chernoff, 1954)
are satisfied. When different constituencies are offered incomplete subsets of the broader
national set of parties, then vote choices – and their aggregation – may simply not be fully
informative measures of a society’s deeper preferences. By inducing variation in the menu
of party offerings within a country, then, selectively entering parties may well pose a serious
challenge to meaningful articulations of social choices at the national level.
For all of these theoretical considerations, the question of selective entry is germane
empirically as well. Figure 1 illustrates the average share of districts – for each party across
all elections it contested – in which the party chose to field candidates.1 Each observation in
gray depicts one party’s average share of districts entered and the observations are arrayed
within the countries they reside. Heavier, black dots indicate the average share of districts
entered by all parties within each country and the countries themselves appear in descending
1

The data underlying this graphic were organized by the author from various sources. The particulars

of these data will be explained in great detail in the empirical section.
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order of average percent of districts entered. In a few settings at the top of the figure, the
question of variation in party competition at the district level is moot by definition when a
single at-large district is used. These cases are followed by a smattering of other countries
with very few districts overall, making entry by parties in all districts more likely, but by and
large, there is an astonishing amount of variation across countries. There is also a great deal
of variation within countries, with individual parties’ gray dots arrayed virtually from one
district to all districts (in most cases). The overwhelming preponderance of parties across
these elections chose to enter a selection of districts rather than all districts. About 75% of
the party-election observations in my data set entered districts selectively. On average, these
parties entered a nontrivial share of a country’s districts (about 25%) and, more importantly,
these parties garnered more than 60% of all votes cast across all elections in the data set.
Cross-nationally, we know something about the black points in Figure 1, but virtually
nothing about the gray points. In countries where the value of national office is high (as in
presidential systems, for instance), scholars have argued that parties will link their efforts
across districts and enter across a broader range in order to increase their odds at gaining
representation at the national level (Cox, 1999; Morgenstern, Swindle and Castagnola, 2009).
We also know that decentralized fiscal or political power or the presence of region-based social cleavages might prompt parties to intensively enter smaller numbers of districts rather
than flooding all districts with candidates (Brancati, 2008; Morgenstern and Swindle, 2005;
Morgenstern, Swindle and Castagnola, 2009). Even within countries, we can think of convincing and commonsense reasons why some parties contest few districts and others many:
parties have differing resource endowments, especially in countries with very few campaign
finance restrictions2 , and some parties – especially of the niche rather than the catch-all
2

In surveying the recent literature related to party systems and electoral competition in Latin America,

Morgenstern and Vazquez-D’Elia (2007) observe that “it appears reasonable to assume that the same rules
may pose different challenges and opportunities to differently endowed parties” (p. 155, emphasis added).
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Figure 1. Average Share of Districts Entered by Party (Gray Points) Within Each Country (Country-Level
Averages Depicted in Black)
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variety – will espouse platforms that fail to gain traction in certain types of districts.3
Rather than explaining variation across parties in the national-level incidence of entry,
however, I will endeavor to explain the specific entry decisions parties make on a district-bydistrict basis. That is to say, for every observation in Figure 1 that falls below universal entry
across districts, I put forward a district-level model that explains variation in entry decisions.
To my knowledge, my work is the first to treat selectively entering parties’ strategic election
decisions as a string of dichotomous outcomes across all districts within a country. I define
a concept called win potential that captures two dynamics that parties care about when
choosing where to field candidates: first, the number of voters who failed to identify a winning
party in the last election and, second, the fewest number of votes it would take for a selectively
entering party to become a winning party. In other words, win potential measures whether
there are enough voters coordinating on losing parties who, taken together, could make a new
party a winner. By accounting for the cost of the “cheapest” seat and the votes most easily
available to “buy” it, win potential provides a summary measure not only of the threshold of
representation for a new entrant, but also the number of votes it might be able to mobilize in
an effort to clear this threshold. I explain how win potential becomes a less salient factor for
selectively entering parties as they grow in size and situate my explanation alongside other
intuitive predictors of selective entry – namely, district magnitude and whether or not the
party previously invested resources in a district.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I will articulate in greater detail my theory of
selective entry before, second, describing the data set I employ in the course of testing my
hypothesis. Next, I estimate a logistic hierarchical model of district-level entry decisions for
parties that do not enter all districts in a given election and substantively discuss the model’s
results. A consistent empirical story emerges. Where there is variation in district magnitude
within a country, parties that are forced to selectively enter a subset of districts consistently
opt for districts with larger magnitudes. Having made the decision to enter a district in the
3

See Rodden (2010) for a discussion on the geographic clustering of political preferences.
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first place, most parties persist in re-entering that district in subsequent elections, perhaps
drawing on the organizational apparatus they constructed there in the last election. Despite
these powerful and predictable trends, however, a district’s win potential also consistently
exerts a positive and statistically significant impact on the probability that a party will enter
a given district: as a district’s win potential increases relative to other districts, any given
party is more likely to enter that district. This result is robust to alternative specifications
of the model that I present in two appendices.

A Theory of Selective Entry
Even in party systems where several party offerings are universal, selectively entering parties still contest elections (Blais et al., 2011; Morgenstern and Vazquez-D’Elia, 2007; Tavits,
2007). While uniformly entering parties simply “enter” the race at the national level, selectively entering parties – having made the decision to enter at all – must then enter a subset
of districts rather than the full field. Typically in studies of strategic party entry, only the
first decision is given much consideration while the intranational, cross-district variation in
entry is neglected (see discussions by: Lago and Martinez, 2010; Tavits, 2006). Indeed, scant
research has addressed the question: given that a party chooses to selectively contest some –
but not all – districts in an election, how can we explain where it chooses to enter? Effectively
answering this question requires disaggregating the discussion about strategic entry from a
national perspective to a district perspective. If political elites determine that their party’s
electoral prospects differ across districts, then we need to seek out determinants of these elite
assessments that vary at the district level. Previous research in the field of strategic party
entry, however, does not offer much in the way of precedent on this point.
Cox (1997) discusses the costs of entry as well as the benefits of potentially obtaining
office. Simply put, he argues that parties enter a race when the benefits outweigh the costs.
Following Hug (2001) and others, Tavits (2006) employs a comprehensive test of numerous
hypotheses pertaining to the costs of entry and finds that parties are more likely to enter
14

when registration costs are low, when average district magnitude is high, and when the
electoral histories of incumbents are short. Other work has explored the emergence and
success of “niche parties” in particular (Meguid, 2005; Mudde, 2007) and an older literature
investigated the emergence of new parties of specific ideological orientations such a Christian
Democratic parties (Kalyvas, 1998), parties of the left (Kitschelt, 1988), and parties of the
far right (Kitschelt, 1995).
While more general studies in the line of Hug (2000) have explored cross-national variation
in generic party entry, these studies reach divergent conclusions. Harmel and Robertson
(1985) conclude, for example, that the emergence of new political issues invite new party
entry, while on the other hand, scholars such as Hino (2006) argue that electoral systems
are the chief determinants of entry. These are all, as Lago and Martinez (2010) call them,
“inter-variation” studies that take as their unit of analysis an election in a particular year in
a particular country. Thus, parties either do or do not enter the election dependent on the
characteristics of their country and these are characteristics that vary across national cases,
but not within them. Put differently, entry anywhere and entry everywhere are conceptually
identical in these studies.
In actuality, however, the strategic landscape of selectively entering parties never looks
like this. Rather, for these parties, strategic entry “in an election” is actually an aggregation
of many (sometimes literally hundreds) of dichotomous yes-or-no entry decisions. What
district-level characteristics might influence the probability that a selectively entering party
chooses “yes” for a particular district? Although different parties contest elections with
different motivations, their aspirations can usually be best realized by winning or by coming
as close to winning as possible. Winning a seat in a district or coming close to winning a
seat are both roads to increasing visibility: whether a party is motivated to change policy,
to promote a pet issue, or to push a like-minded establishment party to change its platform,
coming as close to winning as possible is a straightforward manner to call attention to the
party’s goals. Thus, I argue that parties require some sort of informational signal about
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the potential of winning a seat within each district (which is conceptually distinct from
arguing that they actually expect to win a seat). This assumption has its roots in a long line
of literature beginning with Leiserson (1968) and Riker (1962) and continuing through to
Laver and Schofield (1990) who argue that – whatever their underlying motivation – parties
seek office. A more recent review of party motivations argues that although different parties
are motivated by different incentives, “it is almost always better to be in office than not”
(Müller and Strom, 1999, p. 6). Selectively entering parties, in particular, should look to a
type of signal about the potential for gaining a seat that varies across districts within the
same country.4 In particular, selectively entering parties should look to districts with evident
previous electoral “market failures” as prime targets for successful entry.
Cox (1997) likened elections to markets and posited an equilibrium concept that balances
both the supply of and demand for party offerings. This equilibrium point is structured
by the well-known psychological and mechanical effects of party competition articulated
by Duverger (1954): a given set of electoral rules (of which the choice of magnitude is
oftentimes the most consequential) governs the mechanical translation of votes into seats and
voters, not wanting to waste their votes on nonviable parties, strategically abandon parties
that have entered in excess of this equilibrium. When this equilibrium point is exceeded
and a larger number of parties net substantial vote shares, then the electoral market has
failed (Lago and Martinez, 2010): many voters have cast ballots that, by virtue of going
toward nonviable contenders, will not be included in the mechanical translation of votes into
seats. In very new democracies, this failure can be attributed simply to unfamiliarity with
democratic rules (Duch and Palmer, 2002; Dawisha and Deets, 2006; Tavits and Annus, 2006;
Vander Weyden and Meuleman, 2008). But if we continue to observe variation in electoral
4

It is important to note that many of the informational inputs available to larger parties, such as detailed

campaign survey data, are generally unavailable to smaller, perhaps resource-strapped parties. The measure
of win potential that I describe below has the advantage that elites of all parties – regardless of resource
endowments – should be readily able to calculate this measure based simply on previous electoral returns.
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market failure across districts within established democracies (which, empirically speaking,
we often do), then the persistence of electoral market failure might rather be construed as
voters expressing their discontent with current party offerings (Lago and Martinez, 2010). By
persistently casting ballots for nonviable parties, voters are, in a sense, giving voice to their
dissatisfaction with current party offerings (Lago and Martinez, 2010; Hirschman, 1970).
When selectively entering parties observe electoral market failures, they see a set of
voters whose support should be comparatively easy to win (especially vis-à-vis voters who
have settled into established patterns of support for consistently seat-winning parties). Given
that extant parties have been unable to mobilize support in this non-coordinating section of
the district’s electorate, the door remains open for a selectively entering party to offer a new
option on the menu of party labels. New potential entrants do not have to pry votes away
from already winning parties; rather, they just have to tie up the losing parties’ loose ends.
In an attempt to capitalize on voter dissatisfaction, then, selectively entering parties will
enter districts where there has been a breakdown in voter coordination around a viable set
of party offerings. Empirically measuring this “breakdown” however, can be difficult and, as
previous studies have argued, the choice of metric is of some consequence (Cox, 1997; Crisp,
Olivella and Potter, 2012; Singer and Stephenson, 2009; Tavits and Annus, 2006).
I create a new measure of coordination failure because, as I will argue, I am interested
in a very specific type of calculation on the part of party elites.5 What is needed is a
measure both of (1) the cost, measured in votes, of gaining a seat in the district (i.e. the
hurdle over which a party must pass if it is to gain office) as well as (2) the number of
poorly coordinating voters who might be easily convinced to throw their support behind a
new entrant (i.e. the electoral materials at a party’s disposal with which it might cross
the hurdle of representation). Furthermore, the metric must be standardized to account
for the fact that selectively entering parties are making entry decisions in each district by
5

And this calculation is not captured by statistics such as the effective number of losing parties, the SF

ratio, hopeless votes, or the coordination product, which are reviewed in Crisp, Olivella and Potter (2012).
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evaluating their prospects in that district relative to their prospects in all other districts.
Thus, I propose as my explanatory variable of theoretical interest a measure of win potential
which I define at time t in a given district d as:

win potential =

hopeless votes t−1

min party votes i,t−1 / party seats

i,t−1

 , ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N } in d

Where i indexes all parties that won seats in the last election within a given district and
hopeless votes is the sum of all votes going to the second-largest party that failed to win
a seat as well as the votes going to all lesser vote-getting parties.6 This measure is then
standardized (mean-centered) across all districts within a given country-election to reflect
the fact that each district is endowed with a new value of win potential in each election and
each party in the country makes a new round of evaluations across these districts.
In single-member district systems, the denominator simply collapses to the number of
votes going to the party that won that district’s single seat. In multimember systems, the
denominator represents the idea that the cheapest seat to win is not always previously won
by the smallest party. Imagine a hypothetical multimember District A. Perhaps the smallest
seat-winning party in District A won only one seat, but won it soundly. Suppose that the
largest seat-winning party in District A won five seats, but just barely cleared the threshold
to win the fifth seat. In this example, it is this number of votes needed to gain that last seat
of the largest party that a potential entrant into the district should be keeping its eye on.
Thus, the denominator in this multimember context simply divides all seat-getting parties’
vote totals by their seat totals and registers the minimum of all these values as the threshold
which any new potential entrant would have to clear in order to win a seat.
The unstandardized district-level win potential statistic is bound on the low end by 0
6

See Tavits and Annus (2006) for a discussion of the advantages of using “hopeless” votes over “wasted”

votes, which is simply the sum of all votes going to all non-seat-winning parties, rather than just those votes
going to the second-largest non-seat-winning party and all other smaller parties. By and large, the empirical
results hold when I replace “hopeless” votes with “wasted” votes in the numerator.
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(i.e. a scenario where all votes go to winning or first-losing parties, meaning the district is in
perfect electoral equilibrium) and can assume values upwards of 10 (in the improbable case
of, say, an exceedingly diffuse distribution of votes in a single-member district with a very
low margin of victory).7 Across the observations in my data set, however, unstandardized
win potential has a mean of 0.31 and an interquartile range from 0 to 0.42. There are two
things that can increase the value of win potential : either the number of votes going into
the awarding of the cheapest seat in the district decreases (thereby signaling that winning
representation in a district has become, in a sense, cheaper) or the number of hopeless votes
increases (thereby signaling that a new potential entrant has a larger number of poorly coordinating – or disaffected – voters at its disposal with which it might cross the seat-winning
threshold). Having made clear the operationalization of the main explanatory variable, then,
I explicitly state my first hypothesis:
H1: Selectively entering parties are more likely to enter any given electoral district
as its win potential increases relative to other districts.
When presented with the option of entering either of two districts, say, a selectively entering
party will choose – other things being equal – the district with a higher win potential. It
is in that district, when compared with the other, that the cost in votes of winning a seat
or coming closest to it is lower and/or the supply of easy-to-mobilize voters who have been
previously disappointed with extant party offerings is sufficiently large so as to make fielding
a candidate in the district probabilistically worthwhile.
The relationship between win potential and the probability of entry should not be unconditional, however. As parties increase in size and contest more districts, they should
7

Empirically, the vast majority of observations fall between 0 and 1, with an additional, but very small,

cluster of observations falling between 1 and 2. There is then a long tail of scattered observations assuming
values as high as 13.83, which is the maximum. In the original data sets, values higher than this were
reported but, upon closer examination, appear to have been generated by data entry errors in the original
sources. When an error was located, that district was deleted. These deletions amount to less than 0.5% of
the data set and the regression analyses presented below hold even if these erroneous districts are included.
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depend less and less on win potential as an informative signal about their prospects in a
given district. Entry in more districts indicates greater party capacity. As a party’s capacity
increases, the tradeoff between entering one district at the expense of not entering another
drops off until, at the extreme where a party enters all districts, the tradeoff disappears completely. When capacity is low, win potential will constitute a crucial informational signal to
selectively entering parties because the stakes are higher; with fewer districts to enter in the
first place, entering just one of them precludes entering potentially many others.8
Empirically, then, as a proxy for party capacity, we can use the proportion of all districts
that a party entered in the previous election. As a party’s capacity increases – whether as
a result of more resources in the party’s coffers or an interest in creating a more national
presence or in response to previous electoral successes – the importance it places on win
potential as an informative signal should decrease. Put differently, selectively entering more
districts overall necessitates a higher probability of entering any one district in particular.
Thus, I formulate a second hypothesis:
H2: As party capacity increases, the utility of win potential as a signal to selectively entering parties should decrease.
There are two other potentially important determinants of selective party entry for which
I need to control. The first determinant is district magnitude, which creates very different
competitive environments for selectively entering parties. Where district magnitude is high,
the translation of votes into seats is more proportional and electoral competition is more
permissive. That is to say that winning a seat is mechanically “easier” in large magnitude
districts. This is somewhat different than the idea of “ease” of winning a seat embodied in
the win potential metric. There, parties are weighing both extant party strength as well as
8

Additionally, parties may extend into other districts over time in an effort to increase their profile

(thereby appearing more “nationalized” in character) or out of a belief that voters throughout the country
are entitled to cast a vote for the party, even if the party has no hope of winning a seat in the district. Both
of these dynamics would work against the impact of win potential as party capacity increases.
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the psychological nuances of voter coordination.9 Although irrelevant in countries without
intranational variation in magnitude, district magnitude could nonetheless exert a positive
influence on the probability of a party selectively entering a district. This idea is rather
similar to district-level studies of entry and voter coordination, but recasts it in terms of
relative tradeoffs that party elites face in deciding where to enter.
The second factor for which I must control is whether or not a party previously invested
resources in a district in the last election. Certainly by having gone through the process of
investing resources in a district once, the party may be able to make use of those resources
in subsequent elections. This idea is similar to the emerging literature linking party organizational development to variation in electoral performance across districts (Tavits, 2012).
While not being able to make use of detailed party organizational data in a cross-national
test, controlling for previous entry in a district should serve as a rough proxy for previous
resource investment. If previous entry is found to be a positive predictor of current selective entry, this will indicate that parties place a valuable premium on the past either as an
organizational placeholder (Tavits, 2012) or as a learning heuristic (Gschwend, 2007). The
reasoning regarding my controls leads to the following hypotheses.
H3: Selectively entering parties are more likely to enter any given electoral district as its district magnitude increases relative to other districts.
H4: Selectively entering parties are more likely to enter an electoral district where
they previously invested resources.
A possible objection to my focus on these four hypotheses is that they do not take into
account interactions between parties such as mergers, coalitions, or stand-down agreements.
Empirically, there is little that can be done to account for this level of nuance in a large,
cross-national study. Theoretically, however, I would argue that individual parties will not
engage in these sorts of mutual agreements with other parties if they evaluate their own
9

The two measures are clearly tracking different concepts as magnitude is correlated with (unstandard-

ized) values of win potential at only r = 0.35 and with (standardized) values of win potential at r = 0.08.
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prospects in a district sufficiently positively. Put differently, if a party likes its odds in a
given district, it would prefer not to share its success with other parties. It will not stand
down in a district or merge with another party if it expects to do well there. The fact remains
that if a party sees a high potential for doing well, it should be expected to enter; if it does
not see this, then it should not be expected to enter. Any specific inter-party dynamics
that govern this decision of “non entry” (which include, but are certainly not limited to,
engaging in a stand down agreement or merging platforms and changing party labels) enter
the story at a different theoretical stage and should not bias the results of the analysis that
follows. Keeping this in mind, I now move onto a discussion of the nature of the data set,
the statistical model, and its results.

The Data Set and Variables
In order to test the hypotheses, I require complete vote and seat data at the district level
for all parties that contested a national lower-house election in a given democratic country
in a given year.10 As I am interested in selectively entering parties – and as these are
often the very parties that get lumped together into an aggregated “other votes” category
in many cross-national databases – I need to be particularly certain that the vote data
records all parties individually. Therefore, I take as my starting point the ConstituencyLevel Elections (CLE) Dataset compiled by Brancati (2007), which was gathered with the
specific intent of avoiding the grouping of smaller parties’ votes in an aggregated “other
votes” category. Working with this baseline data set, I then merged in a number of elections
from the Constituency-Level Elections Archive (CLEA) compiled by Kollman et al. (2011).
This data set is not as explicitly oriented toward avoiding the reporting of votes in an
“other votes” category and, thus, I only took from this data set those elections for which the
authors had complete votes for all parties. In both the CLE and CLEA cases, there were
10

I take as my definition of “democratic” a score of 5 or higher on the Polity IV measure of democracy,

though almost every country included in the data set clears this hurdle by a rather healthy margin.
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some countries that had complete vote data, but incomplete seat data; for those countries,
I filled in seats from other sources wherever possible.11
Employing these criteria, I created a data set with a large number of elections; however,
I pared down the number of observations based on additional criteria. First, I was only
interested in continuous series of elections due to the fact that I have argued that election
outcomes in the immediately previous election should inform parties’ entry decisions in
this election. Second, I dropped observations for countries (such as Malta and Jamaica)
during periods of time in which they were not sovereign, independent countries.12 Despite
these fairly restrictive inclusion criteria, I have a data set that far exceeds the number of
observations included in most cross-national studies of electoral politics. Indeed, I retain
district-level electoral data for more than 3,700 districts in a diverse set of 40 democracies.
But the unit of observation is not the electoral district; rather, it is each party’s entry
decision (whether yes or no) in each electoral district. In terms of the available data, I define
entry = 1 for a given party in a given election’s district when that party received at least
1 vote in the data set. I define entry = 0 for those districts where the party received no
11

In the cases of Grenada, Jamaica, and Zambia – in which seats are assigned in single-member districts

based on simple plurality rule – I simply assigned the district’s sole seat to the party with the most votes.
For elections in the Dominican Republic in 2002 and 2006 and Sri Lanka in 2000, 2001, 2004, and 2010,
I relied on seat data reported by Adam Carr in his online Election Archive. For elections in Colombia, I
aggregated individual list-level seat totals to the party level as reported by Arend Lijphart in his online
Elections Archive. I relied on Lijphart as well for seat data pertaining to the 1995 election in Turkey. For
elections in Finland in the same year, I pulled seat data from the Finnish electoral commission.
12

Occasionally, other institutional peculiarities (such as partial renewal in Argentina and multiround

elections in France) resulted in observations being dropped because dependably tracking vote totals across
partial and multiround elections proved to be too difficult. In some countries that employ mixed-member
systems – like South Korea, Mexico, and Germany – available electoral data only covered one tier of electoral
results. These countries were also dropped from the data set because, without data from both tiers, we would
have no way of understanding how parties’ deliberations at these levels affected their entry decisions overall.
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votes.13 I work from the fundamental assumption that, if a party stood for election in a
given district, then it received at least one vote in the district.14
Expanding the data set to the party-district-entry-decision creates a huge number of observations, but not all of these are relevant. On a party by party basis, I drop observations
related to two additional types of parties. First, by election, I drop observations for parties
that entered all districts in a given election (otherwise, there is no variation on the outcome
variable for these parties).15 Second, I drop observations pertaining to independent candidates as, by definition in legislative elections, an independent candidate can never contest
more districts than her own. Due to the need to include lagged values as explanatory variables, no party enters the regression analysis until its second election appearance. Despite
culling the data set in this way, I am left with more than 500,000 entry observations.16
I control for a number of variables related to the hypotheses articulated above. First, I
13

Practically speaking, the data sets that I draw on for electoral returns treat non-entry in systematic

ways that make the distinction between entry and non-entry even clearer. The CLE data set simply leaves
blank cells in the data for districts where a party did not field a candidate and the CLEA only includes
party-district observations where the party received at least 1 vote.
14

This is not a terribly heroic assumption, given the fact that it would require very few resources for a

party to net one vote in any given electoral competition (indeed, we might expect that the candidate who
stood in the competition would at least vote for herself or himself). Still, it is worth conceding the point
that a party’s banner might have appeared on a ballot on election day, yet the party received no votes.
15

However, and importantly, the empirical results of the statistical model do not change when I include all

parties, including those that entered all districts uniformly. Thus, even if one argues that uniformly-entering
parties simply decide “yes” on a district-by-district basis for all districts in a country (a decision calculus
which I find unlikely), accounting for this empirically does not affect the results presented here.
16

This data also encapsulates more than 4,000 party-elections, which will be discussed in greater detail

below. The countries included in the analysis are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Bulgaria, Canada,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Grenada,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Luxembourg, Mauritius, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, West Germany, and Zambia.
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control for logged district magnitude because of the well-known implications of this variable
for party competition (H3 ). Second, I control for previous resource investment (or lagged
entry) on a district-by-district basis because parties that have previously invested resources
in constructing a campaign infrastructure in a district can be expected to re-enter that
district in subsequent elections (H4 ). Although the structure of the data is hierarchical in
nature, I do not control for variables at the country level. While it is easy to argue that
many country-level variables (such as federalism, say, or whether the country is a presidential
democracy) might impact the incidence of selective party entry, it is rather more unclear
how any of these variables might affect the specific entry decision in any given district. So
while there might be a discernible difference in the average percentage of districts entered by
parties in Sweden when compared to parties in Spain (as, indeed, there is if we consider again
Figure 1), it is very difficult to see how Sweden’s national-level institutions vis-á-vis Spain’s
national-level institutions would differently impact a generic party’s decision about which
of two districts to enter. I do present a model in Appendix A that includes country-level
covariates (and demonstrate the my results do not change in this context), but I maintain
that we derive the most explanatory power for subnational variation in selective entry by
focusing on variables that vary across districts and across parties within the same country.
At the level of the party, we can imagine a number of variables that would impact not
only the party’s incidence of selective entry, but that might also inform its specific districtby-district entry decisions. Unfortunately, in a cross-national study, many of these variables
(like the extent to which the party’s platform is regional in nature) are impossible to obtain.17
17

However, in a robustness check presented in Appendix B, I attempt to control for some of these

potentially confounding party-level factors. In results not reported here, it is worth pointing out that the
model’s results hold on two additional theoretically relevant subsets of the data: first, on those parties
that entered two or more districts and, second, on those district entry observations where parties did not
previously enter. These two tests drive home important points: the inclusion of single-district entrants or
“nuisance” parties is not driving the results of the model presented below and, additionally, despite lagged
entry’s strong role in predicting entry, it is not sufficient by itself to drive the results of the model.
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For the time being, I focus on one party-level attribute that is readily available based on
electoral returns – party capacity – because I expect that this attribute will qualify the
relationship I have hypothesized exists between win potential and the probability of entry
(H2 ). I operationalize party capacity as the share of districts a party entered in the previous
election.18 For the same party across different elections, then, this variable should take on
different values. In the model that follows, I interact win potential with party capacity to
demonstrate the diminishing marginal utility of win potential as an information source as
parties contest increasingly more districts. I now turn to a discussion of this model.

Modeling Selective Entry Cross-Nationally
Selectively entering parties make a set of dichotomous yes-or-no entry decisions – one decision per district per election. Because these decisions are nested in broader contexts, the
appropriate modeling strategy is a multilevel logistic regression where each yes-or-no entry
decision at the party-district-election level is nested within a particular party’s set of decisions in a given election. At the same time, the attributes of each district that do not change
from election to election (like magnitude) should comprise their own separate level in the
data’s hierarchy. In the analysis that follows, I specify a hierarchical logistic model as:

Pr(entryped


= 1) = logit
γd + γpe + β1 winpotentialed
−1

+ β2 investmentped,t−1
+ β3 winpotentialed ∗ capacitype,t−1 +

2
σped



γd ∼ N (αd + δ1 log(magnituded ), σd2 ) for d = 1, ..., D
2
γpe ∼ N (αpe + ξ1 capacitype,t−1 , σpe
) for pe = 1, ..., P E

Here γd and γpe are, respectively, district-level and party-election-level random intercepts
that are modeled, again respectively, by the log of district magnitude (which, in general,
18

Using the share of districts entered in the current election would be endogenous to the outcome variable.
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should not vary from election to election) and lagged party capacity (which, in general
for selectively entering parties, should vary from election to election). The βs in the model
correspond to coefficients for, respectively, win potential (which varies at the district-election
level in this election based on voter coordination in the district in the past election), a party’s
lagged entry decision in the district, and an interaction between win potential and lagged
party capacity. In the data set, the districts are indexed by country (such that two similarlynamed districts in different countries are not, in the model, included in the same country)
and the parties are indexed by country and election year (such that a party in the United
States in 2008 is not also faced with entering districts in Spain in 2008). In the models that
follow, then, I will present estimates for the coefficients β1 , β2 , β3 , δ1 , and ξ1 in addition
to random effects at the district-level (γd ) and the party-election level (γpe ) together with
measures of variance across these random intercepts at each level.19
Recall that win potential and logged district magnitude are standardized within each set
of country-election observations to convey the relative tradeoffs that parties face in selectively
entering one district at the expense of another. To aid in making the regression models’
coefficient estimates across explanatory variables more directly comparable, I have similarly
mean-centered party capacity. The regression model in Table 1 includes all observations
in the data set for selectively entering parties. Coefficient estimates appear in the second
column and the bounds of the 95% confidence intervals appear in the third column.20 The
model overall is a good fit to the data. A log likelihood ratio test indicates that the model
performs significantly better than a null baseline model that includes only a constant, a
lagged outcome variable predictor, and the random intercepts. In addition, the model’s
error rate (i.e. predicting yi = 0 when logit−1 (Xi β) > 0.5 or predicting yi = 1 when
logit−1 (Xi β) < 0.5) across more than a half-million observations is just 4%. As expected,
the coefficient on win potential is positively signed. Party capacity exerts a strong and
19

2
) is set to 1.
In estimating the logistic model, variance at the level of the observation (σped

20

All coefficient estimates in Table 1 are highly statistically significant at the p ≤ 0.001 level.
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Table 1. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Model of the Probability of Entry

Estimate
Win Potential
Party Capacityt−1
Potential x Capacityt−1
Previous Investment
Magnitude (Logged)
Intercept

0.10
0.65
-0.07
3.25
0.51
-2.77

σ̂d2

0.18
2.22
1.00

2
σ̂pe

2
σ̂ped

N districts
N party-elections
N obs.

95% C.I.
[
[
[
[
[
[

0.08 , 0.12
0.60 , 0.70
-0.08, -0.06
3.20 , 3.30
0.47 , 0.55
-2.83, -2.71

]
]
]
]
]
]

3,750
4,069
522,198

Notes: All coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the p ≤ 0.001 level. All coefficients have been
mean-centered to aid in comparability. The bounds of the 95% confidence intervals were generated from
1,000 simulated draws of the model’s parameters.
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statistically significant impact on the probability of entry and – as values of this variable
increase – its interaction with win potential indicates that the strength of win potential
as a predictor decreases. Previous investment in an electoral district and logged district
magnitude, as expected, both exert sizable positive effects on the probability of entry.21
The substantive impact of win potential, party capacity, and their interaction on the
probability of entry is difficult to assess without graphical aid. Figure 2 depicts win potential’s multiplicative impact on the odds of entry for different values of party capacity.
When this multiplicative effect is greater than 1.0, then the effect of increasing win potential
increases the odds of entry. When it falls below 1.0, the the effect of increasing win potential
is a decrease in the odds of entry. The black line is the predicted multiplicative effect and
the dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.22 In support of H1, we can clearly see
that increasing win potential positively increases the odds of entry across the entire range
of party capacity values (and the uncertainty around this predicted effect is bounded well
away from 1.0). Also, in support of H2, we see that the magnitude of the positive effect of
increasing win potential on the odds of entry is decreasing as party capacity increases.
To assess the effect of win potential on the odds of entry in more concrete terms, let
me discuss it in terms of underlying probabilities. Table 2 provides a summary of how
each explanatory variable impacts the predicted probability of entry. These probabilities are
based on 1,000 simulations of the model’s parameters, with the predicted value appearing
at the top of each row and the bounds of its corresponding 95% confidence interval in
brackets below. In all cases “low” indicates the first quartile value of the variable and “high”
indicates the third quartile value. In support of H2, we see that increasing win potential
across its interquartile range increases the probability of entry by about 8% for low capacity
21

An objection to the modeling strategy in Table 1 might be that parties that selectively enter only

one district in an election are not necessarily doing so with an eye toward sustained and strategic electoral
competition. As noted previously, the results of the model do not change when I drop single-district entrants.
22

The confidence bounds run parallel to the predicted effect due to the almost completely uniform distri-

bution of party capacity values over the range depicted on the x-axis.
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Figure 2. Win Potential’s Effect on the Odds of Entry Across Different Values of Lagged Party Capacity

parties, but increases the probability of entry by only about 3% for high capacity parties.
Additionally, the confidence intervals on these two predictions indicate that we can be surer
about a statistically discernible difference at the lower end than we can at the higher end.
The other explanatory variables also exert statistically discernible impacts on the probability of entry. First, in support of H3, we can see that increasing logged district magnitude
across its interquartile range increases the probability of entry by about 21%. In support of
H4, we see that when a party has previously invested resources in an electoral district, it is
markedly more likely to enter that district in the next election. Indeed, previous investment
jumps to the fore as having the most important impact on entry decisions. After having previously invested resources in a district, it seems that parties have a infrastructure in place
that they can return to in subsequent elections. That the value of this infrastructure might
outweigh the party’s actual electoral performance in the district is a potentially interesting
finding that deserves greater exploration. This result points to the relatively static nature
of party competition among those entrants that do not uniformly contest all districts. By
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Table 2. Predicted Probabilities of Entry for Each Explanatory Variable

Low
Win Potential

High
Win Potential

Low Capacity

0.51
[ 0.49, 0.53 ]

0.55
[ 0.53, 0.57 ]

High Capacity

0.58
[ 0.56, 0.60 ]

0.60
[ 0.58, 0.62 ]

Low
Magnitude

High
Magnitude

0.56
[ 0.53, 0.59 ]

0.68
[ 0.65, 0.71 ]

Previously
Uninvested

Previously
Invested

0.05
[ 0.04, 0.06 ]

0.61
[ 0.59, 0.63 ]

H1 & H2

H3
“Average” Case

H4
“Average” Case

Notes: Low Capacity and High Capacity examples include setting logged district magnitude to its mean
and setting previous investment to 1. Average Case examples include setting other variables at their means.
Random district-level and party-election-level intercept values were held at their means across all examples.
In all cases “low” indicates the first quartile value and “high” indicates the third quartile value.
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examining a selectively entering party’s choice of entry decisions in its first election, we can
learn quite a bit about its long-run patterns of entry.
Of course, these probabilities of entry will look different for different parties and herein
lies the utility of hierarchical models. The hierarchical modeling strategy allows for random
intercepts at the level of the party-election. As indicated graphically in Figure 1 and by the
variances reported in Table 1, we see important variance in these random intercepts both
within and across countries, indicating that the underlying probability of entry for differentlyendowed parties and more-or-less regionalized parties are affected in different capacities by
the model’s explanatory variables. There is obvious evidence that different parties assign
varying importance to different factors when making their entry decisions. As is the case in
the United Kingdom – where regionalized parties like the Scottish National Party and Plaid
Cymru compete next to more nationalized parties such as Labour and niche parties like
UKIP and the Greens – parties employ diverse strategies in pursuing their electoral goals.
A hierarchical model employing data disaggregated to the district level is sufficiently flexible
to allow parties to retain their diversity. In a sense, the modeling approach makes far fewer
assumptions about parties’ behavior than do studies that focus on national-level data or do
not make adequate use of the natural hierarchies in the data structure.

Conclusion
I began this paper by pointing out a theoretically important gap in the literature on strategic party entry and, furthermore, by demonstrating that this gap in our understanding of
electoral politics has left us without an explanation for important empirical variation at the
subnational level. Investigating the entry decisions of parties at the aggregated national level
obscures a vitally important additional strategic calculation that these parties must conduct:
how do selectively entering parties decide on a subset of all possible electoral constituencies
in which to enter? Due to the fact that most parties around the world are selectively entering
parties, this is a question in need of answering. Prior to this study, the question of selective
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entry has never been addressed at the district level in a comparative fashion. In those terms,
this paper marks the first effort to frame district-by-district entry decisions in a hierarchical
data structure that directly models the implicit tradeoffs these selectively entering parties
face in deciding where to field candidates or party lists.
I argue that win potential – a ratio that encapsulates both the marginality of the district’s
cheapest seat as well as the extent of poor voter coordination – serves as an important
informational cue to selectively entering parties. As win potential increases, ceteris paribus,
parties should enter a district with higher probability. This relationship should be qualified,
however, depending on party capacity or the amount of resources a party has with which
to field candidates in multiple districts. Indeed, as party capacity increases, the tradeoffs
inherent in entering one district at the expense of entering any one of a number of others
should diminish. At lower levels of party capacity, where a selectively entering party can only
enter a very small subset of all possible districts, these tradeoffs make themselves felt and
parties in such positions rely more heavily on the information carried by the win potential
ratio. Increasing win potential does indeed have a positive and statistically discernible impact
on a party’s probability of entry in a given district. The same holds true for party capacity.
The analysis also confirms previous findings on electoral competition, but frames them in
a new perspective. That district magnitude should consistently turn up as positively impacting a party’s probability of entry is not at all surprising. Indeed, a long line of studies has
demonstrated that district magnitude is one of the main determinants (if not the primary
determinant) of the raw number of entrants in a district as well as the effective number of
parties. The value added of the findings presented in this study, however, is the explicit
modeling of the tradeoffs selectively entering parties face as they deliberate simultaneously
over a number of dichotomous entry decisions. Rather than simply understanding electoral
coordination as a district-level phenomenon that structures generic numbers of parties with
generic vote distributions, the findings of this paper point to a party-level causal story about
why this might be the case. I am able to demonstrate that selectively entering parties enter
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districts with larger magnitudes specifically at the expense of entering districts with comparatively smaller magnitudes. The same is true for those districts where parties previously
invested resources: parties clearly prefer to reenter districts they are familiar with rather
than strike out into new territory.
Beginning to understand the determinants of selective entry is an important step in
refining what we know about party system nationalization and social preference aggregation.
Nationalization is typically studied as a demand-side phenomenon: when voters uniformly
support parties across districts, then a party system is thought to be nationalized in nature.
But this conceptualization takes as given the fact that all voters are presented with the
same party offerings. The same is true when thinking about ballots as choice sets and
when treating the outcomes of elections as articulations of meaningful social choice: without
meeting the prerequisite of uniform ballots, we have to be wary of collective preferences.
Whenever a party enters one district, but not another, it inserts a complication for voters –
in the aggregate – when it comes time for them to choose some parties over others or support
some parties more broadly than others. Indeed, “nationalization” in vote distributions and
“choices” on ballots in the aggregate do not mean what we think they mean when most parties
are entering districts selectively. Broad-based party support and collective preferences, as
concepts, are most informative either when most parties universally enter all districts or –
as this is rarely the case – when we can accurately account for patterns of selective entry.
This study is an important first step, then, in deepening the conceptual usefulness of party
system nationalization and electoral balloting choices.
Avenues for future research are manifold. A subset of countries from this cross-national
data set could be integrated with data on party resources, party organization, and campaign
finance laws in an effort to model more explicitly the party capacity concept developed in
this paper. Although I control for previous entry decisions, the modeling strategy in itself is
not evolutionary in nature and, on this front (especially with additional data collection that
might extend the time series within each party) explicitly modeling the process by which a
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new party first enters a few districts and then strategically develops over time into a more
major political player could evince important evolutionary dynamics. In considering how any
one party pits itself against a range of competing parties, we might also begin to understand
how parties jockey against similarly-oriented parties (either in ideological or financial terms)
for district-by-district holds on different constituencies within the same country.
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Appendix A: Modeling Country-Level Covariates
I have argued that the best predictive model of selective entry – a phenomenon that varies
at the subnational level – should be predicated on variables that can assume different values
below the level of the country as a whole. While certain types of national level institutions
may incentive a party to enter more or fewer districts overall, it would be difficult to argue,
say, that the fact that a country is a presidential democracy should have any bearing on
a party’s decision to enter any specific district at the expense of entering another. Indeed,
the model without country-level covariates presented above exhibits a strong fit to the data
(showing dramatic improvement over a null model that just includes a lagged dependent
variable and intercepts at the district- and party-election-level) and correctly models about
96% of more than a half-million observations.
However, drawing on the full scope of the data set’s inherent hierarchy, in this appendix
I include a model with several country-level covariates. This robustness check demonstrates
that the statistically significant impact of win potential, district magnitude, and previous
investment on a party’s probability of entry hold in the face of controlling for the extent of
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, whether or not the country is federal, whether or not the
country is a parliamentary democracy, whether or not the country’s electoral system is a
proportional one, and the total number of districts in the country as a proxy for its size.
The first of these controls is taken from Fearon (2003), the next from Treisman (2007), and
the remainder are taken from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions. Due to
limited data availability, the number of countries included in the analysis is 34.
As can be seen in the table below, the highly statistically significant relationships between
the original variables and the probability of entry all maintain. Of the country-level covariates, the only variables that come close to this level of significance are federalism and the
number of districts, which are signed in intuitive directions: in more federalized countries,
selectively entering parties are less likely to enter broadly and as the number of districts
increases, these parties are also less likely to enter any given district.
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Table A1: Hierarchical Logistic Regression Model of the Probability of Entry with Country Covariates

Estimate

95% C.I.

Original Variables
Win Potential
Party Capacityt−1
Potential x Capacityt−1
Previous Investment
Magnitude (Logged)

0.05
0.53
-0.06
3.61
0.48

[
[
[
[
[

0.03 , 0.07
0.49 , 0.57
-0.07, -0.05
3.56 , 3.66
0.44 , 0.52

]
]
]
]
]

Country-Level Variables
Fractionalization
Federalism
Parliamentarism
Proportional
Number of Districts

-0.16
-0.81
-0.21
-0.70
-1.13

[
[
[
[
[

-0.38, 0.06
-1.32,-0.30
-0.63, 0.24
-1.46, 0.03
-1.57,-0.68

]
]
]
]
]

Intercept

-2.80

[

-3.40,-2.21

]

σ̂d2

0.14
1.32
0.55
1.00

N
N
N
N

2
σ̂pe

σ̂c2

2
σ̂ped

districts
party-elections
obs.
countries

3,703
3,919
520,046
34

Notes: The estimates for all of the original variables remain statistically significant at the p ≤ 0.001 level.
Of the country-level variables, the only two that come close to this level of significance are federalism and
the number of districts. All coefficients have been mean-centered.
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Appendix B: Selective Entry in Regionalized Systems
A straightforward objection to the theory I presented above would be to argue that selectively
entering parties are overwhelmingly regional parties and that these parties enter specifically
(and simply) in “their” region’s electoral districts and nowhere else. In this case, knowing
whether or not a district falls in a given region should be sufficient to predict whether the
party entered the district and this consideration should override the other explanations I have
already advanced. While I have previously argued that the conceptual label of “selectively
entering party” actually incorporates a much broader range of “types” of parties beyond
only regional parties, I grant that the argument has merit and I attempt to address it
in this appendix. Accounting for the extent to which the content of individual parties’
policy platforms are “regionalized” in a cross-national study is nearly impossible. Instead, I
demonstrate that my results hold in particular in countries with marked regional cleavages
and with patterns of regional competition.
Brancati (2008) demonstrates that the extent of political decentralization in a country
is positively linked to the formation and success of regionalized parties. When freestanding
regional parliaments exists, for example, region-based parties have additional incentives to
compete in elections. I select a subset of “decentralized” (as identified by Brancati) countries
from my data and run the same regression models as above. These countries include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, the UK, the US, and Venezuela.
As can be seen in Table 1 below, the coefficients remain statistically significant, similarly
signed, and retain their relative magnitudes. Party capacity plays a slightly less substantial
role in determining entry, perhaps because while a party’s capacity in a particular region
may be quite high, its capacity in the country more generally could be rather low. This
makes party capacity (which is measured at the national level) a less informative predictor
of entry for regionalized parties that do not necessarily have an interest in contesting all of
a country’s districts.
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Table B1: Hierarchical Logistic Regression Model of the Probability of Entry (Regionalized Country Subset)

Estimate
Win Potential
Party Capacityt−1
Potential x Capacityt−1
Previous Investment
Magnitude (Logged)
Intercept
σ̂d2
2
σ̂pe
2
σ̂ped
N districts
N party-elections
N obs.

0.08
0.59
-0.10
3.93
0.52
-3.27
0.14
3.92
1.00

95% C.I.
[
[
[
[
[
[

0.06 , 0.10
0.51 , 0.67
-0.12, -0.08
3.88 , 3.98
0.46 , 0.58
-3.35, -3.19

]
]
]
]
]
]

2,496
2,733
467,922

Notes: All coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the p ≤ 0.001 level. All coefficients have been
mean-centered to aid in comparability. The bounds of the 95% confidence intervals were generated from
1,000 simulated draws of the model’s parameters.
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Appendix C: Correcting for Spatial Autocorrelation
Spatial autocorrelation in outcome variables arise from the fundamental proposition that
units of observation (in this case, electoral districts) that are spatially closer together are
more similar than those districts that are spatially further apart (Tobler, 1970). When it
comes to selective party entry, it is reasonable to assume that, having made the choice to
invest resources in contesting a given district, a party might more cheaply also contest a
contiguous district rather than a district that is further removed. This is due to a number of
reasons. The constituents in two districts that are located in close proximity to one another
will, with higher probability, share more characteristics in common than constituents living
in two districts that are further apart (Johnston, 1992; Chen and Rodden, 2009). This is
especially the case if two districts fall within the same region in a country where regions
are politically salient. It might also be the case that a campaign office in a given district
or a set of volunteers or employees can easily be shuttled to a contiguous district. Media
markets, like those in the United States, may also subsume multiple contiguous electoral
districts, thereby making it easier for a party to cover contiguous districts with television
advertisements after they have already paid to do so in one. The presence of such spatial
autocorrelation in entry decisions poses a potential challenge to the theory developed in this
paper. After all, the relationship between win potential and the probability of entry may
be significantly weakened after accounting for the simple fact that parties prefer to cluster
their entry decisions so as to make use of increasing returns to scale on their investment
of resources. Adding an additional district is comparatively cheaper if it is proximate to
preexisting campaign resources than if it is much further away.
Recently, spatial autocorrelation has received greater attention as a methodological issue
in the field of political science (Franzese and Hays, 2008), especially in studies of policy
diffusion (Beck, Gleditsch and Beardsley, 2006), and electoral geography (Rodden, 2010).
However, the methodological toolkit is still somewhat limited. A potential approach to
accounting for autocorrelation would be a post-estimation correction on the coefficient es40

timates produced by regression analysis. The first step toward taking this approach would
be to calculate Moran’s autocorrelation coefficient (Moran, 1950) which – if it indicated
evidence of spatial dependency – could then be employed in adjusting the standard errors
of regression coefficients. Calculating Moran’s I becomes rather complicated in hierarchical models, however, and there is some debate as to whether it is an appropriate tool for
addressing autocorrelation in dichotomous outcomes.1
As an alternative to post-estimation adjustments in the standard errors of the regression
coefficients, then, I construct an intuitively appealing measure of contiguous clustering that
provides a measure of a party’s general proclivity to selectively enter districts in such a way
that it would capitalize on the increasing returns to scale arising from geographic proximity.2
Consider a given district di for i, ..., n districts that a party p entered in a given election and
any district dj that is contiguous to di .3 Let Entry(dj ) = 1 when the party entered the
contiguous district dj and 0 if it did not. We can then define:
PJ

j=1 Entry(dj ) = 1
PJ
PJ
j=1 Entry(dj = 0)
j=1 Entry(dj = 1) +

contiguous clustering for p in di =

PN
contiguous clustering for p =
1

i=1

!

contiguous clustering for p in di
N

A second potential approach would be to calculate a clustering coefficient of the type seen in network

analysis (Holland and Leinhardt, 1971; Watts and Strogatz, 1998). However, given the structure of the data,
an application of network theory would involve bipartite (two interdependent) networks – one of district
contiguities and one of party entry decisions – and the complexity of calculating this value across multiple
networks extends beyond the scope of this study.
2

I choose to cast this measure at the level of the party rather than the district to account for the fact

that some parties will rely on geographic returns to scale more than others. While a measure of clustering
at the district level would encapsulate some aspects of clustering in entry decisions, it would not embody
different parties’ varying reliance on geographic clustering.
3

In the case of Spain, i ranges from 1 to 52 while j ranges from 0 to 8 contiguous districts.
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In words, for every district that the party enters, consider the full set of contiguous districts
that surround it. Calculate the proportion of potential contiguous districts that it actually
entered. Average across these district-level proportions to arrive at a measure for a given
party in a given election of the extent to which geographic proximity informed its selective
entry decisions. Because the resulting metric is an average proportion, it ranges from 0 (in
the case where a party entered only one district or a subset of districts with no contiguous
connections) to 1 (in the case where a party entered all contiguous districts in a country).
Consider Figure C1 below for a graphical depiction.
Each panel depicts the mainland districts in Spain, with shaded districts indicating hypothetical patterns of selective entry. In the upper right panel, we see a party that selectively
chose to enter only in those districts in the region of Catalonia. These districts are obviously clustered together and, to that extent, necessitate a high contiguous clustering value.
However, there are still contiguous districts that the party could have potentially entered,
yet did not. To this end, the only way for a party to have a contiguous clustering score of
1 would be to enter every mainland district.4 Now consider the drop in the metric’s value
in the upper left panel, where the party chooses to enter the same number of districts, but
shifts one of its entry decisions to a non-contiguous district. Below this, in the bottom left
panel, is a party that again entered the same number of districts, but without taking into
consideration the increasing returns to scale offered by contiguous districts. Finally, in the
bottom right panel, we see an instance of selective entry with two poles. Here is a party
whose entry decisions are informed somewhat by geographic proximity, but also by other
considerations.
While I argue that this contiguous clustering variable is, in the main, capturing the sorts
of geographic dependencies we would like it to, I should also point out that there is a clear
relationship between contiguous clustering and a previous concept I defined earlier, party
4

Entry in Spain’s island districts do not contribute to this score as they are not contiguous to any districts.
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Figure C1: Four Representative Patterns of Entry and the Contiguous Clustering Value They Induce (Note:
Catalonia-Only Entry Depicted in Upper Right Panel)
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capacity. Their relationship is illustrated graphically in Figure C2 below.5 Intuitively, at
low levels of party capacity, contiguous clustering can either take a high or low value. It is
here that the clustering metric is at its most informative, because as party capacity grows
it becomes harder for entry patterns to not look like geographic clustering. Up to party
capacity around 0.5, however, we still see fairly dramatic variation in contiguous clustering,
with many of Spain’s regional parties (such as the Catalonian example presented in the above
figure) located in the heavy dark patches toward the upper left quadrant of the graphic.

Figure C2: Plot Illustrating the Relationship Between Party Capacity and Contiguous Clustering (points
have been jittered slightly to better illustrate areas of density).

5

Recall that instances of party-election “no entry” and “total entry” are not included in the analysis, as

they both indicate a lack of variation in the outcome variable.
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To this extent, as party capacity was hypothesized to curb the effect of win potential on
the probability of entry so, too, should contiguous clustering exert a less informative positive
impact on entry at higher levels of party capacity. This is because, at a certain point, parties
have the resources to enter so many districts in the country that they (a) no longer have
to rely on the hypothesized increasing returns to scale and (b) begin to develop different
goals in electoral competition, such as creating a national presence in the electorate. This
is evinced fairly clearly in Figure C4, where most of the observations on party capacity fall
either below 0.2 or above 0.8. At a certain point in a parties’ growth, they simply seem to
break in favor of broader, more national electoral competition.
Including the contiguous clustering variable in a hierarchical model of selective entry in
Spain should provide a fuller explanation of the variation in entry we observe in the country.
Like party capacity, this is a variable that would be cast at the party-election level. Initial
modeling efforts indicate that controlling for contiguous clustering does, indeed, slightly
weaken the other statistical relationships described in this paper: parties in Spain do seem
to pay attention to district contiguities when making entry decisions. However, as examining
this phenomenon in just one country is too limited for a true test of the theory and as
constructing the contiguous clustering variable for every country in the data set would be
an enormous undertaking, I set aside a cross-national test for future work. At a minimum,
I hope that this appendix has illustrated some possible ways to think about (and eventually
account for) the challenges posed by spatial autocorrelation.
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Appendix D: Out-of-Sample Predictions in Malaysia in 1964
Another method by which we can evaluate the predictive power of a statistical model is to
examine its efficiency in making “out-of-sample” predictions or, put differently, in making
predictions in those countries and elections that were not originally included in the sample
of observations that was employed to estimate the model’s parameters. In order to do this,
I went looking for a country from a time period that was about as far removed as possible
from the data that went into estimating the model that appears in this paper. I quickly
settled in on Malaysia which, surprisingly enough, was a well-functioning democracy for
about a decade in the 1950s and 1960s. In the middle of this time period, the country held
two democratic elections using an SMD system with 100 districts spread across 11 highly
distinct regions. As a check of the model’s predictive power, I pulled electoral data for two
very different Malaysian parties – one small and one quite a bit larger – across these two
elections. I will use the parties’ respective characteristics and previous levels of performance
in the first election to model their probabilities of entry for each of the 100 districts in the
second election, which took place in 1964.
In the absence of a very detailed district-level map of Malaysia in 1964, I was at least
able to determine which electoral districts belonged in each of the 11 regions. A stylized
representation of these districts overlaid on the actual boundaries of Malaysia’s regions appears in Figure D1 below. Although I do not know specifically where each of these districts
fell relative to one another inside of each region, we can be sure about where they stand in
geographic relation to districts in other regions throughout the country. Successfully predicting these entry decisions is going to be a difficult task, considering the fact that the model
used to make these predictions is hierarchical in nature and thus includes random intercepts
at multiple levels of the data. Due to being an out-of-sample prediction, these parties and
districts, and this country cannot be assigned an appropriate set of random intercepts. Accordingly, I simply hold all of the model’s random intercepts at their means (a crude, but
sufficient approach) and employ the rest of the model’s covariates as I normally would.
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Figure D2 depicts the predicted probabilities of entry generated by the model for the
People’s Progressive Party in 1964. Recall that these probabilities are being generated
by each district’s win potential value from the previous election, the party’s capacity, and
whether or not it previously invested resources in a district. Magnitude is held constant
due to the fact that each of these districts has a single representative. In gradations, higher
levels of probability of entry are darkly shaded. The actual entry decisions are overlaid
with heavier black points. Clearly, the party missed some possible opportunities, but by
and large, the party entered where the model would expect it to. The PPP only re-entered
40% of the districts it entered in the previous election, so previous investment is not singlehandedly driving these results. Additionally, even though the PPP is clearly a regional party
(focusing its efforts in Perack), within that region, it is distinguishing critically between
districts. Holding constant magnitude and regional characteristics, then, as well as noting
the comparatively low level of re-entry, we can conclude that variation in win potential is
making a difference (even if only at the margins) in the successful prediction of entry.
Figure D3 depicts the predicted probabilities of entry for a much larger selectively entering party, the Malayan People’s Party. If we examine the actual entry decisions – again
represented by black points – we can see that the model correctly predicts about two-thirds
of the entry decisions of the MPP. Here again, the MPP only repeated its entry decisions
from the previous election about 57% of the time. Although the model is not quite as effective in its predictions for this party, here is an additional – and interesting – aside: in the
districts where the MPP entered “correctly” (in the sense that it entered where the model
indicates it “should” have) it received on average 28% of the votes. In those districts where
it entered “incorrectly” it received only 21% of the votes. This difference across the correct
and incorrect districts is also statistically significant, as indicated by a simple difference-ofmeans t-test. So perhaps the model made a few mistakes in prediction for this party, but
the party would have done well to pay better attention to the models results!
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Malaysian Regions and “Districts” 1964

Perlis

Kedah

Kelantan

Penang
Trengganu
Perack

Selangor

Pehang

Negri
Sembila

Malacca
Johoree

Figure D1: Stylized District-Level Representations of the Separate Regions of Malaysia in 1964.
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Predicted versus Actual Entry: PPP 1964

Pr(Entry)
> 0.7
> 0.6
> 0.5
< 0.5

Figure D2: Predicted District-Level Probabilities of Entry and Actual Instances of Entry for the People’s
Progressive Party in 1964. Color gradations indicate increasingly high levels of predicted probability while
black points indicate actual entry decisions.
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Predicted versus Actual Entry: MPP 1964

Pr(Entry)
> 0.7
> 0.6
> 0.5
< 0.5

Figure D3: Predicted District-Level Probabilities of Entry and Actual Instances of Entry for the Malayan
People’s Party in 1964. Color gradations indicate increasingly high levels of predicted probability while black
points indicate actual entry decisions.
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– Paper 2 –
Within-District and Cross-District Latent Diversity
and Their Impacts on Party System Size

Abstract: Scholars have long hypothesized that the size of a country’s party system is
jointly determined by its latent demographic diversity and its electoral rules. However, in
studies of this relationship, no clear consensus exists regarding the best operationalization of
the latent diversity of a society. Furthermore, the relationship between latent diversity and
electoral rules, on the one hand, and the effective number of parties, on the other, has never
been tested at the level of the electoral district in a cross-national comparative context. This
paper aims to fill both holes while, at the same time, introducing the novel concept of crossdistrict diversity. I find that the extent to which populations across districts are similar to
one another exerts a substantial qualifying impact on the relationship between district-level
diversity and the effective number of parties at the district level. This finding emerges from
a statistical analysis that includes more than 2,563 electoral districts in a diverse set of 29
democracies.

Introduction
The number and relative sizes of political parties participating in elections have long interested scholars of electoral politics. This has largely been due to the fact that the effective
number of parties in a political system is a powerful explanatory variable for many important
outcomes of interest. Indeed, a large body of scholarship has demonstrated both theoretically
and empirically that whether party systems are comprised of many (and smaller) parties or
few (and larger) parties has profound implications for the extent of strategic coordination
among both voters and political elites (Cox, 1997; Duverger, 1954), the extent of convergence
in parties’ ideological positions (Downs, 1957; Grofman, 2004), the degree to which policymaking in the legislature is reflective of changes in the distribution of voters’ ideological
positions (Powell, 2000; Przeworski, Stokes and Manin, 1999), the extent to which democratic representation is consensual in nature (Lijphart, 1999; Lijphart and Crepaz, 1991), the
level of consolidation (or democratic maturity) in the party system (Bielasiak, 2002; Sartori,
1976), and even the nature of internal party organization (Mair, 1990; Katz and Mair, 1995).
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Scholars have also devoted considerable time and energy to exploring the determinants
of the effective number of parties in its own right. Early studies relying on both sociological
(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rae and Taylor, 1970) and institutional (Duverger, 1954; Rae,
1967) explanations for the effective number of parties have recently been updated by theoretical and empirical efforts to demonstrate that it is really social diversity in interaction
with electoral rules that shape the contours of party system size (Amorim Neto and Cox,
1997; Clark and Golder, 2006; Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994; Stoll, 2008). While a country’s underlying pattern of social divisions might suggest a “natural” number of sustainable
party offerings, the actual number of offerings may deviate significantly depending on the
permissiveness or restrictiveness of the country’s electoral institutions (Cox, 1997). Thus,
examining only one or the other variable can lead to incorrect estimates of the size of the
party system (Clark and Golder, 2006).
However, as I will argue in this paper, aspects of the relationship between social diversity
and electoral institutions, on the one hand, and the effective number of parties, on the other,
remain under-studied or, even, unstudied. This is due to a number of reasons. First, studies
of this relationship have tended to rely on a mismatch of data to theory (Stoll, 2008). While
early theoretical arguments about voter and elite electoral coordination were very clearly cast
at the district – and not national – level (Cox, 1999; Duverger, 1954; Singer and Stephenson,
2009), due to data limitations, scholars have typically relied on either national-level electoral
data or national-level social diversity data (Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997; Ordeshook and
Shvetsova, 1994; Singer and Stephenson, 2009; Stoll, 2008). Thus, it has only been in the past
few years, with the emergence of large, district-level repositories of vote data and surveybased demographic databases, that correctly investigating this theoretical relationship has,
strictly speaking, even become possible.
Second, a large and on-going debate exists about the appropriate methodology researchers
should invoke when operationalizing social diversity (which is an inherently latent and difficult concept to measure). Indeed, as Stoll (2008) has convincingly argued, the choice of
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measurement tool by itself can explain much of the variation we see across studies in support
for the conditional hypothesis linking diversity and institutions to party system size. While
scholars such as Posner (2004) and Fearon (2003) have relied on measurements of fractionalization (whether across ethnic, linguistic or religious groups), other scholars have advanced
entropic metrics (Page, 2011), metrics of “cross-cuttingness” across two cleavage dimensions
selected a priori for their relevancy (Selway, 2011), or measures of internal cohesion, like
those which would be used to gauge inter-coder reliability (Crisp, Olivella and Potter, 2013).
At the end of the day, then, even if the data-driven problems related to level of analysis
were remedied, scholars still have at this point no clearly best methodology by which to
operationalize social diversity.
Third, and most importantly, I argue it is not only diversity within electoral districts,
but also diversity across electoral districts that should matter for predicting a district’s
effective number of parties. Stoll (2008) notes that variation in the extent of diversity across
districts within the same country could potentially impact this relationship. Due to the
fact that political parties and voters hardly ever participate in electoral competition in their
district without also having some information about the broader electoral dynamics playing
out in other districts, it seems necessary to situate the level of diversity in any individual
district in the broader context of diversity across all districts. Given recent trends in the
study of party system nationalization (Morgenstern, Swindle and Castagnola, 2009), party
platform linkage or aggregation across districts (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004; Cox, 1999),
and voter coordination (Singer and Stephenson, 2009), it is time to also treat diversity as
something that might saliently vary within the confines of the same country and differentially
impact voters’ and parties’ coordination efforts in any given individual district. Indeed, as
I will argue theoretically and demonstrate empirically, when we take into consideration
this broader context, we begin to see that district-level party system size is differentially
affected by within-district and cross-district latent diveristy. In order to begin thinking
about this more complex mutlilevel relationship, however, we must first satisfy the data and
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measurement prerequisites mentioned above.
Although these prerequisites have not been met in previous studies, I aim to address them
in this paper. Employing district-level survey data about social diversity from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and district-level electoral data collected from various sources,
I am able to correctly test the conditional hypothesis relating diversity and institutions to
the effective number of parties. Perhaps more importantly than this, however, I develop
a novel method of combining voters’ differences across multiple social divisions and then
demonstrate theoretically how within-district and cross-district diversity can work at cross
purposes in determining the effective number of parties at the district level. My argument
is that, while increasing diversity at the district level drives up the “natural” number of
potentially differentiable party platforms, increasing diversity across districts makes it more
difficult for parties to pitch the same platform (and its attendant campaign messages, resources, and infrastructure) across different districts. Thus, while increasing diversity within
a district drives up the effective number of parties in that district, driving up diversity across
districts should modify the strength of this relationship.
In order to appropriately demonstrate this differential effect between within-district and
cross-district diversity, I first use a “topics model” or Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)
model to sort individuals into groups based on their responses to several demographic questions. This methodology has many advantages over previous metrics of latent diversity, the
most important being that it makes no a priori assumptions about which and how many
social divisions are the most salient. I then use the LDA latent number of groups and the
number of individuals within each group to construct my main explanatory variables: the
effective number of groups or (ENG) both within and across electoral districts. I am able to
demonstrate that “high diversity” (which has previously only been measured at the national
level) can either be a result of high levels of diversity within each individual district or,
alternatively, large differences in composition between socially homogeneous districts. Using
both within-district ENG and cross-district ENG as explanatory variables, I then build a
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hierarchical linear model of the effective number of electoral parties. I find that distinguishing between types of diversity provides a more complete and accurate understanding of the
determinants of party system size and also has important implications for our understanding
of other electoral phenomena such as party system nationalization and party system consolidation. In the next section, I will first briefly review the extant literature on this question
before then developing in detail my arguments regarding within- and cross-district diversity.

Diversity, Institutions, and Party Systems
In a recent summary of the state of the literature on diversity and electoral institutions, Stoll
(2008) defines social cleavage as: “large-scale divisions within a society that are exogenous to
the political system” (p. 1441). To drive home both the exogeneity of these social divisions
as well as the importance of thinking about diversity in continuous terms (rather than as a
sorting of disjointed groups, for instance) she adopts the terminology latent diversity which I
will also employ in this paper. As a collection of individuals’ latent diversity increases, so too
does the aggregated complexity of their behaviors, interactions and – most importantly for
electoral politics – their political preferences (Page, 2011). As increasingly different types of
individuals bring increasingly complex permutations of preferences to the table, the number
of (potentially) differentiable party platforms increases (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rae and
Taylor, 1970). Obviously an electoral district with some wealthly Catholic voters and some
poorer Protestant voters harbors a more complex set of preferences than a district that is
homogeneously Protestant and wealthy. Accordingly, we would expect more party offerings
in the former situation than in the latter.
Thus, as Cox (1997) has argued, the level of latent diversity in an electoral district suggests a “natural number” of potentially distinguishable party platforms (p. 140). Given an
underlying distribution of voters across a variable number of social dimensions – and assuming that more similar people have more similar preferences – political elites will construct
party platforms to cater to the needs of different groups, so long as they are substantial
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enough in size (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rae and Taylor, 1970). Less conducive to party
system growth are constituencies that are homogeneous in construction, where the “natural number” of platforms is severely circumscribed and there exist fewer opportunities for
parties to differentiate themselves from one another. Following from this discussion is a
straightforward and well-known hypothesis:
H1: As latent diversity within an electoral district increases, the effective number
of electoral parties in that district will increase.
A separate literature predicated on electoral institutions argues that district magnitude
is the primary determinant of the effective number of parties at the district level. Beginning
with Duverger (1954), who speculated that two-party systems arise from single-member district systems because voters are unwilling to waste their votes on non-viable party offerings,
more recent scholarship has generalized this relationship to multi-member districts with magnitudes greater than one (Cox, 1997; Cox and Shugart, 1996; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989).
As district magnitude increases, the overall level of proportionality in the translation of votes
into seats does so as well, meaning that parties can reasonably hope to gain representation in
the legislature with comparatively fewer votes (Anckar, 1997; Benoit, 2001; Gallagher, 1991).
Additionally, voters in this setting face much lower probabilities of wasting their votes on
non-viable parties. This greater permissiveness induces more parties to compete and thus
drives up the effective number of parties:
H2: As an electoral district’s magnitude increases, the effective number of electoral parties in that district will increase.
However, as has been argued repeatedly, neither H1 nor H2 adequately account for the
interplay between diversity and electoral institutions (Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997; Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994). Specifically, electoral rules that shape the proportionality of
the vote-to-seat translation (most notably district magnitude) can perturb the number of
party offerings from the “natural number” that we would expect given an electoral district’s
underlying diversity (Clark and Golder, 2006; Cox, 1997). Given an underlying level of di56

versity, district magnitude must be sufficiently high if we are to realize the logic articulated
above in H1. Otherwise, even if parties can potentially offer a large number of differentiable platforms, high levels of disproportionality resulting from low district magnitudes will
compel voters to “defect” from their most-preferred party offering if they sense that it is
electorally non-viable. In this way, Cox (1997) argues that district magnitude serves as
an “upper bound” on the effective number of parties: increasing district magnitude mechanically increases proportionality, which should allow more parties to stake out electorally
viable positions predicated on underlying social divisions. Should this “upper bound” be set
comparatively low, however, potential avenues of political competition (as suggested by the
level of diversity) will not be mobilized during electoral competition. Strategic voters will
instead opt for larger parties with broader platforms (or with platforms that simply ignore
less salient social divisions). This line of reasoning leads to the “interaction” hypothesis:
H3: Increasing an electoral district’s latent diversity will only result in an increase
in the effective number of parties if the district’s magnitude is sufficiently large.
The “sufficiently large” qualifier in H3 is somewhat vague, but different studies have
placed differing levels of emphasis either on the overall conditionality of the relationship or
the specific marginal effect of one or the other variable. Recent work has also simplified
the relationship somewhat by positing that district magnitude exerts a “smaller impact”
in homogenous districts than it does in heterogeneous districts (Singer and Stephenson,
2009). In an effort to examine these slightly different formulations of the hypothesis, in the
discussion of the model’s results I will point out whether diversity’s impact on the effective
number of parties is noticeable for all values of district magnitude (i.e. is always increasing
and significant in district magnitude) or is noticeable only for certain levels of magnitude
(i.e. is insignificant below a certain threshold of district magnitude).
However, within-district diversity is not the only sociological variable that should matter for the effective number of parties in any given individual district. Scholars of electoral
politics are beginning to realize that studying the internal dynamics of any one district with57

out considering broader, cross-district considerations cannot provide a full explanation for
district-level dynamics. Singer and Stephenson (2009), for example, argue that, in countries
with variation in magnitude across districts, the presence of larger, multimember districts
at the same level of vote allocation should drive up the effective number of parties in singlemember districts. Having already gained a foothold in more permissive districts, the marginal
cost of fielding a candidate or list of candidates in a more restrictive district should be lower.
Additionally, scholars interested in partisan bias have argued that the distribution of voters
across districts should result in individual districts being “safer” for certain political parties than they should be (Cox and Katz, 1999; Grofman, Koetzle and Brunell, 1997; King
and Gelman, 1991). When geographic reality results in the concentration of like-minded
voters in the same districts, for example, then voters with minority political preferences in
such districts may lose out on meaningful representation (even if they constitute a substantial proportion of the electorate when summed across districts). Finally, studies of party
nationalization argue that similarities between districts falling in the same geographic region of a country will determine which and how many parties contest any individual district
within that region (Caramani, 2000; Jones and Mainwaring, 2003; Morgenstern, Swindle and
Castagnola, 2009). A party that caters to regional separatist interests, for instance, should
only enter districts in the region in question; to this extent, knowing whether or not an
individual district is a part of a distinguishable “region” of districts should shed some light
on whether the separatist party will appear on the ballot.
All of this indicates that no district is an electoral island, perfectly isolated from other
districts in the country. But what specific role might variation in diversity across districts
play in determining the effective number of parties in any one district? Imagine a hypothetical scenario of two electoral districts, A and B. In the first case, assume that the populations of both District A and District B are comprised of two groups and these groups might
best be described as mainly urban-dwelling Catholics and mainly rural-dwelling Protestants.
Suppose that a political party is laboring in advance of an election to construct a battery

58

of policies that it believes will be attractive to the urban-dwelling Catholic population in
District A. Having built this platform, no doubt this party would also garner relatively
commensurate levels of support in District B, given that its two groups are characterized
in the same way. Now, as a second case, consider a similar population in District A, but
split the Catholic population in District B evenly between urban-dwellers and rural-dwellers.
The platform the party built to cater to interests in District A will fail to net commensurate
support in District B. If the party has the resources, time, and energy to rework its platform,
then it might enter both districts and achieve similar levels of support; if not, it will either
abstain from entering District B or enter District B with a less-successful platform. Either
way, under this latter scenario, the effective number of parties in District B will decrease by
virtue of its relationship to District A.
Generalizing from this example, I argue that when the populations of different districts
resemble one another – i.e., when cross-district diversity is low – then the marginal cost to
a political party of fielding a candidate or a list of candidates in an additional district is
comparatively small. Having worked out the campaign infrastructure, advertising strategy,
policy prescriptions, and stump speech in this district, the same election apparatus is easily
implemented in some other similar district. The critical idea here is that while similarlycomprised constituencies respond in the same ways to the same party platforms and messages,
differently-comprised constituencies will require slightly different political messages. This
need to specifically tailor campaign platforms across districts will drive up the marginal
costs for a party in fielding a candidate in another dissimilar district in the country. Even if
the party should choose to field a candidate without putting forth the extra work to refine its
platform, this lack of effort will be met with smaller vote shares. In either case, the effective
number of parties will be lower (whether by lack of entry or less successful entry, given the
mismatch of platform to population) when districts are dissimilar.
A long line of electoral scholarship in both American and cross-national contexts has
argued in support of the idea that different constituencies respond differently to the same
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party platform. To begin, we have substantial evidence that a voter’s partisan affiliation
differentially predisposes her to accept information in campaign advertisements that challenge her ideology (Iyengar and Simon, 2000; Zaller, 1992, 1996). This is especially true with
voters possessing a lower level of interest in the election (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995).
Additionally, Sides and Karch (2008) find that under certain circumstances, “issue publics”
such as senior citizens, veterans, and parents respond differently to different content in political advertising and Abrajano (2005) finds that lower education Latino voters focus on
non-policy, personalistic cues whereas higher education Latino voters do not. Furthermore,
in the American context, it has been shown that the tone and content of negative adds
are much more important in determining turnout among independent voters than among
partisan affiliated voters (Kahn and Kenney, 1999) and in an experimental study in Brazil,
Desposato (2007) concludes that the impact of negative attack ads dampen turnout in lower
social classes, but not higher social classes. Finally, in a cross-national study of voters’ abilities to “learn” about party platforms over the course of a campaign, Arceneaux (2006) finds
that learning effects are more pronounced among individuals with lower levels of political
sophistication.
The the extent, then, that electoral districts are comprised of varying numbers of independent voters, veterans, parents, young people, poorer people, better educated people,
politically sophisticated people, and so on, parties must invest in tailoring their platforms,
advertising strategies – and, really, the entire approach of their campaigns – to specific
districts. In an effort to win the support of different types of people (thereby increasing
their overall vote totals), parties will have to tailor different versions of their platforms. If
not, different-looking constituencies will respond differently to the same (un-tailored) platform. As districts become increasingly dissimilar to one another, fielding candidates or
candidate lists across numerous districts becomes increasingly burdensome. By contrast,
when districts are similar in their composition, then the same platforms and communication
mechanisms should work across districts. In the aggregate, then, countries with higher levels
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of cross-district diversity might experience systemically lower district-level ENP figures because parties, in general, face higher costs of successful competition. This reasoning calls for
a qualification of the traditional and more straightforward “interaction” hypothesis that focuses only on within-district diversity. Specifically, I argue that higher levels of cross-district
diversity should actually dampen this interactive effect by virtue of making it harder for
parties to link their platforms across districts.
H4: Increasing a district’s diversity will only result in an increase in the effective
number of parties if its magnitude is sufficiently large and the level of crossdistrict diversity is sufficiently low.
Drawing the distinction between the two levels of diversity within a country allows us
to consider the full range of nuanced electoral dynamics resulting from the composition of
electoral constituencies. Consider two countries that have similar average levels of withindistrict diversity and similar electoral rules, but differ in their levels of cross-district diversity.
The theoretical expectation is that, even though the two countries have similar district-level
environments, the effective number of parties at the district level may still be systematically
lower in one country than in the other. This could be the case for one (or both) of two
reasons. First, because at least some parties in a country with comparatively high levels of
cross-district diversity will be unwilling to tailor their platforms and, thus, will opt not to
contest more districts. In this case, voters are presented with systematically fewer ballot
options to which they might lend their support. Second, at least some parties in a country
with high cross-district diversity will be unwilling to tailor their platforms but will still
enter districts broadly. In this case, voters will be confronted with a larger number of
ballot offerings, but fewer of these offerings will espouse policies that are relevant in their
constituencies. To test these implications of H4, I will use a hierarchical regression model
to estimate a triple-interaction between district magnitude and both types of diversity. But
first, I next describe in detail the method I employ to operationalize both within-district and
cross-district diversity and I also demonstrate that these are distinct empirical phenomena.
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Concepts and Measurements
As Stoll (2008) points out, there are a number of important questions that must be addressed
when thinking about an appropriate operationalization of latent diversity:
• Should we study one cleavage or many cleavages?
• On which cleavage(s) should we focus?
• Do we focus on “how many” groups or on “how much difference” between groups?
• Should we measure diversity in the aggregate or in individual districts?
Several other scholars have raised similar concerns about the ways in which latent diversity has been operationalized. In order to address the first question above, some scholars
have included multiple separate cleavages in their analysis (Annett, 2001; Powell, 1982) or
have attempted to explore the ways in which separate cleavages overlap one another (Selway,
2011). Focusing instead on answering the third question, other scholars have focused on the
extent of polarization between groups along a single demographic dimension (Posner, 2004)
as well as the relative sizes of these competing groups (Fearon, 2003). Recent research on
diversity issues unrelated to electoral politics has discussed a number of more complicated
entropic measures of diversity that attempt to capture both the number of “types” and the
distribution of individuals in a population across those “types” (Page, 2007, 2011). Finally,
a few scholars of electoral politics have paid close attention to answering the fourth question,
with Jones (1997, 2004), for example, attempting to disaggregate diversity below the level
of the country at large in order to show variation across units of analysis. Elsewhere, Crisp,
Olivella and Potter (2013) argue that measuring the variance in diversity across districts –
rather than simply the diversity of each district individually or the diversity of the country
as a whole – can lead to better tests of many important electoral dynamics. They advance a
measure of intercoder reliability predicated on Krippendorff’s α (Krippendorff, 2004, 2011)
that evaluates the extent to which each district similarly “codes” a set of constituency-level
demographic attributes.
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What is really needed is a measurement tool that can measure diversity both within districts and across them. Furthermore, the method should make no a priori conjectures either
about the number of cleavages that characterize the level of diversity or about which cleavage
is most salient. Finally, related to the third question, an ideal measurement tool would not
only sort individuals into distinct groups, but also take stock of the relative sizes of each
of these groups and their internal cohesion (which are concerns raised by both Page (2011)
and Selway (2011)). The “most correct” method, then, would be some sort of modeling
procedure that examines a group of individuals’ characteristics across a variety of demographic traits, iteratively sorts these individuals into various constellations of groups, and
then selects which sorting is the best fit to the underlying patterns in the data. Below, I will
argue that a probabilistic topic model is one such method capable of generating probability
distributions over several individuals’ group membership based on their demographic traits.1
I first discuss the method as it is applied to within-district latent diversity before illustrating
1

One might argue instead that clustering algorithms are a more logical starting point for the task of

iteratively sorting individuals into groups. Indeed, clustering algorithms have been increasingly employed by
scholars who work with questions of classification and taxonomy (Gordon, 1999; Hand, 1981; Huang, 1997;
MacQueen, 1967; Venables and Ripley, 2002). Despite the many different algorithmic specifications this
literature has developed, however, none of these are actually fit for the research question at hand. First, very
few clustering algorithms are appropriate for categorical data (Huang, 1997) and the demographic variables
under consideration are all categorical in nature. Second, many clustering algorithms either require the
researcher to specify the number of clusters (or groups) before estimation (thereby demanding a priori the
very thing we are interested in recovering from the method) or generate a vague partition of the data set (as
in the case of hierarchical clustering) that does not lend itself readily to interpretation. Additionally, even
if we were to run many iterations of a clustering algorithm with different pre-specified numbers of clusters,
it is very difficult to assess which of the resulting outcomes is a uniquely “best” fit to the data (Venables
and Ripley, 2002). Scholars such as Ray and Turi (1999) have discussed possible selection criteria based on
model fit and the minimization of error, but error can always be made smaller by piling on more clusters
and examining the marginal reduction in error of moving from, say, 2 clusters to 3 clusters is fraught with
ambiguity and subject to the researcher’s arbitrary selection of a marginal threshold.
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how it might be used to measure cross-district latent diversity.
Probabilistic topic modeling – in particular, Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) – is a
form of Bayesian hierarchical generative models developed by scholars of machine learning
in the 1990s and continues to see broad application in a variety of research fields (Blei,
Ng and Jordan, 2003; Griffiths and Steyvers, 2004; Hofmann, 1999). The methodology was
designed as an iterative classification algorithm that examines the types and frequencies of
words in a collection of documents and then returns a set of conceptual “topics” to which
the documents belonged. As with other generative models, the aim of LDA modeling is to
recover the set of latent variables that could have plausibly generated the pattern of observed
data (Steyvers and Griffiths, 2007). In most applications, the “observed data are the words
of each document” and the latent structure is “the topics themselves and how each document
exhibits them” (Blei and Lafferty, 2009, p. 73). The LDA approach can work with highly
dimensional, categorical data – such as that employed in survey research – and makes very
few a priori assumptions about how words and their frequencies should structure the final
description of the latent space. In fact, “because the number of topics is in general not
known, models with several different numbers of topics are fitted and the optimal number is
determined in a data-driven way” (Grün and Hornik, 2011, p. 7).
How is this done? As opposed to the results of other iterative algorithmic procedures
(such as k-modes or hierarchical clustering) the explanatory power and model fit of LDA
outputs can be evaluated with ready-made goodness-of-fit statistics like AIC or BIC. This is a
major advantage over other procedures, because it allows the researcher to evaluate whether
three or four or five, etc. topic groupings best describe the pattern of responses. The field
of machine learning has developed a goodness-of-fit statistic that is uniquely tailored to the
LDA process called perplexity (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003; Grün and Hornik, 2011; Steyvers
and Griffiths, 2007). A technical description of this statistic can be found in Blei, Ng and
Jordan (2003), but from a conceptual standpoint, the perplexity measure can be described
as the “inverse of the geometric mean per-word likelihood” and gives an estimate of the
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model’s generalized performance (Blei, Ng and Jordan, 2003, p. 1010). Lower perplexity
scores indicate that the LDA’s selection of the number of topics is a better fit to the latent
structure of the observed data.2
Newman et al. (2009) argue that LDA topic models are “among the most successful
recent algorithms for analyzing discrete data” (p. 1802) and Blei and Lafferty (2009) extol
the LDA approach’s flexibility and generalizability, noting its application in fields as diverse
as image recognition, population genetics, and social networking. LDA topic models have
even successfully been applied to survey data, which is particularly fitting given my approach
(Erosheva, Fienberg and Joutard, 2007). For demographic survey data, the “topics” of LDA
are conceptually repurposed as the number of “groups” we recover. Depending on the level
of analysis, either the respondents (in the case of within-district diversity) or the electoral
district (in the case of cross-district diversity) constitute the “documents.” Each respondent’s
demographic attributes (or each district’s distribution of these attributes across respondents)
constitute the “words” that, taken together, comprise the groups/topics.
Before demonstrating with a few examples how the LDA procedure classifies individual
survey respondents, I should recapitulate for clarity. Table 1 breaks down how each of
the LDA components can be applied as conceptual analogues in electoral politics. Within
each district, individual survey respondents are represented as “documents.” Within each
country, each district constitutes its own “document.” When measuring within-district latent
diversity, each individual’s pattern of responses to several demographic questions stands in
as “words.” Similarly, when measuring cross-district latent diversity, the responses from
each individual in a district are pooled and the distribution of their pooled responses serves
as a larger pot of “words.” The LDA modeling procedure is iteratively run n separate
times within each district, where n is the number of respondents. Each of these n iterations
is compared against one another and – using the perplexity goodness-of-fit criteria – the
2

The LDA procedure and perplexity goodness-of-fit statistics are easily calculated with R by using the

topicmodels package designed by Grün and Hornik (2011).
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Table 1. LDA Topic Modeling Analogies

Electoral Concept

LDA Concept

Example

Within-District

Survey Respondent
Demographic Attributes
Group

documents
words
topics

“John Doe”
“language:english”
“high-income english-speakers”

Cross-District

Electoral District
Distribution of Attributes
Group

documents
words
topics

“New York 5th Congressional”
“70% language:english”
“mostly english-speakers”

Both Levels

ENG

weighted
number
of topics

3.5, 1.3, etc.

uniquely best-fitting number of topics (or groups) is selected as that district’s latent number
of groups. The group membership of each individual respondent is then recovered so that
each group can be weighted by its size. This weighted statistic is the effective number of
groups or ENG within the district and constitutes one of my two main explanatory variables.
The ENG at the national level (i.e. cross-district latent diversity) is measured analogously.3
Examples are telling. Consider two attributes, religion and the urban-rule divide, and two
possible values within each attribute, { Protestant, Catholic } and { Urban, Rural }. When
we are interested in measuring within-district ENG, we “unfold” all permutations of these
attribute-values and examine the frequency of their appearance across survey respondents.
Each of these permutations – for example, { religion:protestant, divide:urban } – is a possible
“word” that could be exhibited by a survey respondent (or “document”). Not all possible
permutations must exist in a district; indeed, if there were no Catholics in this district,
3

The literature on topic models and LDA modeling, in particular, is well-developed. My discussion

here is simply intended to conceptually review the procedure and explain how it can be applied in studying
diversity. Readers who are interested in the mathematical specifics of topic models should refer to Blei, Ng
and Jordan (2003), Griffiths and Steyvers (2004), and Newman et al. (2009) for relatively accessible reviews.
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then the LDA construction of topics would come down to the relative balance of urban
Protestants versus rural Protestants. If we were to measure three values in the religion
attribute (by adding, say, Islamic), then more word permutations would be possible and this
more complicated demographic space can be easily handled by the flexibility inherent in the
LDA approach. In such complicated spaces, we might, for example, recover a large group
(or “topic”) represented by { religion:islamic, divide:urban, income:high, language:english }
alongside a much smaller group represented by { religion:catholic, divide:rural, income:high,
language:english }. The important point to be made is that the LDA approach selects the
defining characteristics of each group (and, subsequently, the number of groups) in an effort
to reduce the amount of error in classification as measured by the perplexity metric. The
data, however complex, speaks for itself insofar as certain demographic dimensions are given
more importance over others based on the ways in which all dimensions overlap one another.
As a second example, when it comes to measuring cross-district ENG, the process is
virtually identical except that now the “document” becomes the electoral district and –
instead of a survey respondent completely exhibiting { religion:protestant, divide:urban }
– respondents are distributed across possible permutations, meaning that a district might
have 70% of its respondents in the { religion:protestant, divide:urban } permutation. In the
cross-district LDA approach, then, districts with similar distributions across word permutations will ultimately be lumped into the same group. If all districts’ distributions of survey
respondents resemble one another, then the ENG figure will be quite low (around 1.0). If,
however, about half of the districts have mostly urban inhabitants and the remainder have
mostly rural inhabitants, then cross-district ENG will increase (around 2.0). If the addition
of more demographic attributes overlap in such a way that they partition the districts even
further (such as 25% of districts being mostly urban and Protestant, 25% of districts being
mostly Catholic and urban, etc.), then ENG will increase even more (to around 4.0).
Along these lines, a final important conceptual point is that the LDA approach is able
to sift through potentially highly dimensional spaces and – if warranted – return an ENG
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figure that is comparatively low. After all, just because we have information along the same
number of demographic attributes in Switzerland and Japan, this fact alone should not
return the same effective number of demographic groups. Rather, we are interested in how
all of these attributes overlap, reinforce, or fragment one another. This is a process that a
researcher is decidedly unable to manually engage in, especially in a cross-national analysis
involving several demographic attributes that can assume dozens of different values. The
data employed in this study, for example, includes six separate attributes, each of which can
assume anywhere from four to two-dozen values. As will be discussed below, within-district
ENG figures range from 1.0 to 9.3 across the various countries under consideration. This
level of nuance – though vitally critical for assessing the effect of diversity on the effective
number of parties – could not previously be attained by extant methodologies.
Ultimately, conceiving of latent diversity as a weighted measure of the number of distinct
groups within a constituency (or across constituencies) has an important advantage over
measuring diversity as, say, a continuous scale of fractionalization. Specifically, it allows for
a clearer theoretical linkage to the outcome variable: the effective number of parties. While
“more diversity” has always been argued to result in higher ENP, the theoretical story driving this relationship is that more diversity allows for the possibility of more differentiable
policy positions. But how much more fractionalization on a continuous scale, theoretically
speaking, would we need in order to expect the addition of another party offering? The
amount is unclear. The relationship between ENG and ENP, however, is more straightforward. For sufficiently permissive institutional contexts, an ENG of 2.5 should support an
ENP of about 2.5, an ENG of 4.0 should result in an ENP of about 4.0, and so on. The
theoretical mechanism driving this relationship is drawn into much clearer focus when we
think about voters’ party support and voters’ demographic characteristics in the same way:
if a demographic constituency is sufficiently sizable and the electoral institutions allow for
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it, we should see the emergence of a party that will cater to the needs of that demographic.4

Data
To calculate both within-district and cross-district latent diversity, I required district-level
data about the demographic composition of the population along six dimensions that have
been previously argued to structure political competition (Stoll, 2008). These dimensions are
ethnicity, language, religion, income, the rural-urban divide, and support for the democratic
regime.5 I took individual survey responses – situated in individual districts – from the
widely-utilized Comparative Study of Electoral Systems survey database. The CSES database
asks respondents about their demographic attributes and vote preferences, and also includes
identifiers for the specific electoral district in which the respondent resides. Although the
CSES does not sample randomly at the district level, it is wholly unique in the level of
district-level demographic detail it offers to researchers. Indeed, Stoll (2008) concludes from
her review of electoral scholarship on measuring diversity that working with CSES data is
4

This assumes, of course, that there are political entrepreneurs who are willing to activate the combination

of social divisions that would allow them to carve out this electoral niche. While the topic modeling approach
has many benefits, its one shortcoming is an inability to specific which of these effective groups are the most
politically salient. Rather, it returns the group structure as a nuanced mapping of all possibly salient divisions
that could potentially be mobilized by political elites. Measuring saliency is a complicated question that falls
outside the scope of the present analysis, but I will return to the debate between the “sociology of politics”
(i.e., social divisions exogenously determined) versus “political sociology” (i.e., social divisions emerge from
political competition) in the conclusion.
5

Other district-level characteristics no doubt affect party competition and political representation more

generally. Things like district-level unemployment, for instance, or the proportion of the population over
the age of 65 will, of course, affect how many (and which types of) parties populate the ballot on election
day. However, I choose to focus for the time being on the six attributes listed above both because previous
studies of electoral politics have focused on these (Caramani, 2004; Lijphart, 1999; Jones, 2004; Ordeshook
and Shvetsova, 1994; Powell, 1982; Rose and Urwin, 1969) and because data for these six attributes was
more widely available in a comparative context.
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the most promising way forward in constructing district-level measures of diversity. It has
been previously demonstrated by Crisp, Olivella and Potter (2013) that the CSES can be
used as a “best available” approach to examining within- and cross-district demographics.
Missing values were imputed on a country-by-country basis using Bayesian multiple imputation. This approach ensured that in countries where a specific question was not asked
(such as a question on language in the American survey), responses were not being imputed
based on response patterns in other countries (where the relationship between variables might
be inherently different and, thus, uninformative in the country under consideration). So, for
example, if four of the six demographic questions were asked of respondents in a given country, there would be some missing values in the four (asked) questions and complete missing
values in the two (unasked) questions. Values were only imputed for the four asked questions, however, and the two unasked questions were left completely missing as there was no
information from which two impute those values. Additionally, values were imputed on a
country-by-country basis so that, for example, the underlying (latent) relationship between
income and language in Switzerland was not informing the imputation of values along these
two variables in, say, Croatia (where the underlying latent relationship might be different).
Appendix A provides more detail on which attributes were included by the CSES in which
countries and also summarizes the average number of survey respondents that appeared in
each electoral district. Not surprisingly, this number varies widely depending on the country.
In an effort to increase the number of respondents within each electoral district – thereby
feeding into the topic model calculations a larger number of observations – I pooled survey
responses across waves of the CSES in those cases where a country had been covered by
the CSES in multiple elections. Pooling survey respondents in this way has several distinct
advantages, especially in countries employing single-member districts. To begin, the number
of respondents is much lower in smaller-magnitude districts and if one leaves each individual
CSES wave intact (rather than pooling) the end result is that several districts have very
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few respondents.6 This low number leaves little room for the topic model to gain leverage
on the latent amount of diversity in the district. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence would
suggest that district-level demographics will not change dramatically in any given 8- or 10year period. For the data employed in this study, the modal response category in the same
district across different waves of the CSES exhibited significantly static characteristics: the
modal “ethnic” response category remained constant 78% of the time, for instance, while
the modal “language” category remained constant in 79% of cases. What this means is that,
rather than observing shifting demographic distributions between iterations of the election
surveys, what we have instead are simply different election-year snapshots of a more-or-less
static underlying distribution of characteristics. It makes the most conceptual sense, in this
respect, to pool observations across survey waves in an effort to provide the most complete
picture (and the most statistical leverage for the topic modeling procedure).
A final issue with the use of the CSES data set is that, for countries with a very large
number of electoral districts (like the United Kingdom), not all districts are sampled from
in each iteration of the survey. The coverage of districts improves when separate waves are
pooled, because while many districts are sampled multiple times, some districts only appear
in one wave. Still, there is a systematic (but, perhaps, not substantial) under-sampling of
electoral districts in those countries that have hundreds of single-member constituencies. In
terms of examining the effect of within-district diversity on party system size, this sampling
bias should not result in statistical bias: there are still several hundred single-member districts (in both plurality systems and some multimember systems) included in the analysis
and these SMDs exhibit a wide range of within-district ENG values. A potentially larger
problem emerges, however, when we consider the impact this under-sampling might have
6

As depicted in the appendix, pooling brings the average respondents per district in countries like Canada,

the United Kingdom, and the United States to 9.8, 9.7, and 9.6, respectively. This is a large improvement
over leaving the waves unpooled, which results in average response rates in these countries around 3 or 4.
In most cases, however, the number of respondents in each district is much higher. The mean across all
plurality system countries is 23 and the mean of the entire sample of countries is 43.
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on garnering a “complete” picture of a country’s cross-district diversity: indeed, without
sampling from all districts, how can we have faith in a national-level aggregation of diversity
across districts? A solid rejoinder to this concern can be found in the fact that, while the
CSES does not sample from all districts, it appears to sample from all areas – or regions –
of a country. For example, in the United Kingdom, the CSES captures districts from Wales,
Scotland, the length and breadth of England, and Northern Ireland. In the United States,
there are Congressional districts samples from the Northeast, Midwest, South, West Coast
and Pacific Northwest. The most substantial source of bias in cross-district diversity would
potentially occur if, for instance, the CSES had omitted all districts in Scotland and Wales
from their surveys. In the absence of this, we can have some faith in the data’s ability
to pick up on the general level of cross-district heterogeneity: it is not clear that omitting
one Scottish district and including another similar district (Scotland being a very internally
homogeneous region) would unduly bias our national-level understanding of diversity.
The two main explanatory variables of interest, as discussed above, are the within-district
and cross-district effective number of groups ENG, which are statistical approximations of
latent diversity at both the district and national level. Because of pooling observations
across waves of the CSES, I have one measure of within-district ENG per district and one
measure of cross-district ENG per country. Within-district diversity ranges from 1.0 to 9.3
with a mean of 2.6 while cross-district diversity ranges from 1.5 to 11.3 with a mean of 4.6.
For each country, if we compare the average within-district diversity against national-level
cross-district diversity, it is immediately obvious that the two measurements are tracking
distinct phenomena (the correlation coefficient between the two is r = −0.18). Figure
1 below provides an “eagle-eye” overview of how the two metrics relate to one another.
Average levels of within-district diversity are plotted along the x-axis while levels of crossdistrict diversity are plotted along the y-axis. Although the graphic obscures some important
variation in diversity across individual districts, it clearly indicates that the two statistics
are not tracking the same concepts.
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Brazil

Italy

Philippines

8

Croatia

6

Spain

4

Average Cross-District Diversity

10

Peru

Mexico
Switzerland
Slovenia
Romania
Ireland
Austria
Finland
Sweden
Iceland
Czech Republic
Poland
Portugal

2

New Zealand

Denmark
Belgium

2.0

United States

Japan

United Kingdom
Australia

France

Chile

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

Average Within-District Diversity
Figure 1. An Eagle-Eye View Relationship of Diversity. Plot of cross-district diversity (averaged across
elections) Against within-district diversity (averaged across elections and electoral districts)
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Furthermore, on their face, the statistics seem to be returning plausible estimates. Crossdistrict diversity is significantly greater in, say, Brazil (11.3) than in Australia (2.0) and is
also much greater in the Philippines (9.7) than in Iceland (3.6). Within countries, as well, the
topics model returns plausible values. In Switzerland and Spain – two infamously regionalized
countries – average within-district ENG is 2.0 and 2.2, respectively, while national-level
cross-district ENG is 6.1 and 7.1, respectively. This indicates the presence of internallyhomogeneous regions that are also quite distinct from one another. In countries with more
homogenous populations and no notable regional differences, these two figures are much
closer in line with one another (as is the case in Poland, where average district-level diversity
is 1.9 and cross-district diversity is 3.2).7
The outcome variable of interest is the district-level effective number of electoral parties
(ENEP ) or the number of parties weighted by their vote share. This operationalization of
the number of parties has become standard in studies of this type (Singer and Stephenson,
2009; Stoll, 2008). The electoral data underlying the analysis come from a number of sources
including: Brancati (2007), Kollman et al. (2011), the European Elections Database, Adam
Carr’s online election archive, and various electoral commissions around the world. Every
effort was made to collect complete votes data, meaning that smaller parties’ individual vote
tallies were left disaggregated rather than pooled into an “other votes” category that could
potentially obscure some important variation in the ENEP calculation. All told, in the data
7

Looking to other external sources of validity for the topics model’s results is a difficult endeavor,

mainly because the approach differs widely from extant measures of fractionalization (Fearon, 2003), crosscuttingness (Selway, 2011), and measures that take into consideration a broader range of demographic
attributes, yet are cast solely at the national level. Country-specific tests could be applied, but would be
inherently ad hoc in nature. For example, in the case of the United States, there is evidence that more
diverse congressional districts (such as the Illinois 9th and the Missouri 3rd, which cover substantial areas of
downtown Chicago and St. Louis) have considerably higher ENG values than districts in more homogenous
areas of the country such as Utah, Oklahoma, and Colorado. But this type of detailed validity test in a
cross-national study would far surpass the scope of this paper.
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set there are 2,467 districts in 64 elections across 29 countries.
The size of the data set may seem comparatively small for a cross-national, district-level
study of electoral politics. However, there were several limiting factors on inclusion in the
study: (1) the country needed to be included in the CSES, (2) the CSES needed to have
recorded in which electoral district the survey respondent resided (which did not always
happen), and (3) the district names needed to match up with some external source of official
electoral data.8 Additionally, with the intent of giving the topic model enough leverage
to correctly recover the number of groups, in those districts where fewer than 10 survey
responses was reported in a district, I dropped that district from the analysis.9 While other
recent studies of the determinants of ENEP have omitted mixed-member systems, the CSES
included survey responses from the SMD tier of a handful of mixed-member systems and I
include these observations in the results reported below. Typically mixed-member systems
are omitted due to concerns about “contamination” between tiers, or the idea that outcomes
in the SMD tier will be biased due to the presence of an additional MMD tier. However,
as recent research has demonstrated, this concern may be overstated, especially in more
developed democracies (Crisp, Potter and Lee, 2012; Karp, 2009; Maeda, 2008; Moser and
Scheiner, 2004).
Another primary explanatory variable – logged district magnitude – is measured at the
district level (rather than as a national-level average) and is taken from the same sources
of electoral data described above. I control for a number of variables that have been hypothesized to impact the district-level number of parties. At the national level, for instance,
8

The CSES includes some district-level electoral results, but only for a small subset of the parties that

contested the election. In the interest of calculating the most accurate ENEP figures possible, I turned to
more complete sources of electoral data and then merged these together with the CSES results. In some
cases, the CSES database included district names that could not be matched to external data sources. Rather
than biasing the results with rough ENEP approximations, these countries were dropped from the analysis.
9

The cut point of 10 is admittedly arbitrary. However, in Appendix B, I take up this issue in greater

detail and demonstrate that my findings remain intact when I adopt different cut points of 15, 20, and 25.
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presidentialism has been hypothesized to drive down ENEP systematically in all districts as
parties strain to link their platforms across districts to increase their national profile in an effort to gain access to highly valuable national-level offices (Cox, 1999; Greene, 2007; Shugart
and Carey, 1992). Similarly, the extent political concentration (or lack of federal power
structures) is thought to drive down the number of parties, as devolving power to regions
incentives more parties to contest limited numbers of districts (Brancati, 2008; Chhibber and
Kollman, 2004; Samuels, 2000). Finally, a long line of scholars argues that as democracies
age, their citizens and political elites become more familiar with electoral institutions and
are able to coordinate more effectively (Duch and Palmer, 2002; Moser and Scheiner, 2009;
Tavits, 2007; Tavits and Annus, 2006; Zielinski, 2002). As democracies age, then, we would
expect that ENEP decreases. Values for these control variables are taken from Treisman
(2007) and I use a running tally of the number of years a country has been democratic as
my measure of “democratic age.”10

Analysis and Discussion
Given the hierarchical nature of the data structure – electoral districts which are nested
inside countries – as well as the continuous nature of the outcome variable, a multilevel linear
model is the appropriate modeling strategy. Due to the decision to pool survey respondents
across waves of the CSES in order that the LDA model might have the greatest leverage
in recovering latent demographic distributions, I have one value of within-district ENG per
district and one value of cross-district ENG per country. Rather than trying to model
election-specific ENEP figures (which vary within the same district across elections) with
pooled (non-varying) institutional and social variables, I instead average ENEP within each
10

The results presented below are effectively the same when I substitute in different measures of democratic

age, such as an operationalization of “new democracy” from Singer and Stephenson (2009) that takes a value
of 1 if the country did not hold democratic elections prior to 1989.
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district across all elections for which I have CSES survey data in that district.11 In this way,
the model can be specified as follows:

2
ENEP cd ∼ N (γc + Xcd β, σcd
)

γc ∼ N (Xc ξ, σc2 )

where ENEP cd is the outcome variable of interest: the average effective number of parties
(measured in votes) in a particular country’s district. The country-level random intercepts,
γc , are modeled by a country-level matrix of predictors that includes variables such as presidentialism, federalism, and cross-district ENG. The β matrix is a battery of district-specific
explanatory covariates such as within-district ENG and district magnitude. In this way, β
2
and ξ are vectors of coefficients to be estimated and σcd
and σc2 are measures of variance

across each level of the model.12
The first model presented in Table 2 below constitutes a test of H3 – or the classic
“interaction hypothesis” – which postulates that the effect of diversity on party system
size is qualified by the permissiveness of the electoral rules.13 This first model offers some
11

The results presented below hold well, however, when we think about the outcome variable slightly

differently: if we leave intact each election’s separate ENEP figure – as I do in Appendix C – the results do
not change. This formulation has the conceptual benefit of allowing voters and parties to meet repeatedly
in a fixed social-institutional environment, but it also has the empirical drawback of modeling an outcome
variable that varies time-serially with explanatory variables that do not.
12

The models were estimated in R using the lmer command, which is a part of the broader arm package

written by Andrew Gelman and his collaborators.
13

A supplementary model testing the “additive hypotheses” H1 and H2 – which leave intact the separate

effects of diversity and district magnitude on the effective number of parties – is not included here because,
as argued above, this is not the correct way to formulate the relationship between diversity, magnitude,
and party system size. Support for H1 and H2 has consistently been unearthed by previous studies and
my supplementary model also indicates that increasing one or the other will drive up ENEP. I focus in the
discussion of the results on the “interaction” model, however, as being the most appropriate.
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disappointing – yet not surprising – results: when we correctly measure latent diversity at
the district level, then the classic interaction hypothesis does not perform well. Rather, we
see that district magnitude exerts a strong substantive influence on party system size while
diversity’s impact is much small and statistically insignificant. Their interaction falls far
short of either substantive or statistical significance.
This result is not unexpected because, as I have argued, thinking about diversity in any
individual district without also considering the district in a broader context should not yield
a full picture of the dynamics at play. The second model in Table 2 is a first illustration
of why this might be the case. In interacting within-district diversity with cross-district
diversity, we retrieve a statistically significant coefficient that indicates the marginal effect
of within-district ENG on ENEP is not always going to be positive; rather, it seems that
cross-district ENG is going to play an important modifying role. Specifically, the marginal
effect of increasing within-district diversity will only be positive when the effective number of
cross-district groups is less than about 4.5 (∂ENEP / ∂withinEN G = 0.27−0.06crossEN G).
In the third and fourth models, I subset the data by plurality countries (of which there are 10)
and multimember countries (19). The substantive effect of the relationship remains roughly
the same (the marginal effect of within-district diversity is positive so long as the effective
number of cross-district groups remains below 4.8 in plurality systems and below 4.5 in
multimember systems), although within-district diversity is significant in plurality systems
(and not multimember systems) whereas cross-district diversity is significant in multimember
systems (but not in plurality systems).
A final point regarding Table 2 is that the second model fits the data more poorly than
the first model (as evidenced by the AIC and log likelihood ratio test statistics). Dropping magnitude from the analysis clearly results in a poorer model. Indeed, appropriately
modeling H4 requires a more complicated triple-interaction model such as that depicted in
Table 3. Recall that H4 postulates that the extent of cross-district diversity will qualify the
relationship between within-district diversity and district magnitude. Including this triple
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Table 2. Multilevel Linear Regression Model of District-Level ENEP

D.V.

Model 1

Log(Magnitude)

0.51
[ 0.00, 1.02 ]

Within-District
ENG

0.05
[ -0.01, 0.11 ]

Log(Magnitude) ×
Within ENG

-0.01
[ -0.26, 0.24 ]

Cross-District
ENG
Within ENG ×
Cross ENG

Model 2

SMD

MMD

0.27
[ 0.12, 0.41 ]

0.24
[ 0.08, 0.40 ]

0.49
[ -0.10, 1.07 ]

0.30
[ 0.10, 0.50 ]

0.10
[ -0.05, 0.25 ]

0.41
[ 0.15, 0.68 ]

-0.06
[ -0.10, -0.02 ]

-0.05
[ -0.09, -0.01 ]

-0.11
[ -0.22, -0.01 ]

Presidential

0.23
[ -0.64, 1.09 ]

-0.46
[ -1.65, 0.73 ]

Federal

0.14
[ -0.60, 0.89 ]

-0.13
[ -1.09, 0.82 ]

Democratic Age

0.01
[ -0.01, 0.02 ]

0.01
[ -0.01, 0.02 ]

Intercept

2.77
[ 1.90, 3.63 ]

2.38
[ 1.09, 3.66 ]

2.28
[ 1.49, 3.08 ]

2.53
[ 1.04, 4.02 ]

0.67
0.85

0.67
1.42

0.72
0.28

0.56
1.00

AIC
LL Ratio Test Statistic

4018
7466

4077
7406

2822
10

1228
8

N countries
N observations

29
1,600

29
1,600

10
1,100

19
506

2
σ̂cd

σ̂c2

Notes: 95% confidence intervals were calculated from 1,000 simulated draws of the model’s parameters and
appear in brackets below coefficient estimates.
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Table 3. Multilevel Linear Regression Model of District-Level ENEP

D.V.

Estimate

95% C.I.

Log(Magnitude)

-0.27

[ -1.45, 0.91 ]

Within-District
ENG

0.25

[ 0.09, 0.0.40 ]

Cross-District
ENG

0.14

[ -0.02, 0.29 ]

Log(Magnitude) ×
Within ENG

0.24

[ -0.34, 0.82 ]

Log(Magnitude) ×
Cross ENG

0.13

[ -0.08, 0.34 ]

Within ENG ×
Cross ENG

-0.05

[ -0.08, -0.02 ]

Log(Magnitude) ×
Within ENG × Cross ENG

-0.04

[ -0.14, 0.06 ]

Intercept

2.61

[ 1.80, 3.42 ]

2
σ̂cd

0.66
0.76

σ̂c2

AIC
LL Ratio Test Statistic

4002
94

N countries
N observations

29
1,600

Notes: Control variables were included in estimation, but are not reported here as their effects remain
consistent as those presented in earlier models.
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interaction term in the model (and dropping all of the insignificant control variables) results
in the best-fitting of the four models (it returns the lowest AIC value). Interpreting tripleinteraction models can be difficult and recovering the marginal effect of one explanatory
variable on the outcome variable requires taking the partial derivative with respect to the
variable in question (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2005). In assessing H4, I am interested
in the marginal effect of increasing within-district ENG on ENEP at different levels of both
district magnitude and cross-district ENG. This can be derived as follows:

ENEP = β0 + β1 log(mag) + β2 withinEN G + β3 crossEN G
+ β4 log(mag) ∗ withinEN G + β5 log(mag) ∗ crossEN G
+ β6 withinEN G ∗ crossEN G + β7 log(mag) ∗ withinEN G ∗ crossEN G

∂ENEP
= β2 + β4 log(mag) + β6 crossEN G + β7 log(mag) ∗ crossEN G
∂withinEN G
Holding logged district magnitude at its average for the full data set, the marginal effect
of increasing within-district diversity is only positive when cross-district ENG is less than
about 5.0. When cross-district ENG is 1.0, for example, increasing within-district ENG by
one group drives ENEP up by about 0.6 parties. However, when cross-district ENG is much
higher (for example, at 10.0, which is nearing its observed maximum) increasing withindistrict ENG actually drives down ENEP by about 0.5 parties. In fairly broad terms, then,
these results seem to offer tentative support for H4. Holding magnitude at its full-sample
average is not terribly informative, however, and is obscuring some important variation
between plurality and proportional systems. In Figure 2 below, I portray the marginal effect
of within-district ENG holding magnitude constant at 1 (in the top panel), 3 (in the middle),
and 5 (in the bottom panel).
For SMD systems, increasing district-level diversity increases the effective number of parties, but only when cross-district diversity remains below roughly 4 effective groups. When
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0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4

Effect of Within-District ENG on ENEP

When M=1

2

4

6

8

10

8
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8
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Cross-District ENG
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-0.2
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Effect of Within-District ENG on ENEP

When M=3

2

4

6

Cross-District ENG
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0.2
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-0.2
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Effect of Within-District ENG on ENEP
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2

4

6

Cross-District ENG

Figure 2. Marginal Effect of Increasing Within-District ENG on the Effective Number of Electoral Parties
for Different Values of Cross-District ENG with 90% Confidence Bounds. The top pane holds district
magnitude constant at 1, while the middle pane holds magnitude constant at 3, and the bottom pane at 5.
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cross-district diversity increases (in particular, when it increases above 8) then the costs for
parties of tailoring their platforms to radically different constituencies begins to drown out
the electoral inducements of singling out diverse demographics in any one constituency. In
other words, while Districts A and B might both be internally diverse enough to allow new
party entrants into the electoral arena, if the two districts are radically different from one
another, any potential new entrant will have a hard time entering both. This dynamic is
going to systematically drive down ENEP figures across all districts in countries with higher
levels of cross-district diversity. Although the data set does not apparently have a sufficient
number of MMD observations to confirm that the same trend is taking place in countries
relying on multimember districts, the case can be made that cross-district diversity’s impact
on the conditional relationship between within-district diversity and magnitude appears to
be operating in the same direction (yet might not be as highly consequential). The drop off
in the marginal effect in these systems is more substantial, but statistically less certain.
Moving away from a discussion of marginal effects, I present Table 4, which more concretely discusses the model’s results by illustrating predicted values of ENEP at different
levels of district magnitude and within- and cross-district diversity. Table 4 intuitively represents the various take-away points from the models testing each of the four hypotheses
described above. The top set of figures correspond to a country with a low level of crossdistrict ENG (in this case, 2.0 or the lower end of the interquartile range) and the bottom
set correspond to a high level (in this case, 6.5 or the upper end of the interquartile range).
Each cell in the two tables indicates the predicted effective number of parties that correspond
to a pairing of a value of within-district diversity and district magnitude. Drawn from 1000
simulations of the model’s parameters, 95% confidence intervals appear in brackets below
each prediction.
In support of the idea that increasing district magnitude additively (i.e., by itself) drives
up the effective number of parties, we see that increasing district magnitude always (and
usually substantially) increases the effective number of parties (H1 ). Holding within-district
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Table 4. Predicted ENEP Values Drawn from 1000 Simulations of the Model’s Parameters

Cross-District
ENG Low

Within-District ENG
1
3
5

Magnitude = 1

3.0
[ 2.5, 3.5 ]

3.3
[ 2.8, 3.8 ]

3.6
[ 3.0, 4.2 ]

Magnitude = 5

3.2
[ 2.5, 3.9 ]

4.0
[ 3.2, 4.8 ]

4.8
[ 3.0, 6.6 ]

Magnitude = 10

3.3
[ 2.3, 4.3 ]

4.3
[ 3.3, 5.3 ]

5.3
[ 2.5, 8.1 ]

Cross-District
ENG High

Within-District ENG
1
3
5

Magnitude = 1

3.4
[ 3.0, 3.8 ]

3.2
[ 2.8, 3.6 ]

3.0
[ 2.4, 3.6 ]

Magnitude = 5

4.2
[ 3.7, 4.7 ]

4.0
[ 3.4, 4.6 ]

3.7
[ 2.3, 5.1 ]

Magnitude = 10

4.6
[ 4.0, 5.2 ]

4.3
[ 3.6, 5.0 ]

4.1
[ 2.1, 6.1 ]

Notes: “Low” and “High” cross-district diversity scenarios correspond to the lower and upper bounds of the
interquartile range (2.0 and 6.5 effective number of groups). Country-level random intercepts were held at
their means. 95% confidence bounds appear in brackets below each predicted value.
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ENG at 3.0, for example, increasing magnitude from 1 to 10 in countries with low levels
of cross-district diversity results in an increase in ENEP of 1.0 and an increase of 1.1 in
countries with high levels of cross-district diversity. Furthermore, the 95% confidence bands
on these predictions indicate that there is very little overlap in the uncertainty surrounding
these predicted values. The evidence in support of the argument that increasing withindistrict diversity by itself drives up ENEP (H2 ) is very mixed: moving across any of the six
rows in Table 4 (thereby increasing within-district diversity while leaving the other covariates
constant) only increases ENEP in some cases and the uncertainty around these predictions
is comparatively large. There is no evidence in direct support of H3 or the “interaction
hypothesis” and, as I have argued, this null finding can best be accounted for by including
cross-district diversity in the analysis (postulated in H4 ). Here we see that within- and crossdistrict diversity work at cross purposes in SMD systems, but tend to reinforce one another
in MMD systems. Whereas moving from a position of low within- and low cross-district
diversity to a position of high-high in an SMD system will either reduce or leave constant
the predicted ENEP, a similar move in a district of magnitude 5 will increase ENEP by 0.5
while doing so in a district of magnitude 10 will increase ENEP by 0.8.

Conclusion
This paper began by asking an age-old question: how do institutional and sociological factors
combine at the district level to structure political competition? I noted that, although
this question has been asked many times, scholars of electoral politics have never been
entirely satisfied with the answers. For example, Jones (1997, 2004) argues that the districtlevel theoretical tenants of Duverger’s thinking have never been appropriately matched by
empirical investigations cast at that level. Instead, studies have measured one or both of
the explanatory variables and / or the outcome variable at the national level. Stoll (2008)
convincingly demonstrates that scholars working on electoral politics need to devote more
time to thinking about their operationalizatins of “latent diversity” because the choice of
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metric influences the conclusions that one draws from the analysis. Extant measures all
suffer from one or more problems that bias results in different ways. Finally, the findings
of scholars working in closely related topics like party system nationalization, partisan bias,
and “contamination” effects all remind us that no electoral district is an island; rather,
district-level dynamics need to be situated in broader, country-level dynamics that can have
down-ticket implications for political competition in any given constituency.
I cannot argue that my manuscript is a definitive statement that will lay to rest lingering
debates about each of these three points. Indeed, the analysis could be made more robust
if there were more countries included and if there were more survey respondents located
within each district. Both of these would result in greater statistical leverage that would
perhaps bring the relationships I have discussed above into sharper focus. And taking an a
priori agnostic approach to determining which demographic dimensions are “salient” when
it comes to political competition – while being less laden with questionable assumptions than
many methods that try to measure diversity – no doubt infuses my measurements of ENG
with a bit of noise. While there may be 3.5 effective demographic groups, for example, when
we consider survey responses on language, religion, and income, political parties competing
in the district may only make resort to two of these three dimensions in the course of taking
policy positions during campaigns. Additional work could study the nature of political
competition within each district (by examining party platforms, campaign rhetoric, etc.)
and then use this information to select a subset of demographic characteristics to feed into
the LDA modeling procedure.
Despite these shortcomings, however, I am able to make a number of important contributions. Mine is the first true district-level test of the “conditional hypothesis” relating
institutional and sociological factors to political outcomes. This is vitally important because,
as many scholars have previously argued, this is the level at which many of our theoretical
intuitions about electoral competition are supposed to operate. But thorough data collection is not, in itself, much of a contribution. Pushing further, I described how a generative
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Bayesian LDA model could straightforwardly be applied to the measuring of latent diversity
by treating voters and their demographic characteristics as analogies for the “words” and
“topics” of LDA modeling. What results is an iterative sorting procedure that allows the
researcher to make virtually no assumptions that might bias the outcomes. While so doing
might allow non-salient demographic dimensions to creep into the structuring of the groups,
one might argue that this is still important variation that needs to be modeled. Whether or
not political parties make use of every distinct group in an electoral constituency is structured by a number of things, at least one of which is parties’ own ability to shape the rhetoric
of political competition around issues that benefit them electorally. As an older literature on
the spatial model of voting has demonstrated, “political entrepreneurs” and “architects of
political change” are always looking for ways to transform non-salient cleavages into salient
avenues of political competition when they stand to benefit from them electorally (Riker,
1986, 1990; Schofield, 2006). Allowing a measure of diversity to capture some of these
(potentially) non-salient-but-certainly-real demographic divisions allows us to paint a more
complete picture of political competition at the district level.
Finally – in an effort to explain the disappointing lack of support for the “conditional
hypothesis” – I advance a novel theoretical contribution: parties are unlikely to view the
political reality of an individual district in a vacuum. This is a point returned to time and
again in the burgeoning literatures on party system nationalization and partisan bias and
I argue in this paper that the general logic should apply to the question of diversity in a
specific way; namely, that within-district and cross-district diversity should work at cross
purposes. For an average level of district magnitude in the data set, this argument is borne
out empirically: for countries with less than about 4.5 effective groups nationwide, increasing
within-district diversity should indeed increase the effective number of parties. Above this
number, though, increasing within-district diversity either has no impact or actually drives
down the effective number of parties. This is because, when districts are populated with
radically different types of voters, parties have a hard time re-branding their platform over

87

and over again. Even though internally diverse constituencies might offer potential new
parties a wealth of unique policy positions they might assume in order to gain an electoral
foothold, this benefit is quickly overwhelmed by the costs of being universally appealing to
radically different constituencies. The conclusion is simple: for two countries with the same
district magnitudes and the same level of within-district diversity, the country with greater
cross-district diversity will have systematically fewer parties competing in each district.
Statistically speaking, this relationship is slightly weak. The logic expressed above holds
particularly well in SMD countries, but appears to have less influence in MMD countries.
This difference may be due, in part, to the fact that MMD countries have systematically
fewer districts than SMD countries and the prospect of re-branding for parties in these
systems is a less daunting proposition across, say, 29 districts (as is the case in the MMD
country of Sweden) than in, say, 659 districts (as was the case in the SMD country of the
United Kingdom in 1997). But even beyond this largely mechanical point, I think this
dynamic points to a more important finding: district magnitude simply plays a larger role
in structuring political competition than does district-level latent diversity.
As the predicted values in Table 4 indicate, moving from a district magnitude of 1 to a
magnitude of 5 almost always results in a larger absolute change in the effective number of
parties than a commensurate movement from 1 to 5 district-level demographic groups. In
thinking about district magnitude as an upper bound on the number of parties sustained
in political competition, the effective number of demographic groups needs to become quite
large to reach this upper limit. Indeed, if we are to reach an ENEP that equals M +1 (Cox,
1997) in a district with a magnitude of 5 in a country with relatively low cross-district diversity, the results of this analysis indicates that we need almost 9 demographic groups. By
contrast, if we examine a similarly-sized district in a country with high levels of cross-district
diversity, then it is actually impossible to hit the district’s institutional carrying capacity
simply by increasing the amount of within-district latent diversity. This constitutes a significant qualification to our traditional understanding of the way that permissive institutions
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allow sociological diversity to be translated into a diversity of party offerings. Indeed, the
nature of the party system within an individual district will not be the same if it is removed
from its country of origin and dropped into another country with a different level of crossdistrict diversity. This finding should be of interest not only to political practitioners, but
also institutional designers and scholars of political representation.
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Appendix A: ENG Attributes by Country
Table A1: Countries Included in the Analysis.

Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Croatia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Mexico
New Zealand
Norway
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

Avg. Resp.
Per District
34.9
27.1
206.9
130.1
9.8
29.3
100.4
170.1
117.7
177.1
10.1
550.2
84.5
53.3
24.4
40.2
80.5
291.3
175.0
14.6
134.9
266.4
73.5
189.6
74.1
113.5
255.0
9.7
9.6

Ethnic

Language

x

x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x

x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x

Religion

Rural

Income

Regime

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Notes: The first column contains the average number of CSES respondents per district when pooling data
across CSES waves while subsequent columns indicate which demographic components were utilized in the
diversity calculations.
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Appendix B: Testing Different Response Rate Cut-Points
The topic modeling approach employed in this manuscript should, in principle, be applied
to a sufficiently large set of observations to allow it enough “degrees of freedom” for correct
classification of individuals and districts into groups. Technically speaking, however, the
model is capable of operating on any set of observations, no matter how small. This is
especially helpful in the case of survey respondents situated in electoral districts, where the
number can sometimes be quite small. In the CSES database I employ in this study, for
example, the mean number of respondents in each district is 43 (pooling across waves of
the CSES). In single-member districts, the average response rate is somewhat lower at 23.
In order to provide the topic model with a more-or-less detailed portrait of each district, I
dropped those districts with 10 or fewer respondents in the main line of my analysis.
Admittedly, this low-response cut point is somewhat arbitrary. In this appendix, however,
I focus on one important model and show how applying different cut points leaves the result
intact. I calculate three different hierarchical models, report the coefficients of interest, and
calculate the marginal effects in those cases where we drop all districts with 15 or less, 20
or less, and 25 or less respondents. While I think the case for including districts with lower
cut points is straightforward, these supplementary models demonstrate that the choice of
cut point is generally not driving the results presented in the main line of the analysis.
Table B1: Multilevel Linear Regression Model of District-Level ENEP.

D.V.

Drop ≤ 15

Drop ≤ 20

Drop ≤ 25

Within-District
ENG

0.31
[ 0.12, 0.51 ]

0.41
[ 0.17, 0.65 ]

0.55
[ 0.27, 0.84 ]

Cross-District
ENG

0.27
[ 0.10, 0.43 ]

0.30
[ 0.13, 0.48 ]

0.36
[ 0.17, 0.54 ]

Within ENG ×
Cross ENG

-0.06
[ -0.11, -0.02 ]

-0.08
[ -0.13, -0.03 ]

-0.10
[ -0.16, -0.04 ]

N observations

1,189

981

899
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In the paper, I calculated the marginal effect of increasing within-district diversity for
different levels of cross-district diversity and concluded that this effect is positive so long as
cross-district ENG remains below 4.5. The marginal effect of within-district ENG on the
effective number of parties is β1 − β3 crossENG. For these three models, the marginal effect
of driving up within-district diversity on the effective number of parties is positive so long
as cross-district ENG remains below 5.2, 5.1, and 5.5, respectively. In conclusion, not only
do all coefficients remain statistically significant at different cut points, but the substantive
effect is remarkably consistent: increasing within-district diversity only increases the effective
number of parties so long as cross-district diversity remains comparatively low.
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Appendix C: Models Without Averaging Values of ENEP
In the paper, I argued that – since diversity data was pooled across separate waves of the
CSES in order to capture the most complete picture – the outcome variable should be pooled
as well. To that extent, one value each of pooled within-district diversity, pooled cross-district
diversity, and district magnitude was paired with one value of average effective number of
parties per electoral district. Random intercepts in the data hierarchy were only included at
the country level. In this way, each district appears in the data set once, regardless of how
many rounds of electoral data I had for the district. Conceptually, this makes good sense:
if we are not measuring time-serial variation in the explanatory variables, nor should we be
in the outcome variable.
Typically in district-level studies of electoral outcomes, however, researchers take a different approach with their modeling efforts: the underlying institutional and social characteristics of an electoral district structure a latent environment where voters and parties meet
repeatedly to play out multiple rounds of electoral competition. Under this conceptualization of electoral competition, each electoral district’s institutional and social attributes are
measured once and held constant across different iterations of the electoral process. In this
way, in the hierarchical structure of the data, each district can be modeled with its own random intercept and the outcome variable (ENP, voter coordination, number of new parties,
volatility, etc.) can be allowed to take on a new value in each election. In the models that
appear below, I adopt this approach in an effort to demonstrate that my choice of averaging
values of the outcome variable presented in the main line of the analysis are not influencing
the results. I repeat the analysis for the “traditional interaction” model (my Model 1) and
the “diversity model” (my Model 2). I have omitted insignificant control variables in an
effort to focus on the relationship between district magnitude and latent diversity.
As opposed to the model included in the manuscript, we see here in the supplementary
version of Model 1 that district magnitude and within-district ENG both return statistically
significant coefficients in this formulation of the “interaction model” although the interaction
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itself is far from being significant. By contrast, the findings on the interaction between withinand cross-district diversity are very consistent with the results reported in Model 2 in the
manuscript. Not only do all coefficients remain significant, but they also generally maintain
their substantive size. However, as evidenced by the goodness-of-fit statistics, this second
model fits the data more poorly than a model that includes district magnitude, lending
additional credence to my substantive conclusion that it is really district magnitude that
drives party system size rather than the niceties of underlying social divisions.
As a final point, it should be noted that district-level variance in this formulation of the
hierarchical model is quite low. This is not surprising, given that the district-level predictors
cannot take on different values in each election; by contrast, the outcome variable assumes
a new value for each election year. Thus, the “value added” of modeling this district-level
variance is not readily apparent. Accordingly, the main line of the manuscript’s analysis
relies on averaging values of the effective number of parties and treating each district as
its own (single) observation, regardless of whether or not the CSES administered multiple
election surveys there.
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Table C1: Multilevel Linear Regression Model of District-Level ENEP.

D.V.

Model 1

Log(Magnitude)

0.60
[ 0.03, 1.16 ]

Within-District
ENG

0.11
[ 0.04, 0.18 ]

Cross-District
ENG
Log(Magnitude) ×
Within ENG

0.41
[ 0.22, 0.60 ]
0.30
[ 0.11, 0.49 ]

-0.01
[ -0.28, 0.27 ]

Within ENG ×
Cross ENG
Intercept

Model 2

-0.08
[ -0.12, -0.04 ]
2.84
[ 2.43, 3.26 ]

2.37
[ 1.38, 3.36 ]

2.04
0.05
0.76

2.04
0.07
1.44

AIC
LL Ratio Test Statistic

11404
76

11458
22

N countries
N districts
N observations

29
1,605
3,160

29
1,605
3,160

2
σ̂cde

σ̂d2

σ̂c2

Notes: Values for the outcome variable in different elections are left separate (rather than averaged), thereby
driving up the number of observations. 95% confidence intervals were calculated from 1,000 simulated draws
of the model’s parameters and appear in brackets below coefficient estimates.
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Appendix D: The Political Saliency of Social Divisions
One important consideration that the main line of the analysis fails to take into account is the
political saliency of social divisions. In the conclusion to the manuscript, I note that while
we should expect more parties in the presence of a larger effective number of social groups,
this will only be the case when political entrepreneurs are willing to undergo the political
machinations necessary to electorally mobilize these groups. If, for example, a population
can naturally be divided into three groups based on a combination of religious and income
divisions, but most parties run on economic platforms, then religion would not be politically
salient despite the fact that – mathematically speaking – it could potentially be. Addressing
the issue of salience in large-n, cross-national comparative research is difficult. Relying on
in-depth knowledge of election- and country-specific contexts simply becomes too infeasible
when we are interested in assessing empirical relationships across a large number of cases.
As a side-project for this dissertation paper, I developed the beginnings of a methodology
that – together with Santiago Olivella and Brian Crisp – I will continue to work on in the
near future. The basic idea is to apply the type of iterative, algorithmic classification procedures discussed in this manuscript with district-level electoral results in an effort to explain
which demographic attributes were primarily responsible for structuring electoral outcomes
in socially similar districts. First, at the district level, we will develop a computational clustering procedure that classifies districts into different “groups” based on many demographic
dimensions and that is a priori agnostic both about the number of salient divisions in society
and also which specific divisions are most important (call these groups demographic partitions). We will also use this same clustering procedure to similarly categorize districts into
groups based on the nature of electoral outcomes in the district (call these vote partitions).
Second, we will compare both sets of partitions using a novel correspondence procedure
that evaluates all possible matches of these taxonomies and selects the optimal match. The
result of this process will not only be a measure of how many social divisions are needed
to slot districts into a distribution that could support a matching electoral distribution, but
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also which specific divisions are needed to produce such a match. Third, we will validate
both the dimensionality and the social attributes that characterize the match by comparing
the results to expert surveys and party manifesto codings. For example, if we find that votepartitions and demographic-partitions in a given country are best explained by ethnicity
and income, we might look to Comparative Manifesto Project codings or expert surveys for
that election to see if the parties were, indeed, talking about ethnic and economic issues.
With this type of external validation in hand, we will, finally, use the results as a powerful
explanatory variable to evaluate a number of novel hypotheses related to party competition,
government formation, and policy outcomes.

Figure D1: The Clustering Correspondence Procedure as a Method for Ascertaining the Political Saliency
of Social Divisions

Before listing the sorts of research questions we hope to examine, I will first discuss in
greater conceptual detail how we can use district-level electoral and demographic data to
recover the salient social divisions underlying party competition. The Figure D1 intuitively
illustrates this process. First, we use a clustering procedure to slot districts into similar
groups based both on votes for parties and also for various demographic characteristics.
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In the simplified illustration below, similar districts in the vote partition are merely those
where the same party won the majority of votes. The demographic partition will entail
many more complications because we intend to iterate the clustering procedure across all
possible permutations of demographic variables. So, for example, at the bottom left corner
of the diagram, the districts have been categorized taking only income and religion into
consideration whereas at the bottom right corner, three demographic variables (language,
religion, and ethnicity) have been used as the criteria with which to sort the districts. At
any rate, we should be able to return a description of which demographic attributes combine
to provide the closest clustering match to electoral outcomes. In the case of the figure above,
it is clear that the electoral outcomes in the hypothetical arrangement of districts most
closely matches a social taxonomy of districts predicated on linguistic, religious, and ethnic
divisions. We would conclude, then, that these three social attributes were salient in this
election. With this information in hand, we will be positioned to begin theorizing along a
number of important dimensions. The range of potential research questions is large, but we
have begun to think about the following:
• Are parties able to change the contours of their social support?
• Do countries with more salient cleavages have larger party systems? Are party systems
that mobilize more social cleavages also more “nationalized” in nature?
• Does the nature of a party’s social support influence its probability of being included
in a governing coalition?
• Does the social structure of political competition affect what types of policies and
budgets are produced by the legislature?
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– Paper 3 –
Explaining Party Label Linkage as
Supply-Side Ballot Composition

Abstract: The extent to which political parties field candidates or lists across multiple
electoral districts can profoundly impact the comparability of ballots voters in different
parts of the same country have access to on election day. While previous studies have
measured this “linkage” by focusing on the distribution of voter support across districts, I
argue that measuring linkage – an inherently supply-side phenomenon – using demand-side
information is empirically incorrect and obscures some important theoretical attributes of
the electoral market. I demonstrate that linkage is an empirically differentiable concept from
nationalization. I then examine which institutional factors shape the extent of linkage across
nearly 2,000 parties in nearly 500 elections in 47 different democracies. I find that, while the
centralization of political power in a country drives up the extent of linkage, this effect is
more salient for smaller than larger parties. Indeed, as parties grow, they tend to link their
platforms across almost all districts, regardless of the macro-institutional environment.

Introduction
Around the world and across all types of electoral systems, party elites make strategic decisions leading up to election day that structure the supply side of the electoral market. Indeed,
before voters ever have the opportunity to cast a ballot, the ranks of this ballot must first be
populated with party offerings. Scholars of electoral politics have long studied the determinants of ballot composition at the district level: various institutional and social factors come
to bear in determining both the number (whether few or many) and type (whether centrist,
extreme, niche, etc.) of party offerings in any given district (the literature in these regards is
vast, but see, for example: Cox, 1997; Cox and Shugart, 1996; Downs, 1957; Duverger, 1954;
Golder, 2003; Grofman, 2004; Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994). Voters living in larger magnitude districts, for example, especially in newer democracies with a number of salient social
divisions, must sort through comparatively longer rosters of potential candidates or party
lists. In addition, these offerings can be expected to occupy a broad swathe of the ideological
spectrum, possibly including even the most extreme positions. By contrast, voters living in
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single-member constituencies in more established democracies will face a severely circumscribed set of ballot options on election day. These offerings can additionally be expected to
be more centrist in their ideological orientations.
Moving beyond thinking about ballot composition in any one district, however, scholars
have also been interested in explaining cross-national variation in the extent to which ballots
across different districts within the same country might resemble one another. This level
of similarity in ballot composition has been examined indirectly through various lenses.
For example, scholars have shed some light on this question by explaining the emergence of
“regional” parties versus more “national” parties (Brancati, 2008; Hearl, Budge and Pearson,
1996). In the vocabulary of earlier studies, a political party is a “national party” if it is able
to contest elections on equal terms in all areas of a country (Schattschneider, 1960) or if it is
able to compete in “all or all but a handful of constituencies in every region of the country”
(Urwin, 1982, p. 220). Other studies have more explicitly called attention to similarities in
ballot compositions as a byproduct of elite-level decisions to “link” their party labels across
districts (Cox, 1999), or as a result of the extent to which parties field candidates with a
mind toward providing “territorial coverage” of the entire country (Caramani, 2004). More
recently, scholars have turned to a battery of “inflation indices” (Chhibber and Kollman,
1998; Kasuya and Moenius, 2008; Moenius and Kasuya, 2004) predicated on voter support for
party offerings in order to examine the extent to which the party system in any one district
resembles the national party system in the aggregate. These comparisons have always been
made using an electoral statistic – the effective number of parties – that draws on both
supply-side ballot offerings and demand-side voter support.
But this focus on the size of the party system weighted by vote shares conflates the
two (separate, albeit interrelated) stages of electoral competition: first, political elites make
strategic decisions about contesting certain districts and then, second, voters make decisions
about which subset of these offerings to support. Previous measures of party system linkage,
inflation, and nationalization all draw on information garnered from the second stage –
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specifically, the distribution of voter support across districts – to draw inferences about the
strategic calculations undergone by political elites during the first stage. If we are interested
in the question of what determines ballot similarity across electoral districts, then what we
require is a renewed focus on the supply side of the market.
This is a question worth answering for a number of important reasons, most obviously
because it can qualify our understanding of nationalization as conceptualized by demandside voter support. Mechanically speaking, the level of party label linkage across districts
(or the homogeneity of ballot composition across districts) will impose an upper limit on the
level of party- and party-system nationalization (or the homogeneity of voter support across
districts) that can plausibly be attained. If very few parties enter all or most districts during
an election, then the extent of nationalization can never be high. To this end, it is worth
studying the determinants of linkage as a supply-side prerequisite for nationalization. As Cox
(1999) first argued years ago, we need to consider the set of factors that might differentially
affect party elites and voters because our grasp of the two sides of the electoral market is
uneven. While recent studies in the vein of Morgenstern, Swindle and Castagnola (2009)
and Morgenstern, Polga-Hecimovich and Siavelis (2012) have explored the determinants of
vote homogeneity both across districts and over time, the dearth of studies on linkage has
left the supply side of the electoral market a “neglected topic” in this respect (Cox, 1999).
Pairing a separate measure of linkage that is isolated from vote outcomes with a separate measure of nationalization also allows us to paint a richer conceptual picture of what
transpires across electoral districts. Lower levels of nationalization, for example, will mean
different things in the presence of lower or higher levels of linkage. When there are very few
similarities in ballot composition across electoral districts, we will necessarily see lower levels
of nationalization. But this pairing of outcomes implies a completely different scenario than
one where linkage is high, but nationalization remains low. In the former case, we know
nothing about voters’ collective proclivity to uniformly support the same set of parties. In
the latter case, however, we can clearly delineate a set of party leaders who are overly opti-
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mistic in spreading their candidates thinly across a voting population that is more discerning
in which ballot offerings it supports.
In this paper, I make a number of contributions to the study of party label linkage.
First, I advance a simple but intuitive measure of linkage that focuses purely on a supplyside concept: the composition of ballots across districts within the same country. I argue
theoretically and demonstrate empirically that linkage is a distinct concept from nationalization and, in so doing, make the case for examining its causes. In the second section, I
build on the theoretical efforts of Cox (1999), which is, to the best of my knowledge, the
only published work to speculate explicitly about the cross-national determinants of ballot
composition. I introduce a number of novel hypotheses pertaining to both macro-level institutions and micro-level party strategies that are then tested in a multivariate, hierarchical
framework. By merging district-level electoral data collected by Brancati (2007) and Kollman et al. (2011), I draw on what is perhaps the largest database of complete district-level
electoral outcomes ever employed in a cross-national study of elections.1 I show that the
extent of centralization of political power in a country will tend to make the party system,
as a whole, more linked. At the level of the party, however, different parties respond to
political centralization in different ways, with smaller parties responding more predictably
than larger parties. Indeed, it seems that most large parties – having hit some threshold of
notoriety and resource endowments – opt to link their party label across nearly all districts,
regardless of the macro-level institutional environment.
1

This database completely disaggregates the “other parties” category that plagues most repositories of

electoral data. By virtue of possessing complete vote data for all political parties, I am able to study ballot
composition in very fine-grained detail across thousands of districts in nearly 500 elections spread across 47
democracies.
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What is Supply-Side Linkage?
The concept of “linkage” has been defined by numerous scholars as an elite-level, supply-side
concept that is temporally antecedent to voters’ decisions about for which party (or parties)
to cast a ballot. Cox (1999), for example, defines linkage as “whether the parties in one
district are the same as those in another” (p. 146) and, elsewhere, discusses linkage in terms
of parties’ decisions to compete across all districts, rather than in terms of the subsequent
levels of support they receive from voters (Cox, 1997). At various points in his canonical book
on electoral dynamics, Cox (1997) refers to linkage as a “national entry market” problem
(p. 198) and a “nationally brokered multi-constituency entry game” (p. 202). Similarly,
Caramani (2004) describes linkage as being synonymous with “territorial coverage” or “the
number of constituencies in which the party is present” (p. 61), rather than the distribution
of votes for the party. An earlier strain of this literature emerging from studies of American
politics similarly defined linkage in supply-side terms, with Schattschneider (1960) referring
to patterns of contestation (in other words, appearance on ballots) and Urwin (1982) focusing
on whether or not a given legislative seat was contested or not (in other words, whether or
not there were only one or two ballot offerings for voters to consider).2
But despite the conceptual clarity underlining “linkage” as an elite-level, supply-side dynamic, empirical indicators of linkage have almost universally drawn on voter-level, demandside information. Cox (1999), for example, constructs a measure of party system inflation
that compares differences in the effective number of parties (ENP) at the local and national
levels. ENP is a weighted measure of the number of parties competing in the election and
the weighting itself is based on the vote shares each party receives on election day. From a
theoretical standpoint, this conflates supply with demand: rather than having a raw count
2

While I am clearing drawing on the electoral institutions literature for my definition of “linkage”, I

should also point out that the term has been used to indicate different concepts in other literatures. For
example, Kitschelt (2000) and Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) use the term to discuss different ways of
representationally “linking” voters to their elected legislators.
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of parties competing in the district, we instead have a weighted count that internalizes the
outcome of the election itself. We can think of any number of research questions that might
require the disjuncture between supply and demand to remain intact, rather than merged.
For instance, do voters have greater difficulty in coordinating when they’re faced with more
ballot options? And does the number of ballot options make it more difficult for major parties to dominate the distribution of votes? These are questions that we are fundamentally
unable to answer if we cannot distinguish party offerings from voter preferences.
From an empirical standpoint, increasing the raw (unweighted) count of party offerings
can have a positive, negative, or negligible impact on the effective number of parties (weighted
by vote shares). After all, simply because an additional party enters a district does not imply
that it will net a number of votes substantial enough to shift the overall ENP figure. If it
does draw votes away from preexisting parties, its entrance may also – depending on the
overall distribution – actually reduce the effective number of parties. This makes the inflation
measure advanced by Cox (1999) and similar inflation measures advanced by Chhibber and
Kollman (1998), Kasuya and Moenius (2008), and Moenius and Kasuya (2004) even more
problematic as proxies for elite-level decision outcomes. More sophisticated vote-based work
in party system nationalization can provide a more nuanced picture of the demand side
of the electoral market, but not of the homogeneity in ballot composition across different
districts (Bochsler, 2010; Caramani, 2004; Jones and Mainwaring, 2003; Morgenstern and
Potthoff, 2005; Morgenstern, Swindle and Castagnola, 2009). What is needed is a measure of
ballot composition that is free from the weighting biases incurred by considering (temporally
subsequent) vote distributions.
This is not a difficult measure to construct and one has already been proposed by Caramani (2004), although it requires a slight refinement and has up to this point never been
used in a broad, cross-national study of this type. I begin with his measure of territorial
coverage, which is simply the number of constituencies a party entered in an election divided by the total number of constituencies in the country. I refine this measure slightly
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by weighting each district’s contribution to this percentage by its district magnitude, which
is a standard approach employed in previous studies of nationalization. As many scholars
of nationalization have argued, variation in district sizes (whether considering magnitude or
voting population, which correlate very highly with one another) can cause methodological
and conceptual problems when aggregating up from individual districts to the level of a
party (Bochsler, 2010; Ersson, Janda and Lane, 1985; Morgenstern, Polga-Hecimovich and
Siavelis, 2013; Rose and Urwin, 1975). In the particular case of studying linkage, I weight
entry decisions by district magnitude for the following reason: while political parties would
like to offer their platform to as many voters as possible, “voters” do not come to parties
as continuous units, but rather as discrete blocks that have been sectioned off into districts.
To this extent, where within-country variation in magnitude exists, it is not the same for
parties to enter a district with magnitude of five as it is to enter a district with magnitude
of ten. The party has a chance to place its platform in front of more voters in the latter case
and, thus, the decision to enter the latter district should drive up linkage levels more than
entering the former.
Where there is no within-country variation in magnitude, the decision of whether or not
to weight entry by district magnitude results in no change; where there is some variation
present, this weighted measure appropriately accounts for the fact that the decision to enter a
larger district is not the same as the decision to enter a smaller district.3 This measure, then,
returns for each party in each election an estimate of the share of all possible ballots upon
which its party label appeared. Across all parties within each election, we can then take an
average of these party-level shares to construct a system-level measure of the average share
of ballot homogeneity (or supply-side linkage) across all districts. As this measure increases
toward 1.0, voters in different districts are encountering increasingly similar ballots when
3

In empirical fact, however, the choice of whether or not to weight this percentage by district magnitude

is immaterial as the two versions (weighted and unweighted) are correlated with one another at r = 0.98
across nearly 5,000 party-election observations.
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they head to the polls on election day.
While I am strictly interested in the question of entry and not the resulting distribution
of votes across parties, I do have to make a few concessions to demand-side dynamics when
aggregating up from individual parties to the level of the party system. Rather than weighting each party’s linkage score by its national-level vote share (which would, I believe, bring
the concept too in line with various nationalization scores), I instead drop from the analysis
those “nuisance” or “very small” parties netting one-percent or less of the national vote
before calculating the average level of linkage across all remaining parties.4 This strategy
has the dual conceptual advantage of, first, acknowledging that the analysis should focus on
parties that are sufficiently sizable while also, second, leaving as intact as possible the pure
supply-side dynamic of the electoral market.
The data set I employ in this study is constructed from very fine-grained data: complete
vote data on all parties at the district level across all districts in a given election in a given
country. My primary data source was the Constituency-Level Elections Dataset managed
by Brancati (2007). This is a database that focuses specifically on collecting thorough and
complete vote data for all parties that competed in an election, no matter how small. I
supplemented this data with a subset of the elections presented in the Constituency-Level
Elections Archive by Kollman et al. (2011). This latter repository is not as deliberately
focused on collecting complete vote figures for all parties and often reports aggregated “other
parties” categories wherein vote totals for very small parties are lumped together. For most
research questions, this distinction is immaterial. Yet for the research question at hand –
the composition of ballots – the appearance of a party name (regardless of how few votes the
party will eventually go on to obtain in the election) on the ballot is my primary point of
interest. Lumping together many smaller parties’ vote totals into an “other” category will
4

The regression results presented later in the manuscript are robust to dropping those parties that netted

five-percent or less of the national vote before calculating the cross-party average linkage level. The results
of this robustness test are presented in the appendices at the end of this paper.
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obscure much of the important variation I am interested in measuring.
I define entry = 1 for a given party in a given election’s district when that party received
at least 1 vote in the data set. I define entry = 0 for those districts where the party received
no votes. Practically speaking, the data sets that I draw on for electoral returns treat nonentry in systematic ways that make the distinction between entry and non-entry even clearer.
The CLE data set simply leaves blank cells in the data for districts where a party did not field
a candidate and the CLEA only includes party-district observations where the party received
at least 1 vote. Admittedly, without having original ballots on-hand, I cannot observe the
possibility of an entry decision that resulted in absolutely no voter support. However, I work
from the fundamental assumption that, if a party stood for election in a given district, then
it received at least one vote in the district. This is not, I think, a terribly heroic assumption,
given the fact that it would require very few resources for a party to net one vote in any
given electoral competition (indeed, we might expect that the candidate who stood in the
competition would at least vote for herself or himself). Still, I concede the point that a
party’s label might have appeared on a ballot, yet the party received no votes.5
The resulting indicator is empirically distinct from previous measures of linkage or nationalization that include various weighting schemes based on vote distributions. A glance
at the correlation coefficients between my indicator and various other indicators in Table
1 is telling: isolating the supply side from the demand side results in a very low degree of
covariation between the two concepts.6 In the next section, I will summarize the scant liter5

In correspondence with Prof. Dawn Brancati, however, she argues that this scenario occurs with

negligible frequency in her data, which provides the overwhelming majority of observations in my analysis.
6

In large part, this might be attributed to the simple fact that one measure is weighted by national-level

vote share and the other is not. Although I have argued that there are analytical justifications for not merging
the supply and demand sides of the electoral market in this way, in results not reported here, I weighted my
linkage metric by national-level vote share and plotted it against the same battery of nationalization metrics.
The correlation coefficients are stronger, but still comparatively weak and allow for a great deal of variation
in nationalization values while holding constant linkage values. For example, for those country-election
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Table 1. Correlations Between Average Share of Districts Entered and Various Linkage Indices

Linkage Metric

Correlation
Coefficient

Cox’s Inflation Index

0.04

Chhibber and Kollman’s Difference Index

0.04

Moenius and Kasuya’s Inflation Index

-0.37

Moenius and Kasuya’s Weighted Inflation Index

-0.41

Jones and Mainwaring’s Gini Measure

0.57

Bochsler’s Gini Measure

-0.31

Note: Country-Election Observations, n = 511.

ature that has speculated on the causes of linkage and conduct the first cross-national test of
these hypotheses alongside my own novel set of hypotheses. I will pay particular attention
to different dynamics that might exist at the level of the party system in the aggregate as
well as at the individual party level.

Explaining Variation in Linkage
Why might a political party decide to enter electoral competition in fewer or greater numbers
of electoral districts? I will advance several hypotheses in response to this question, each
of which falls into one of three broader conceptual arguments. The first set of hypotheses
was advanced by Cox (1997, 1999) and can be characterized as system-level centralization
hypotheses: as political control in a country becomes increasingly centralized, party elites
face incentives to increase their national profiles and link their platforms across districts in
observations in my data set with very high system-level weighted linkage (i.e., 0.95), Bochsler’s measure of
nationalization returns system-level values ranging from 0.7 to 0.9. Clearly, then, linkage is a concept worth
studying in its own right as something distinct from nationalization.
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an effort to draw as much support as possible from as many constituencies as possible. The
second set of hypotheses might best be characterized as pertaining to system-level electoral
institutions: parties may enter districts more or less broadly due to there being larger (or
smaller) district magnitudes or due to political elites’ and voters’ level of experience with
democratic institutions. Finally, the third set of hypotheses pertains to party-level characteristics: larger and smaller parties – in terms of their notoriety and, perhaps, resource
endowments – will be differently predisposed to linking their efforts across electoral districts.
Furthermore, the effects of the system-level variables might differentially impact large and
small parties. I discuss each of these three types of hypotheses in turn.
To begin, Cox (1999) makes the straightforward argument that when political parties
need to accomplish tasks that require many legislators (like securing a majority of seats in a
unicameral or strongly unitary legislature), they will field candidates across a larger number
of electoral districts in the hopes of increasing their vote shares. This logic follows on from an
older literature on consociational or consensus democracy, where unitary and unicameral political systems are thought to push political elites into “winner-take-all” strategic mentalities
(Lijphart, 1977, 1984; Lijphart and Crepaz, 1991). Completely aside from electoral institutions themselves, the existence of powerful offices with hefty jurisdictional powers over the
country at large will orient political elites toward merging their platforms with like-minded
parties to benefit from returns to scale that are unavailable to smaller parties opting to retain their own label in just a subset of the country’s electoral districts. Where the value of
national office is high – as it is in unitary and unicameral systems – the supply side of the
electoral market should be considerably more restricted when compared to countries with
significantly devolved decision-making powers or with two houses in the national legislature.
Make no mistake: political parties always prefer more seats in national-level legislatures.
The argument for centralization leading to linkage, however, is that centralization creates
fewer opportunities for success in a limited set of electoral districts to result in some substantial amount of seats. Under more diffuse power arrangements, by contrast, there are
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more opportunities for limited (regional) success to result in actual political representation.
In the presence of the devolution of political power in federal systems, for example, smaller
parties can gain representation in regional legislatures by only running candidates intensively
in a handful of the country’s electoral districts. Indeed, Brancati (2008) demonstrates that
political decentralization results in the emergence and success of regional political parties.
Having gained representation in regional parliamentary bodies, regional parties can use this
visibility to contest elections at the national level – but they can only effectively do this in
their regions. In unitary systems, by contrast, this cannot happen. Parties must instead
cast their policy platforms more broadly for want of plausible region-level venues of political
contestation. Additionally, as is the case in many countries – such as Austria, Germany,
and India – representatives to the upper chamber are nominated by regional parliaments
(Brancati, 2008). For these reasons, as political power becomes increasingly centralized,
linkage – measured in the aggregate – should increase as parties contest elections in a more
geographically diffuse fashion.
H1: Linkage will be higher in unitary systems than in federal systems.
H2: Linkage will be higher in unicameral than in bicameral systems.
Cox (1999) notes that the choice of executive type could potentially impact linkage as well,
specifically that the existence of an independently-elected president offers a substantially
valuable national-level office to political parties (Samuels, 2002; Shugart and Carey, 1992;
Shugart, 1995). Scholars of the effective number of parties have long explored the link
between the size of the party system (again, weighted by demand-side vote distributions) in
the presence of presidential elections, especially those that coincide with legislative elections
(Clark and Golder, 2006; Golder, 2006; Hicken and Stoll, 2008, 2011). The common empirical
finding in this literature is that presidential elections exert a downward pressure on the size
of the party system (Cox, 1997; Hicken, 2009; Hicken and Stoll, 2011). While some research
in this vein has qualified the relationship somewhat by arguing that this effect is felt more
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strongly when presidential and legislative elections are concurrent (Golder, 2006; Samuels,
2002, 2003; Shugart and Carey, 1992) and when the powers of the presidency are substantial
(Cox, 1997; Shugart and Carey, 1992), it should at least be the case that – relative to
parliamentary systems – presidential systems induce higher levels of linkage.7
H3: Linkage will be higher in presidential than in parliamentary systems.
Moving away from the dynamics of centralization, we can consider supply-side hypotheses
that have more to do with system-level electoral institutions. These include issues of proportionality and of political elites’ and voters’ level of experience with democratic institutions.
As the average magnitude of all districts in a country increases, for example, so too does the
proportionality in the translation of votes into seats (Anckar, 1997; Benoit, 2001; Gallagher,
1991; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). Parties may enter a larger share of districts in a country with higher average district magnitude, not necessarily with an eye toward increasing
their national profiles, but as a down-ticket implication of their district-by-district strategic
calculations. In a country that has large multimember districts, for example, the higher
level of proportionality results in a smaller overall share of votes in each district being converted into seats in the legislature. The marginal utility of fielding an additional candidate
or list in another district in the country is high where proportionality is high. Completely
aside from any considerations about national policy or the concentration of decision-making
7

The empirical findings of the literature relating presidentialism to party system size are many and

nuanced. For example, the presence of an independently-elected executive has been found to drive down
party system size, but only when there are few (as opposed to many) presidential candidates (Golder, 2006).
Without data on presidential election outcomes, I cannot in the present study control for these various
nuances. However, in regression models not reported in this study, I explored issues of concurrence and
presidential power within the subset of presidential countries I have in my data set (10 total). The empirical
results relating these variables to linkage were null. Because I am working toward a broader theory of linkage
– of which the nature of the executive branch is only one facet – I herein draw only a fairly crude distinction
between presidentialism and parliamentarism and leave the exploration of greater nuance in this relationship
for future work.
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power, then, we might expect more linkage in countries with larger districts.
H4: Linkage will increase as average district magnitude increases.
Another system-level hypothesis I offer pertains to democratic learning and builds on
the well-known relationship between, on the one hand, party and voter coordination and,
on the other, the number of times that parties and voters have interacted under a set of
democratic electoral institutions.8 Substantial empirical evidence supports the claim that the
homogeneity of ballot offerings should be higher in older rather than in newer, less established
democracies. When voters and parties have little experience with democratic institutions (or
immediately after a major reform to electoral institutions) they have a hard time coordinating
amongst themselves and assessing which party offerings are truly viable (Tavits, 2007; Tavits
and Annus, 2006; Weyden and Meuleman, 2008). The empirical literature has found evidence
of less successful coordination in the first, second, third, fourth, and – in some cases – even
the fifth election held after a democratic transition (Dawisha and Deets, 2006; Duch and
Palmer, 2002; Moser, 1999, 2001; Singer and Stephenson, 2009). When coordination levels
are low and voters are not afforded the “heuristic benefit” (Gschwend, 2007) of previous
elections, then “every potential entrant is perceived as having as good a chance of winning
8

A final possible explanation for cross-national variation in linkage that Cox (1999) discusses is social

heterogeneity, although he ultimately concludes that its effect on linkage (whether positive or negative)
could operate in either direction. The reasoning behind the ambiguity of this relationship is that – for social
cleavages to inform linkage – we need some way to measure heterogeneity not only across districts, but
within them as well. The findings of recent studies on the distribution of voter support for political parties
across districts reinforce this ambiguity. Morgenstern, Swindle and Castagnola (2009), for example, return
null results when they consider social diversity measured only at the national level and Crisp, Olivella and
Potter (2013) demonstrate that, without taking into account the ways in which demographic characteristics
are spread across districts, we cannot adequately assess the role that diversity plays in determining voter
support for party offerings. Due to the theoretical and empirical ambiguity surrounding the relationship
between social cleavages and the extent of linkage (as well as severe data limitations for the set of countries
considered in this study), I set aside this potentially important explanatory variable for the time being and
move onto focus on other determinants of linkage.
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as any other” (Tavits, 2007, p. 117). In this environment of confusion, parties in nascent
party systems might be overly optimistic about their electoral prospects as they wait for
voters to coalesce around the more viable offerings.
This false optimism about their electoral prospects might find smaller (poorly-linked)
parties hanging on over the course of the first few elections. Over time, however, such parties
will be forced to confront the fact that the electorate has separated out the viable from nonviable parties and has begun to coalesce around more successful ballot offerings. As these
learning effects take hold and as these larger (better-linked) parties begin to consolidate their
dominance, smaller parties will be forced to drop out of competition. In doing so, the overall
level of linkage in the party system will increase over the course of the first several elections
after democratic transition or major institutional reform. In more established democracies,
then, system-level linkage will be higher and this will be due to the fact that the party system
is – on the whole – comprised of a larger share of highly linked individual parties.
H5: Linkage will be lower in newer than in more established democracies.
Moving on to consider some party-level dynamics, one could straightforwardly argue that
“larger” parties (whether measured by resource endowments, public notoriety, national-level
vote share, etc.) will field their candidates or lists in more districts, thereby driving up partylevel linkage. This relationship no doubt has both mechanical and strategic components.
For instance, it is almost mathematically true that – in party systems around the world –
those parties netting the highest national-level vote shares are also those parties whose label
appears on almost every ballot in the country. Linkage is, in this sense, a prerequisite for
achieving very high levels of success in the national aggregate: no matter how successful a
regional party may be, its success at the national level is constrained by its comparatively
lower level of linkage. Beyond the mechanical, however, there are also strategic components
behind larger parties’ efforts to achieve higher linkage levels. Having one’s candidates in
all (or most) districts across the country can, itself, be a signal of electoral viability. Even
in those countries with very restrictive electoral rules where strong incumbents sometimes
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run unopposed – such as the United States and the United Kingdom – major political
parties – such as the Republican Party and the Labour Party – still field candidates in the
vast majority of electoral districts (despite the rational expectation of losing many of these
contests). Especially when a party has undertaken the task of crafting a policy platform
that caters to broader – rather than regionalized – interests, the marginal cost of fielding
this platform in an additional district is comparatively low. For both these mechanical and
strategic reasons, then, we would expect larger parties to exhibit higher levels of linkage.
H6: At the party level, linkage will increase as party size increases.
Despite my focus on the supply side of the electoral market, I grant the fact that parties
are strategic actors and will, to some extent, condition their linkage decisions based on
evidence they have garnered from previous iterations of the electoral market. In particular,
parties may look to previously high levels of variability in their support among voters as
evidence that they are stretching themselves too thinly across too many districts. When
their lagged district-level vote shares, for instance, indicate that their support is substantially
imbalanced, this is a signal that different constituencies are responding differently to their
party label. Accordingly, parties are faced with the prospect of either tailoring their platforms
to specific constituencies (a resource-intensive proposition) or simply pulling back on the
number of districts they contest. Thus, I hypothesize that previously high levels of variability
in a party’s district-level voter support will prompt it to drop out of areas where it fared
poorly and decrease the overall number of districts in which it previously fielded candidates.
H7: At the party level, linkage will increase as variance in a party’s lagged
district-level vote shares decreases.
Finally, I argue that differently sized (or endowed or notable) parties will respond to
macro-level institutional variables in different capacities. Specifically, I argue that the partylevel strategic considerations of larger parties will begin to override these institutional concerns as parties grow in size. Political centralization, proportionality, and democratic experience will all drive up linkage for most parties in a country. Larger parties, however –
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perhaps making resort to the economies of scale inherent in fielding their candidates across
all districts (even those where they expect to lose) – will exhibit high levels of linkage regardless of the institutional circumstance. For this reason, it is possible to find major parties
with high linkage levels in both parliamentary and presidential democracies, for instance, as
well as in both federal and unitary countries. Smaller parties, by contrast, must be more
discerning in choosing where to field their candidates. They possess fewer resources and are
less recognizable to the general voting public. They face real tradeoffs in opting to compete
in some districts at the expense of others. For smaller parties, then, institutional incentives
should bite in the sense that smaller parties, of necessity, will pay much closer attention to
these incentives. This leads to my final hypothesis.
H8: The relationships between macro-level institutions and linkage will – at the
party level – hold better for smaller parties than for larger parties.
I now turn to an examination of each of these hypotheses in a cross-national, hierarchical
regression analysis. Because of the nature of the data set – repeated elections nested within
countries with fixed characteristics – I employ a set of hierarchical linear models. I first
construct a model at the party-system level taking average linkage across parties as the
outcome variable. I next build a model at the individual party level that includes a handful of
party-level covariates as well as their interaction with the macro-level institutional variables.
This model will seek to explain party-level linkage figures. In both sets of models, I exclude
those parties netting less than one-percent of the national-level vote in order to eliminate
“nuisance” or very small parties that are so idiosyncratic that their inclusion would only add
statistical noise to the estimates. In an appendix, I re-estimate the models by increasing the
barrier of exclusion to five-percent or less of the national vote.
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Data and Analysis
As described above, my data set is comprised of complete district-level vote totals across
more than 500 elections in nearly 50 countries around the world.9 For the system-level
model, my outcome variable is average party linkage across parties gaining more than onepercent of the national vote within any given election.10 In an effort to leave separate the
demand-side vote information, the average is unweighted by party vote shares. This choice
of not weighting – while problematic in that it might be potentially biased in favor of smaller
parties – is nonetheless a more accurate reflection of “linkage” as defined by homogeneity
in ballot composition across districts. For the second, party-level model, these weighting
concerns are immaterial, as no aggregation of parties must take place. The outcome variable
here is simply the party’s level of linkage in a given election.
For the first model, my institutional explanatory variables are cast at the national level.
First, I use a dummy variable taken from Treisman (2007) that measures whether or not a
country is a federal system.11 To test the effects of bicameralism on linkage, I employ another
dummy variable for bicameralism that is taken from the World Bank’s (DPI) Database of
Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001). A third dummy variable for presidentialism is
similarly taken from the DPI, where I coded as “presidential” any country that has a directly9

Although, due to data availability on other covariates, not all of these elections and countries will be

included in the regression analyses that follow.
10

Recall that these linkage percentages are weighted by district magnitude. In separate models not reported

in this manuscript, robustness checks were undertaken at both the system- and party-level with linkage figures
that were unweighted by district magnitude. The signs and significance levels of each of the main results
were almost always completely unchanged.
11

Following, Hicken and Stoll (2008), I substituted in data on the share of a country’s expenditures and

revenues that are spent or generated at subnational levels. These data were taken from the World Bank’s
Fiscal Decentralization Indicators. The temporal coverage of this data is comparatively sparse compared
to the federalism dummy variable, but substituting in either subnational expenditures or revenues failed to
return any significant relationship between federalism and linkage.
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elected executive. The average district magnitude variable was based on original calculations
from the electoral returns described above and enters the regressions in logged form. This
is to account for two things: first, because studies of proportionality have long noted its
diminishing returns as magnitude increases and, second, because the values of this variable
are not normally distributed. Logging district magnitude ensures the regression model will
meet the basic assumptions of linear regression analysis. Finally, following Crisp, Olivella
and Potter (2012), I operationalize democratic age as a series of dummy variables for voters’
experience with (1) one or fewer elections, (2) two elections, (3) three elections, or (4) four
elections. This follows from the logic articulated by Singer and Stephenson (2009) and Tavits
and Annus (2006) that democratic learning takes place in electorates up through the first
five elections. As with the line of argumentation presented in Crisp, Olivella and Potter
(2012), operationalizing democratic experience in this way allows us to measure the specific
drop off in learning effects after inaugural elections.
The second, party-level model retains these national-level covariates and adds the addition of two important party-level variables: party size and previous vote variance.12 So as to
avoid endogeneity concerns, party size is measured by the party’s national-level vote share
from the previous election. Similarly, previous vote variance is measured as the square of
the standard deviation across all of the party’s district-level vote shares (for those districts
in which it fielded a candidate or party list). To explore the drop-off in institutional effects as parties increase in size, party size is interacted with district magnitude, federalism,
bicameralism, and presidentialism.
As I have previously mentioned, the structure of the data set is hierarchical in nature:
repeated elections – featuring some of the same parties over time – take place under the same
12

Democratic age in this formulation is not statistically significant. In order to focus on the other – more

robust relationships – in the party-level model, I collapse the four dummy variables into a new democracy
variable that assumes the value of 1 during the country’s first five elections and the value of 0 thereafter. In
an appendix to the manuscript, I return to a discussion of age and experience at the party level that aims
to shed some light on why the findings are disappointing in this respect.
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umbrella of country-level covariates. The outcome variable – whether average system-level
linkage or individual party-level linkage – is continuous and can assume any value between
0 and 1. Thus a linear model is an acceptable modeling strategy so long as the outcome
variable tends toward values away from the absolutes of 0 and 1. More specifically, the
system-level model I will be estimating is the following:

2
Linkage ce ∼ N (γc + Xce β, σce
)

γc ∼ N (Xc ξ, σc2 )

where Linkage ce is the outcome variable. The model includes a country-election battery of
covariates, Xce , that can assume new values for each election (such as democratic age and
the average size of electoral districts, should these change in between elections). The model
2
returns a vector β of coefficients for these variables as well as a measure of variance σce
.

The model also includes country-level intercepts modeled by a separate matrix of countrylevel covariates, Xc (such as bicameralism and presidentialism). The vector of country-level
coefficient estimates ξ captures the effect of Xc on linkage when Xce is 0 and variation among
these country-level intercepts is captured by σc2 . The party-level regression model, which will
be presented secondly, shifts the unit of analysis to Linkage cep . This subscript represents
the level of linkage exhibited by a specific party during a specific election in a country. In
this second model, a new random intercept γep is included and is modeled by a matrix Xep
of party-level covariates (such as size) that are all election-specific and the variation among
2
these party-election intercepts is embodied in σep
.

The regression results for the system-level model are reported in Table 2 below. The
first noteworthy result pertains to democratic learning effects, where we see that initially
these effects are quite significant, but tail off rather quickly. Relative to more established
democracies (in this case, the point of comparison is a democracy in which the electorate
has passed through at least five prior elections), party systems in countries with one or fewer
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elections of prior experience have a reduced linkage level of 0.09 (recall the scale ranges from
0 to 1). The effect is still significant – but shrinks in size – when countries have two prior
elections of experience and this effect continues to shrink substantively (and lose its statistical
significance) after this point. Clearly, very small parties are leaving electoral competition
quickly, thereby ceding territory to larger parties. This fact drives up linkage as these larger
and more successful parties come to dominate the electoral landscape. To say that party
systems in more established democracies have an average linkage level 0.09 units higher than
democracies in their first or second election is a substantial finding. Indeed, this figure is
nearly 1/10 of all districts in a country. In the United States, this difference would equate
to most parties entering all of 435 districts instead of entering roughly 390. In Spain, the
substantive difference is between entering all of 52 districts instead of entering roughly 45.
The other macro-institutional variables perform in the hypothesized directions. Increasing district magnitude, for example, drives up the average level of linkage in a party system
by about 0.06, but this difference will be felt more strongly moving from a single-member
district system to a proportional representation system rather than simply increasing magnitude in preexisting multimember districts. By this, I mean that transforming the relationship
out of the logged scale, results in a 0.06 increase in linkage when moving from an average
magnitude of 1 to about 2.7 or from 2.7 to about 7.4. Thereafter, average magnitude must
increase to roughly 20.1 to realize another 0.06 increase in linkage.
Finally, the power centralization variables influence system-level linkage in intuitive ways,
although bicameralism falls just short of statistical significance at conventional levels. Relative to unitary systems, federal systems experience 0.14 less linkage. Similarly, relative to
unicameral systems, bicameral systems experience 0.07 less linkage. Presidential systems,
when compared to parliamentary systems, seem to increase average linkage by a somewhat
substantial amount: 0.11. On the whole, then, we can leverage the results of this model
to explain rather marked variation in linkage levels across countries. A nascent presidential
system, for example, that utilizes single-member districts and has devolved some political
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Table 2. Multilevel Linear Regression Model of System-Level Linkage.

D.V.

Estimate

95% C.I.

Experience ≤ 1

-0.09

[ -0.13, -0.05 ]

Experience = 2

-0.07

[ -0.12, -0.02 ]

Experience = 3

-0.04

[ -0.09, 0.01 ]

Experience = 4

-0.02

[ -0.08, 0.04 ]

Log(District Magnitude)

0.06

[ 0.03, 0.09 ]

Federal System

-0.14

[ -0.24, -0.04 ]

Bicameral System

-0.07

[ -0.17, 0.03 ]

Presidential System

0.11

[ 0.01, 0.21 ]

Intercept

0.85

[ 0.77, 0.93 ]

2
σ̂ce

0.01
0.02

σ̂c2

N countries
N observations

47
472
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power to its regional governments can be expected to have a party-system level of linkage of 0.73 (the positive influences of presidentialism and low district magnitude offsetting
the abbreviated levels of democratic experience and diffuse political power). By contrast,
an established parliamentary democracy with a bicameral legislature and relatively sizable
average district magnitudes has a predicted level of linkage of 0.92.
To the extent that we can equate party-level “linkage” levels with party “size”, these
predicted values might seem counterintuitive. After all, we tend to think that presidential systems with restrictive electoral institutions (like the United States) will harbor very
few large parties (which are presumably highly linked across districts), while parliamentary
countries with more permissive electoral institutions (such as many proportional representation countries in Western Europe) will be characterized by a more fractionalized party
system (and again, presumably lower levels of linkage). This somewhat counterintuitive set
of results can be explained by shifting the level of analysis to the party level, where we can
roughly distinguish “types” of parties based on their size and previous variability in voter
support across electoral districts. The results of a model including this additional level of
analysis are presented in Table 3 below.
The macro-institutional variables in the party-level model all retain their signs, but many
of them fail to clear the conventional threshold of statistical significance.13 As H7 argues,
however, this is actually what we should expect to see when we take into account the fact
that parties have varying sizes and patterns of electoral support. Indeed, party size – or the
lagged share of the national vote – is among the strongest performing explanatory variables
in this model and its interactions with each of the macro-institutional variables indicate that
its qualifying effect on the previous hypotheses is somewhat substantial. On its own, the
coefficient on party size indicates that increasing a party’s previous vote share from 5% to 20%
should increase its level of linkage by nearly two-thirds of its level in the previous election. In
interaction with the macro-institutional variables, we see that as parties increase in size, the
13

This is also true of a model, not reported here, that omits the interaction terms in Table 3.
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Table 3. Multilevel Linear Regression Model of Party-Level Linkage.

D.V.

Estimate

95% C.I.

New Democracy

-0.01

[ -0.03, 0.02 ]

Log(District Magnitude)

0.07

[ 0.04 0.10 ]

Federal System

-0.12

[ -0.26, 0.02 ]

Bicameral System

-0.20

[ -0.32, -0.08 ]

Presidential System

0.09

[ -0.04, 0.23 ]

Party Size

0.25

[ 0.09, 0.41 ]

Lagged Vote Variance

-0.57

[ -1.41, 0.27 ]

Party Size × Federal

0.14

[ -0.09, 0.37 ]

Party Size × Bicameral

0.60

[ 0.38, 0.82 ]

Party Size × President

-0.20

[ -0.47, 0.07 ]

Intercept

0.74

[ 0.64, 0.84 ]

2
σ̂cep

0.02
0.03
0.02

2
σ̂ep

σ̂c2

N countries
N parties
N observations

47
492
1,861
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hypothesized effects of these institutions lessen and, eventually, lose their predictive power
altogether. While lagged vote variance operates in the expected direction (more variance
results in a party reducing the number of districts it contests), it falls shy of statistical
significance.14
In an effort to gain some clearer traction on these interactions – and also to directly
assess the value of the macro-institutional variables one at a time, rather than side-byside – Table 4 reports the abbreviated results of four separate repetitions of the party-level
hierarchical model. In each case, district magnitude is included as a statistically significant
control variable, while democratic age is dropped due to its apparent lack of predictive
power alongside these other variables. The table does not report data on each model’s
random intercepts and measures of variance in order to highlight the theoretical relationships
depicted in each model. The first pane examines federalism and party size; the second,
bicameralism; third, presidentialism; and, finally, I model the interaction of party size with
district magnitude.
Given the relative dearth of control variables in these models, it is not terribly surprising
that virtually all of the coefficient estimates are statistically significant (with the single
exception being presidentialism, which is correctly-signed, but insignificant). In general,
we see that the interaction term between party size and any of the institutional variables is
working against the term assigned to the institutional variable itself. For example, federalism
and bicameralism both drive down linkage (note their negative coefficients), but these effects
are made less negative by increasing party size. Similarly, both presidentialism and district
magnitude drive up linkage levels (both coefficients being positive), but increasing party size
makes these effects less positive.
The four panels in Figure 1 draw on the four models’ results to construct the marginal
effects and attendant confidence intervals on each of these four macro-institutional predictors.
14

Although in an appendix to this manuscript that repeats this analysis on a subset of more sizable parties,

this variable is considerably more statistically robust.
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Table 4. Multilevel Linear Regression Models of Separate Interaction Results.

D.V.

Estimate

95% C.I.

Log(District Magnitude)

0.07

[ 0.04, 0.10 ]

Federal System

-0.22

[ -0.35, -0.09 ]

Party Size

0.48

[ 0.36, 0.60 ]

Party Size × Federal

0.45

[ 0.25, 0.65 ]

Log(District Magnitude)

0.07

[ 0.06, 0.08 ]

Bicameral System

-0.25

[ -0.36, -0.14 ]

Party Size

0.20

[ 0.05, 0.35 ]

Party Size × Bicameral

0.69

[ 0.50, 0.88 ]

Log(District Magnitude)

0.07

[ 0.05, 0.09 ]

Presidential System

0.08

[ -0.06, 0.22 ]

Party Size

0.66

[ 0.56, 0.76 ]

Party Size × President

-0.32

[ -0.59, -0.05 ]

Log(District Magnitude)

0.13

[ 0.10, 0.16 ]

Party Size

0.92

[ 0.80, 1.04 ]

Party Size × Log(Magnitude)

-0.28

[ -0.35, -0.21 ]

N countries
N parties
N observations

47
492
1,861

Notes: Insignificant control variables have been deleted from the models. Coefficient estimates and confidence
intervals reported here; intercepts and measures of variance at each level of the model are omitted to highlight
the theoretical relationships of interest.
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Figure 1. Marginal Effect Plots for Four Institutional Interactions at the Party Level. Effects and confidence
intervals are calculated from the separate interaction regression models.
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Lagged party vote share (or party size) ranges from about 5% to about 50% along the x-axis
in each figure, while the marginal effect of the institution in question – whether positive
(above the y=0 horizontal line) or negative(below this line) – is represented by y-values.
The confidence intervals comprised 95% bands that were drawn from each model’s variancecovariance matrix. Thus, we see that the impact of federalism on party-level linkage is
negative and discernible from zero until such point that the party netted around 20% of the
overall national vote. This 20% cutoff point is virtually the same as that for the bicameralism
dummy variable as well. A similar trend is evident in the panel depicting the marginal effect
of presidentialism (i.e., presidentialism exerts a positive marginal effect, up to a certain party
size), but this effect is not discernible from zero. In the final panel, district magnitude’s
positive marginal effect has more staying power: indeed, it is not until a party becomes
quite large – obtaining around 35% of the national vote – that its linkage decisions are no
longer driven by the overall level of proportionality in the translation of votes into seats.
The fact that party size clearly plays an important qualifying role in institutions’ abilities to
shape the incentives of parties is an interesting finding. I will return to this point on greater
length by way of conclusion.

Conclusion
This study contributes to our understanding of electoral competition and the nature of
party systems in several ways. It is the first to take seriously the concept of “linkage” as
a purely supply-side, elite-level consideration that temporally precedes the electoral stage
at which voters’ evaluate a range of ballot offerings. Thinking about the composition of
ballots across districts can lead to theoretically interesting qualifications about party system
nationalization, the size of party systems, and the interpretability of electoral outcomes as
being fully informative representations of collective decision-making. Indeed, the fact that
voters in different districts within the same country can potentially be faced with radically
different menus of party offerings on election day presents a difficult challenge to interpreting
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electoral outcomes as fair-minded expressions of collective preferences (Austen-Smith and
Banks, 1999). When different constituencies are offered incomplete subsets of the broader
national set of parties, then vote choices – and their aggregation – may simply not be fully
informative measures of a society’s deeper preferences. Whenever a party enters one district,
but not another, it inserts a complication for voters when it comes time for them to choose
some parties over others or support some parties more broadly than others. Broad-based
party support and collective preferences, as concepts, are most informative either when most
parties universally enter all districts or – as this is rarely the case – when we can accurately
measure and control for variation in linkage levels.
The first step in deepening our understanding of electoral outcomes as indications of
nationalization and collective preferences is to move away from statistics along the lines of
the effective number of parties. Weighting party offerings by vote shares has, in a way,
become the sine qua non of electoral politics, standing in variously as an indicator of (1)
voter coordination, (2) the size of the party system, (3) the stability of the party system,
when compared across elections, and (4) linkage in party offerings, when compared across
different level of aggregation. In this paper, however, I have made the case that we stand
to benefit by partitioning the supply and demand sides of the electoral market. When we
begin to think about linkage as the level of homogeneity in ballot offerings (rather than
“inflation” between district- and national-level ENP figures and rather than vote-weighted
estimates of nationalization in voter support), we can isolate the specific strategic decisions
undertaken by political elites and study these in an environment that is not biased by
subsequent vote outcomes. Indeed, I have argued that conflating raw party entry figures
with vote distributions not only allows for conceptual drift, but also obscures important
variation in supply-side dynamics that are deserving of separate investigation.
The value added of this approach is readily apparent from the regression results, where
I have offered the first cross-national, multilevel statistical analysis of the determinants of
party label linkage. While Cox (1999) offered anecdotal evidence from a subset of countries in
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support of his centralization of political power arguments, the size and scope of the present
analysis is far more comprehensive and offers some insight into why linkage levels at the
party level and the broader, system level might differ from one another. In general, I find
that voters living in well-established democracies with proportional electoral systems and
political institutions that centralize power are bound to be presented with a more-or-less
homogeneous ballot on election day, regardless of in which area of the country they reside.
The same is not true of newer democracies and of democracies with more diffuse power
structures, such as regional parliaments and bicameral legislatures. In these settings, knowing
something about where a voter resides within the country should tell you something about
the composition of her ballot. More than likely, she must select her legislative representatives
from a circumscribed roster of the full field of party offerings.
In some sense, these results are counterintuitive if we suspect that linkage and party
size go hand-in-hand (which, empirically speaking, this study has demonstrated that they
do). Scholars of electoral politics often look to counties with restrictive electoral institutions
(like the United States) as denizens of large-party, high-linkage cases. Conversely, we tend
to think of the electorally permissive, parliamentary democracy as the canonical case of
deep fractionalization and large (presumably poorer-linked) party systems. This surprising
finding can be adjudicated by moving away from my paper’s system-level results – where
smaller parties are perhaps given an unfair share of attention in the aggregation of linkage
– and drilling down to the level of the individual party, where size clearly plays an important qualifying role on these dynamics of centralization, democratic learning, and electoral
permissiveness.
Specifically, it seems that larger parties – those netting above, say, 20% of the national
vote – have the resources, notoriety, and wherewithal they need to simply field candidates or
lists across the vast majority of districts, regardless of the broader institutional incentives.
That is to say, those parties most likely to gain substantial legislative representation – thereby
experiencing firsthand the results of more or less centralized power-making structures – are
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the parties that are the most cavalier in the extent of their entry decisions. Rather than
worry about the translation of votes into seats or the spoils of office, larger parties seem
to prioritize geographic coverage. Indeed, the homogeneity of their ballot offering may, in
itself, be a salient electoral strategy: on some level, being able to field your candidates in
almost every district around the country is a signal of electoral viability. This is a luxury
that is not afforded to smaller parties, who must pay much closer attention to the political
realities of their specific institutional environment. The strategic linkage calculations of the
Libertarian Party in the United States must look quite different than those of the Green
Party in Germany or the Basque National Party in Spain. By contrast, the Democrats in
the United States, the Christian Democrats in Germany and the People’s Party in Spain
are all, no doubt, similarly unconcerned about the distinction between fielding candidates in
90% or 95% of electoral districts throughout their respective countries.
Around the world, the distribution of party-level linkage figures seems to reflect this
“grim trigger” breaking point: once a party hits a certain size, it tends to enter uniformly
regardless of other considerations. Figure 2 presents three distributions of linkage figures
for parties of various sizes. In the first pane are very small parties that netted less than 5%
of the national vote; in the middle pane are parties of middling size that netted somewhere
between 5% and 20% of the vote; and the right pane shows the distribution of linkage figures
for parties netting in excess of 20% of the vote. It is immediately clear that there is not
much in the way of middle ground when it comes to linkage. Very small parties tend to enter
only a subset of districts. Middling parties begin to make the transition to extensive linkage
levels, with only a comparative few trying to hold onto more moderate levels of entry across
districts. For large parties, this sparsely-populated area in the middle of the distribution
virtually disappears altogether. Ultimately, there exists a systematic and gaping hole in
linkage levels across parties of different sizes (even across those parties operating within the
confines of the same country).
The story that emerges for voters living in different areas of the same country, then, is one
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Figure 2. Distribution of Party-Level Linkage Figures for Different Subsets of Party Size (percentage figures
refer to lagged national-level vote share).
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of ballot variability at the margins. On most ballots, we can expect a core of major, uniform
entrants accompanied by a (perhaps larger) roster of fringe offerings. On a strategic level,
this outcome is not terribly accommodating of voters; indeed, it demands a lot from them.
If the primary tasks for a voter are, first, to decide which party she most closely identifies
with and, second, to determine whether or not that party is a viable contender, it seems
that there are two ways to facilitate her decision. In the first scenario, ballots are uniform
and populated only by truly viable party offerings. Political elites have learned their lessons
over the course of multiple elections and either drop out of the race (if they are not viable)
or expand their patterns of contestation. All voters easily recognize these offerings and are
able to cast ballots for their most-preferred option without running the risk of wasting their
votes. In the second scenario, political parties – regardless of their size – recognize that they
are stronger in some areas of the country than in others. The cede territory when they know
the situation is hopeless. Ballots in this case are no longer uniform, but voters at least know
that the offerings on their ballot are all plausible options.
But neither scenario is realized in empirical reality. The parties that appear homogeneously across all ballots are at least sometimes bluffing (in the sense that they are ignoring
some important incentives crafted by macro-level institutions) and the parties that appear
only on a very small subset are unfamiliar to voters (and, by virtue of not appearing on
other ballots, voters cannot look to election outcomes in other areas of the country to make
conjectures about the outcomes of their own race). The tactic taken by political elites seems
to be to shift the burden to the voters and let the demand side of the market sort out the
supply side. In a sense, this finding presents very few challenges for studies of nationalization in voter support, which have generally relied on the assumption that major parties
enter everywhere (the “linkage prerequisite” to which I earlier referred), thereby allowing
demand-side vote distributions to be actually reflective of voters’ responses to more-or-less
uniform ballots (rather than arising incidentally from dramatic within-country variation in
ballot offerings). More problematic, however, are the implications of this finding for treating
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the outcomes of elections as fair-minded representations of some underlying collectively-held
preference ordering of a country’s political parties. With so much demanded of the voter
in sorting out the wheat from the chaff, we should hesitate to characterize electoral results
as mistake-free embodiments of “what the people wanted.” Exploring this nexus between
linkage and collective choice in greater depth is a potentially valuable subject for future
work.
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Appendix A: Party Age and Linkage
In addition to the size of a party (or, perhaps, its resource level), the age of a party ought
also to have some effect on the extent of its linkage across electoral districts. This is due to
the simple fact that individual parties face different electoral realities and, over time, will
necessarily adapt in different ways. A party that enters electoral competition and meets
with some initial success, for example, might branch out into additional districts over time.
By contrast, a newer party that fails to net much notice upon entering a handful of districts
may, over time, winnow down its efforts to a subset of districts before, ultimately, dropping
out of electoral competition altogether. Compiling data on party age is difficult in a large,
cross-national study such as this one (especially one that is concerned with very small parties
in addition to larger, more established parties) and attempts at integrating party age as a
variable in the party-level regression analysis repeatedly failed to return significant results.
However, in this appendix, I will briefly take up the issue in an effort to explain how individual
party-level ages can be considered in the aggregate to explain why we see increasing linkage
at the system-level over time.
For those countries in the data set for which I have a temporal series of election results
that begin with the inaugural democratic election (as determined by the Database of Political
Institutions), I can gain some traction on party age without having to delve deep into
the contextual specifics of individual countries. Specifically, parties that appeared with
some district-level vote total (no matter how small) in this inaugural election begin with an
age = 1 counter and those that did not are simply coded with missing values. Whenever a
party received a vote total in subsequent elections without having received a vote total in
the prior election, that party was at that point similarly coded with an age = 1 counter. For
subsequent elections in which these parties garnered some vote, the counter was increased
by one unit. Once (if) the party failed to subsequently receive any votes in any districts
(this serving as a proxy for its departure from electoral competition), it again assumed
missing values. For those countries in the data set for which I did not possess vote totals
133

for the inaugural democratic election, I was unable to code for party age; indeed, without
the inaugural benchmark, I cannot be sure what any given party’s age might be unless I
examined other sources of (context-rich and country-specific) data.
The temporal data coverage was such that I had uninterrupted data for the first (and
subsequent) elections for 26 (or little more than half) of the countries. These include a diverse
set of both established and newer democracies, single-member district and multimember
district electoral systems, as well as presidential and parliamentary systems. In the figure
below, I plot party age (for the first 10 elections) along the x-axis and party-level linkage levels
along the y-axis. As can be seen fairly readily from the graphic, the first election in which
parties compete (regardless of the age of the party system more generally) shows substantial
variation in linkage. Over the course of the second, third, and fourth elections, however,
a dramatic sorting effect emerges where parties either enter systematically more or fewer
districts (with the middle ground clearing out substantially). As we move into significantly
older parties, it is apparent that entering few districts is an unsustainable strategy; indeed,
the clump of low-linkage observations that pop up in the second, third, and fourth elections
have almost dissipated entirely at older ages.
Despite the visual trends, when it comes to the party-level hierarchical regression models
in this manuscript, including party age additively in the model fails to return any significant
findings (as does interacting party age with lagged national vote share to proxy for “previous
success” or “resource endowments”). This is probably due to the fact that there is less
statistical leverage to begin with (recall that we drop many parties from countries where I
am unable to code for party age). The effect of party age may also simply get overwhelmed
by the other variables that clearly play an important role in determining linkage levels.
At the system-level, however, the scatterplot manages to empirically underscore a point
that was argued theoretically: namely, that linkage should increase over time as non-viable
parties become better acquainted with their fates and drop out of electoral competition.
Obviously, there is more nuance at play (for these observations, party age and system age
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are only correlated with one another at r = 0.6), but the general trend makes conceptual
sense. Linkage is positively correlated with past performance (which I’ve taken as a proxy for
resource endowments), current performance (which I measure as national-level vote share),
and longevity. Other things being equal and if one has the resources, offering one’s platform
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across as many districts as possible is clearly a strategic best response.
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Figure A1: Scatterplot of Party-Level Linkage (Weighted by District Magnitude) Plotted Against Party
Age (in Number of Elections). Observations have been jittered slightly along the x-axis to better illustrate
areas of density.

135

Appendix B: System-Level Model Robustness Check
In this appendix, I present the results of a model that is identical to that used to model
system-level average linkage, but – instead of dropping those parties netting 1% or less of
the national vote before averaging linkage figures – I here drop those parties netting 5% or
less of the national vote before averaging linkage across parties. The results hold up well.
In particular, we can see that nascent party systems are still subject to systematically lower
levels of linkage. Increasing district magnitude drives up linkage and so does presidentialism.
Bicameralism fails again to achieve statistical significance.
Table B1: Multilevel Linear Regression Model of System-Level Linkage.

D.V.

Estimate

95% C.I.

Experience ≤ 1

-0.07

[ -0.10, -0.04 ]

Experience = 2

-0.03

[ -0.07, 0.00 ]

Experience = 3

-0.03

[ -0.06, 0.01 ]

Experience = 4

-0.04

[ -0.07, -0.01 ]

Log(District Magnitude)

0.03

[ 0.01, 0.05 ]

Federal System

-0.13

[ -0.20, -0.06 ]

Bicameral System

-0.02

[ -0.08, 0.04 ]

Presidential System

0.08

[ 0.02, 0.14 ]

Intercept

0.94

[ 0.89, 0.99 ]

2
σ̂ce

0.01
0.02

σ̂c2

N countries
N observations

47
472

Notes: The outcome variable was constructed as a system-level average across all parties after having dropped
those parties that failed to gain at least 5% of the national vote.
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Appendix C: Party-Level Model Robustness Check
In this appendix, I present the results of a model that is identical to that used to model
party-level linkage, but – instead of dropping those parties netting 1% or less of the national
vote – I drop those parties netting 5% or less of the vote. The results generally hold up well,
with variance in previous district-level vote shares emerging as a very strong predictor for
this subset of larger parties.
Table C1: Multilevel Linear Regression Model of Party-Level Linkage.

D.V.

Estimate

95% C.I.

New Democracy
Log(District Magnitude)
Federal System
Bicameral System
Presidential System

-0.01
0.05
-0.13
-0.07
0.07

[ -0.03, 0.02 ]
[ 0.02 0.07 ]
[ -0.26, 0.00 ]
[ -0.18, 0.04 ]
[ -0.06, 0.20 ]

Party Size
Lagged Vote Variance

0.18
-1.74

[ 0.03, 0.34 ]
[ -2.61, -0.88 ]

Party Size × Federal
Party Size × Bicameral
Party Size × President

0.16
0.30
-0.17

[ -0.10, 0.41 ]
[ 0.08, 0.53 ]
[ -0.46, 0.12 ]

Intercept

0.82

[ 0.73, 0.91 ]

2
σ̂cep

0.02
0.01
0.02

2
σ̂ep

σ̂c2

N countries
N parties
N observations

47
492
1,861

Notes: The outcome variable is linkage at the individual party level, but those parties that failed to net at
least 5% of the national vote are excluded from the data set.
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